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Abstract 
 
This thesis critically appraises the exceptions to the principle of autonomy in 
documentary credits. In appraising the exceptions, the central theme pursued is to 
address the question whether the application of the exceptions to the principle of 
autonomy is satisfactory.  In addressing this general question, the study pays special 
attention to English law on documentary credits. However, the thesis also looks at the 
comparable position in other common law jurisdictions, such as United States, Canada, 
Australia, Singapore, and Malaysia. 
 
Recently, in the different jurisdictions, opinion has not been consistent on what 
constitutes exceptions to the principle of autonomy in letters of credit. Apart from the 
traditional exception of fraud, recent English decisions to some extent have 
recognised illegality and express contractual restrictions on a beneficiary’s right to 
draw on a credit as compelling grounds on which the autonomy doctrine would be 
ignored. In other jurisdictions, other exceptions such as nullity and unconscionability 
have emerged. This dissertation assesses all these exceptions to the principle of 
autonomy with the aim of answering the question whether these exceptions facilitate 
documentary credits’ practice or as argued in some quarters, undermine the assurance 
of payment promised the seller/beneficiary.  
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 Chapter One 
 
1.0.                                    General Introduction 
 
The documentary credit1-characterized sometimes as ‘the life blood of commerce’2- 
retains its role as an instrument for financing international trade. Its development as a 
financing tool in international trade is a creation of modern commerce that involves 
parties trading long distances with at times neither previous commercial relationship 
nor being properly aware of parties’ financial position. In this kind of situation where 
parties sometimes are unaware of the other parties’ financial position, what the 
seller/beneficiary needs when dealing with a buyer/applicant with whom no previous 
commercial relationship exists is an assurance that before he makes shipping 
arrangements or parts with the goods that he will be paid after shipping the goods.  
These concerns of the seller/beneficiary3 with respect to his right to payment upon 
shipment of the goods remain a primary concern which documentary credits4  are 
designed to satisfy in international sales.  
                                                 
1
 A payment instrument that ought to be differentiated from “open” or “travellers” letter of credit which 
is a letter furnished by a banker or by a merchant of reputation to a person travelling overseas, 
addressed to the issuers’ correspondents, who were promised with reimbursement for amounts 
advanced to the beneficiary. It has to be noted that the popularity of travellers’ letters of credit 
diminished after the development of travellers cheques in 1909 by American Express Co. and has 
gradually become obsolete. See Peter Ellinger and Dora Neo, The Law and Practice of Documentary 
Letters of Credit (Hart Publishing 2009); Michael Bridge (ed), Benjamin’s Sale of Goods (8th edn, 
Sweet and Maxwell 2010) para 23-001. For detailed discussion on the origin of Documentary credits, 
see FR Sanborn, Origin of the Early English Maritime and Commercial Law (New York Press 1930) 
347. 
2
 RD Harbottle (Mercantile) Ltd v National Westminster Bank Ltd [1978] QB 146, 155 (Kerr LJ); 
Power Curber International Ltd v National Bank of Kuwait SAK [1981] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 394,400 
(Griffiths LJ); Intraco Ltd v Notis Shipping Corporation of Liberia; The Bhoja Trader [1981] 2 Lloyd’s 
Rep 256, 257 (Donaldson LJ); Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation v Kloecker &Co AG 
[1989] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 323, 330 (Hirst J). 
3
 Note also that there is equally a concern for the buyer/applicant who for the purposes of hedging his 
own position does not want to pay the price for the goods until the goods are no longer at the disposal 
of the seller. 
4
 It has to be noted that documentary credits are also used to cover payment obligations which do not 
arise from the shipment or supply of goods and hence does not require the presentation of shipping 
documents. 
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The documentary credit contract, despite being a creature of the seller’s and the 
buyer’s interest in the underlying transaction5 that gave rise to it, once issued has the 
fundamental characteristics of being independent of the underlying 
contract/transaction that brought it into being. This situation where the documentary 
credit contract is detached from the underlying contract is aptly captured by the 
autonomy doctrine. To emphasize this autonomy, a documentary credit is stated to be 
documentary in character. In this circumstance, the paying bank is prepared to pay the 
seller/beneficiary because it holds the documents as collateral security and would be 
prepared to make payment once the documents are conforming regardless of issues in 
the underlying transaction. Put differently, it is irrelevant to the bank whether the 
underlying contract involves the purchase of corn, machinery or oil. 6  The only 
exception traditionally recognized where the bank should refuse to pay under the 
credit occurs if it is proved to the appropriate standard that the documents, though 
apparently conforming on their face, are in fact fraudulent and the seller/beneficiary 
or his agent was involved in such fraud.7 
 
The emergence of fraud as an exception to the principle of autonomy has had its own 
legal implications. One of such implications is that the scope of the fraud rule varies 
from one common law jurisdiction to the other. Jurisdictions like Australia and 
Canada, in terms of enforcement of the principle, have developed a more robust and 
                                                 
5
 The point here is that the documentary credit contract is established because there is an underlying 
contract on the basis of which the documentary credit contract was established. This underlying 
contract sometimes relates to goods which are being exchanged between the buyer and the seller in an 
international business transaction. However, despite the credit contract taking its life from the 
underlying transaction, it is assumed to operate independently of the underlying contract that gives its 
life. 
6
 But the irrelevance of the underlying contract as to the right of a beneficiary to payment under the 
credit contract does not mean that where the exceptions operate, a beneficiary’s right to payment under 
the credit is unaffected. 
7
 This is known as the fraud exception to the principle of autonomy. 
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wider ground of interference. Jurisdictions like Singapore, while insisting on the 
restrictive approach of English law to the fraud rule, have developed some further 
exceptions like nullity and unconscionability. The primary implication of the fraud 
rule is that the perceived impregnability of documentary credits is no longer absolute 
with some circumstances justifying interference with the autonomy doctrine. These 
circumstances which could displace an otherwise absolute principle by way of being 
exceptions to this autonomy principle are central to the analysis undertaken in this 
thesis. 
 
1. 1. Overview of the Research 
 
As its main goal, the thesis examines critically the exceptions to the principle of 
autonomy in documentary credit transactions. The analysis, as reflected in the title of 
the thesis, centres fundamentally on documentary credits. However, bearing in mind 
that documentary credits and demand guarantees are both abstract payment 
instruments 8  that share similar characteristics, 9  the thesis, for the purposes of 
sustaining its arguments, at times analyses case law and secondary data10 dealing with 
both documentary credits and demand guarantees. The approach adopted in this thesis 
of treating documentary credits and demand guarantees as payment instruments 
sharing similar characteristics has the support of not only English jurisdiction but 
other common law jurisdictions like Canada, Singapore and Malaysia that have 
                                                 
8
 The position that documentary credits and demand guarantees are abstract payment instruments is 
properly reflected in case law. Its abstract nature arises because the credit contracted is said to be 
autonomous to the underlying contract or transaction upon which it is based. See Hamzeh Malas & 
Sons v British Imex Industries Ltd [1958] 2 QB 127; Howe Richardson Scale Co. Ltd v Polimex-Cekop 
[1978] 1 Lloyd's Rep 161; R D Harbottle (Mercantile) Ltd. v National Westminster Bank Ltd [1978] 
QB 146. 
9
 See Howe Richardson Scale Co. Ltd v Polimex-Cekop [1978] 1 Lloyd's Rep 161165 and Bolivinter 
Oil S A v Chase Manhattan Bank N.A. [1984] 1 WLR 392, 393. 
10
 In this case,  I refer to opinion expressed in books, articles and other published materials that are 
different from case law and statutes. 
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regularly maintained that the relevant legal principles applicable are the same in both 
types of case and judicial authorities have sustained this assumption by using 
authorities interchangeably.11   
 
To facilitate the discussion necessary to deal with the topic, the thesis analyses: 
(a) Documentary credits, the autonomy doctrine and the rationale behind it, 
(b)  The established fraud exception to the principle of autonomy in documentary 
credit; 
(c) The rationale and scope of the exception; 
(d) The reason why it established itself as a defence capable of breaching the 
autonomy doctrine; 
(e) The other exceptions to the principle of autonomy in documentary credits; 
(f) Arguments in support of and against their recognition and whether their 
recognition in any way affects documentary credit practice. 
 
In addressing the above issues, the thesis aims to answer some crucial research 
questions viz: 
 
(a) How satisfactory is the present approach of English law with respect to the 
scope of the fraud exception and to what extent does it defeat or facilitate the 
letter of credit instrument? 
 
                                                 
11Edward Owen Engineering Ltd v Barclays Bank International Ltd [1978] QB 159; Howe Richardson 
Scale  Co Ltd v  Polimex- Cekop [1978] 1Lloyd’s Rep161. 
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(b) To what extent is illegality a defence to the principle of autonomy in 
documentary credits and to what extent is the scope of the exception properly 
defined? 
 
(c)  Apart from fraud and illegality, are there convincing reason(s) for the judicial 
recognition of some other exceptions to the principle of autonomy in 
documentary credits? In addressing this question, the thesis investigates such 
other exceptions as nullity, beneficiary’s recklessness, unconscionability, and 
finally discusses contractual restrictions on a beneficiary’s right to draw on a 
credit.  
 
 
(d) Taking into consideration that documentary credit law represents an area of 
law that is constantly changing and embracing wisdom that did not previously 
exist, the thesis, as part of its conclusion, suggests approaches to the 
exceptions that the author deems preferable. Put differently, the thesis explores 
whether a change of attitude from the current predominant approach that 
emphasizes the supremacy of the autonomy doctrine even in the face of strong 
countervailing consideration(s) ought to be revisited. The recommendation 
offered is based on the information gathered from the detailed and critical 
analysis of issues under consideration.  
 
1. 2. Methodology of the Research 
 
The thesis adopts an approach that is analytical and not simply descriptive of the 
issues discussed. It critically examines the research topic and the issues raised there in, 
6 
 
by principally analysing case laws, statutes and other legal instruments related to the 
issues under consideration. It also makes an extensive use of other secondary 
literature related to the topic. 
 
The thesis, for the purposes of ensuring that the issues analysed are clear, adopts a 
method that analyses the exceptions in the order that simplifies the understanding of 
the exceptions. In this regard, fraud as a primary exception to the principle of 
independence is analysed first. After examining fraud, exceptions, which though not 
based on fraud but are perceived to be an extension of the fraud exception, are 
examined. Here the thesis investigates the extent to which it is appropriate to say that 
issues that are detached from the fraud of the beneficiary or his agent could in fact 
provide a good defence that could displace the autonomy principle. Specific issues, 
emerging as separate exceptions, which seem to have evolved or are still evolving in 
the course of judicial pronouncement on the fraud exception are nullity, 
unconscionability or bad faith and beneficiary’s recklessness. Other exceptions whose 
operations are predicated on some other legal considerations that are different from 
fraud are considered. The exceptions considered here include illegality and express 
contractual restrictions on beneficiary’s right to draw on the credit. 
 
Finally, the thesis addresses the research questions by comparatively analysing the 
legal positions (but not in all circumstances) in other common law jurisdictions 
namely Canada, United States, Australia, Singapore and Malaysia. The objective is to 
analyse the legal practices in other common law jurisdictions with respect to the 
exceptions and use it as a yardstick for judging the merits or satisfactoriness of the 
7 
 
arguments that have been advanced mostly in English law against the widening of the 
exceptions. 
 
1. 3. The Thesis Outline 
 
The thesis chapter structure reflects a sequential presentation of arguments that 
address the key research questions. It is divided into nine chapters. Overall, the thesis 
begins with a general introduction and ends with a general conclusion.  
 
Chapter One is the introductory chapter. The chapter highlights the general overview 
of the thesis, the research methodology adopted and overall structure of the thesis. 
 
Chapter Two deals with the nature of documentary credits and analyses the relevance 
of the principle of autonomy. The chapter looks at the general components of 
documentary credits. It introduces the various contracts involved in a documentary 
credits transaction and also outlines the basic features of each layer of contract.  It 
highlights the cardinal principle evident in documentary credits known as the 
autonomy principle and the role it plays in documentary credits. This chapter also 
examines the nature and relevance of this doctrine. It explains how the strict 
adherence to the doctrine of autonomy has shaped the practice and perception of 
documentary credits in the different legal jurisdictions. It also analyses the extent to 
which the strict interpretation of the autonomy doctrine is well founded. Finally, the 
chapter closes with a discussion of the functions of documentary credit and the 
different ways in which it can be utilized. 
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Chapter Three analyses the issues relating to the fraud exception to the principle of 
autonomy in documentary credits. It is divided into two parts. Part One analyses the 
general issues relating to fraud. In this respect, it notes that the autonomy principle is 
central to documentary credit. However, the autonomy principle admits of an 
important exception if the beneficiary of the undertaking fraudulently seeks payment 
when he has no right to payment. Courts of different legal jurisdictions have in a long 
line of cases acknowledged fraud as an exception to the principle of autonomy in 
documentary credits. But the parameters or scope of the fraud exception to the 
autonomy principle remain largely imprecise. The reason for this lies in the way that 
the different national courts have defined the scope of fraud that is capable of 
constituting an exception to the principle of autonomy in documentary credits. Also 
the standard of proof required to establish such fraud has been a subject of different 
treatment from the various jurisdictions. The chapter takes a comparative approach to 
the issue of fraud with the objective of establishing if the English approach to the 
fraud rule is in the main satisfactory. It ends with a question as to whether there is 
room for some other exceptions to the principle of autonomy. The second part of the 
analysis relating to the fraud rule concentrates on fraud in deferred payment and the 
effect of the current UCP 600 in relation to such fraud. It seeks to address the question 
whether the problems created by the Banco Santander Case has been resolved by this 
latest edition of the UCP 600. 
 
Chapter Four assesses the nullity exception in documentary credits which is an 
extension of the fraud rule. Nullity as an exception that is distinct from fraud has been 
recognised by the Singapore courts. But in England it has been held that the nullity 
exception is not part of the English law. The chapter considers the Singapore 
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approach to the exception and the extent to which its recognition is founded on sound 
legal principle bearing in mind the autonomy rule. It also considers the scope and 
rationale for the exception. Finally the chapter concludes with an examination of the 
arguments for or against the nullity exception with the objective of assessing whether 
it should be recognised in other jurisdictions. 
 
Chapter Five considers whether recklessness of the beneficiary in tendering a 
document forged by a third party is an exception to the autonomy principle and 
capable of excusing payment where his dishonesty could not be established.  
Beneficiary’s recklessness traces its origin from the dictum of the court in the 
Singapore case of Lambias and has been favourably commented on by the English 
Court of Appeal in Montrod’s case. The chapter considers to what extent the 
enthusiasm generated by the dicta of the courts in the case of Lambias and Montrod 
regarding beneficiary’s recklessness as a possible exception to the autonomy principle 
should be welcomed or whether its recognition runs contrary to accepted documentary 
credit practice. In addressing the question relating to beneficiary’s recklessness, 
consideration is given to the question whether the beneficiary owes a duty to act 
carefully so as to safeguard the issuing bank and/or the applicant against being 
defrauded by a third party who may be involved in the preparation of the documents 
stipulated in the credit. 
 
Chapter Six deals with the unconscionability exception and the focus of this chapter is 
a consideration of whether unconscionability can constitute a separate ground upon 
which the independent undertaking in documentary credits can be breached. It then 
explores the question whether unconscionability should be recognised in English law.  
10 
 
 
Chapter Seven examines the illegality exception to the principle of autonomy in 
documentary credits. Under English law, the illegality exception is gradually gaining 
ground as an exception to the autonomy rule in letters of credit. This is evident from 
prevailing judicial pronouncements. The chapter looks at the nature of the illegality 
exception. It analyzes the authorities that are a pointer in the direction of its 
recognition as well as decisions that have acknowledged it. It aims to define and 
analyse the scope of the exception and the standard for establishing it. It also weighs 
the exception by analysing the arguments for or against it. The chapter concludes by 
addressing in a comparative manner illegality issues in letter of credit from other 
jurisdictions with the view to understanding the law and practice in place in other 
jurisdictions.   
 
Chapter Eight deals with contractual restrictions on the beneficiary’s right to draw on 
the credit. It discusses the exception to ascertain to what extent it is accurate to argue 
that the principle of autonomy is undermined in a case where the beneficiary had 
expressly agreed with the applicant for the credit not to draw down the credit unless 
certain conditions are fulfilled and a draw down is sought to be prevented on the 
grounds of non-fulfilment. 
 
Chapter Nine summarizes the issues and conclusions arrived at. It aims to take a 
position based on the issues raised and discussed in the preceding chapters. It 
endeavours to point out issues that probe the current thinking (accepted practice of 
documentary credits law exceptions) with a view to assessing the satisfactoriness of 
the current position of the law. 
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                                                       Chapter Two 
 
2.0.  Nature of Documentary Credit and Principle of Autonomy 
 
2. 1. Introduction 
 
Amidst the various ways in which the price of exported goods may be paid, 
documentary credit12 plays a vital role in international sales. Its origin is traceable to 
the activities of merchants concerned with the ways of resolving the conflicting 
interests between the parties to a contract of sale. On the one hand, the seller does not 
want to give up the control of the goods before he has received the purchase price. On 
the other hand, the buyer of goods, for the purposes of hedging his own position, does 
not want to pay the price for the goods until the goods are no longer at the disposal of 
the seller. It is to resolve this conflict between the buyer and the seller arising from 
their interest in the goods that the documentary credit was developed.13 
 
The primary concern of this chapter is to spell out the fundamental issues relating to 
documentary credits, whose understandings are necessary for a proper appreciation of 
the issues subsequently discussed in later chapters. The chapter is divided into 
sections and generally deals with the meaning of documentary credit, the mechanism 
                                                 
12
 Documentary credit has already occasioned one of the greatest outpourings of legal writings. Notable 
textbook in the area include: Richard King,  Gutteridge and Megrah’s Law of Bankers Commercial 
Credits (Europa Publication 2001); Peter Ellinger, Benjamin’s Sale of Goods (10th edn, Sweet & 
Maxwell 2002); Michael Brindle & Ray Cox Law of Bank Payment (Sweet &Maxwell 2004) Ch 8; 
Mark Hapgood, Paget’s Law of Banking (Lexis Nexis 2007) ch. 34;  Ewan McKendrick, Goode on 
Commercial Law (Penguin 2009) Ch. 35; Ali Malek and David Quest Documentary Credits (4th edn, 
Tottel Publishing 2009); Raymond Jacks, Documentary Credit (Trottel 2009); Peter Ellinger & Dora 
Neo, The Law and Practice of Documentary Credit (Hart Publishing 2010).  
13
 Michael Bridge (ed),  Benjamin’s Sale of Goods (8th edn, Sweet and Maxwell 2010) para 23- 001. 
12 
 
of operations and the parties to it. It discusses the principle of autonomy which 
together with the doctrine of strict compliance form the cardinal rules that underpin 
the law and practice of documentary credits. Some aspect of the sections, deal with 
the different legal instruments that regulate and govern documentary credit practice. 
 
2. 2. The Concept of Documentary Credits 
 
The documentary credit was once described by Professor Kozolchyk14 as a type of 
mercantile currency embodying an abstract promise of payment, which possesses a 
high, though not total, immunity from attack on the ground of breach of duty of the 
seller to the buyer. This apt definition of documentary credits raises a further question 
inherent in the definition itself as to the circumstance(s) contemplated in the definition 
under which the high immunity evident in the abstract promise to pay will not be 
total.15 Another eminent academic,16 referred to a documentary credit as ‘a money 
promise which is independent of the transaction that gives it birth and which is 
considered binding when received by the beneficiary without acceptance, 
consideration, reliance, or execution in solemn form.’17 
 
In similar vein, the Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits (UCP 
600) defines documentary credit as an arrangement, however named or described, that 
                                                 
14
 See Kozolchyk, ‘Letters of credit’, (1973) in IX International Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law 
(ed K zweigert and Ulrich Drobnig, 1973) Chapter 5 at pp138-143; Roy Goode ‘Abstract Payment 
Undertakings’ in  Peter Cane and Jane Stapleton (ed), Essays for Patrick Atiyah (OUP 1991) 1079, 
1098. See also the definition offered by Professor Ellinger, where he argued that documentary credits 
should be treated as a sui generis instrument embodying a promise which by mercantile usage is 
enforceable without consideration. E P Ellinger, Documentary Credit (1970) ch.IV cited in Ewan 
McKendric Goode on Commercial Law ( Penguin 2009) 1078. 
15
 It has to be noted that these circumstances albeit restricted to those situation where they displace the 
autonomy principle remain the major interest pursued in this thesis.  
16
 See Roy Goode ‘Abstract Payment Undertakings’ in Peter Cane and Jane Stapleton (eds), Essays for 
Patrick Atiyah (OUP 1991). 
17
 ibid at 209. 
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is irrevocable and thereby constitutes a definite undertaking of the issuing bank to 
honour a complying presentation.18 In this regard, a complying presentation is also 
defined in the UCP 600 as ‘a presentation that is in accordance with the terms and 
conditions of the credit, the applicable provisions of this rule and international 
standard banking practice.’19 
 
From the foregoing definition of documentary credits, some issues are worth pointing 
out. The first is that the contracts of documentary credits though having a binding 
force20 does not follow the normal rules of contract. It still remains binding in the 
absence of the normal contract law rules of consideration and acceptance. 21  The 
explanation logically given for its binding force in the absence of such ingredients like 
consideration (being ingredients required to make a contractual obligation binding) is 
that its application is based on mercantile usage.22  Secondly and more importantly, is 
that the undertaking is independent. The nature of the independence of the 
undertaking is captured by the Professor Kozolchyk23 who described its independence 
in terms that reflect documentary credits as possessing a high, though not total 
immunity from attack on the ground of breach of duty of the seller to the buyer. As 
will be reflected later in the subsequent chapters, the thesis analyses the circumstances 
                                                 
18
 Article 2, UCP 600, note also that only irrevocable credit is described as credit and is different from 
the UCP 500 that describes both revocable and irrevocable credit. 
19
 ibid. 
20
 Article 7 (b) where the UCP 600 stated that an issuing bank is irrevocably bound to honour as of the 
time it issues the credit. 
21
 Consideration and acceptance are essential ingredients that make a contract binding in ordinary rules 
of contract. 
22
 EP Ellinger,  Documentary Letters of  Credit- A Comparative  Study (University of Singapore Press 
1970); Roy Goode, ‘Abstract Payment Undertakings’ in Peter Cane and Jane Stapleton (eds), Essays 
for Patrick Atiyah (OUP 1991) 225. 
23
 See Kozolchyk ‘Letters of Credit’ (1973) in K Zweigert and K Drobnig (eds), IX International 
Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law (Mohr Siebeck and Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1973) 138-143. 
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under which the high immunity24  on the ground of breach of duty of the seller to the 
buyer could be displaced. 
 
2. 3. Parties to Documentary Credit 
 
In line with the current definition of documentary credits, 25  five contractual 
relationships26 arise in a transaction in which an irrevocable documentary credit is 
issued.27 These basic contractual relationships exclude the addition of parties through 
negotiation of drafts or the transfer of credit.28  The five contractual relationships 
which arise in a typical transaction involving an irrevocable credit are: (1) a contract 
of sale between the buyer (the applicant for the credit) and the seller (the beneficiary), 
(2) a contract between the buyer and the issuing bank containing the terms on which 
the letter of credit is opened, (3) a contract between the issuing bank and the bank 
which confirms or advises the credit (the confirming  or advising bank)  embodying 
the  advising or confirming bank’s mandate to advise and/or confirm the credit, 
collection of documents and payment on acceptance or negotiation, (4) a contract 
between the issuing bank and the seller containing the issuing bank’s undertaking to 
the seller to pay him or accept or negotiate his draft(s)  provided that the seller has 
presented the stipulated documents in accordance with the terms of the credit and (5) 
a contract between the confirming bank and the seller containing the confirming 
bank’s additional undertaking to the seller to pay him or accept or negotiate his draft(s) 
                                                 
24
 High immunity in this case referring to the impregnability of documentary credits as reflected in the 
doctrine of autonomy of the credit. 
25
  See the definition of the UCP 600 in article 2. 
26
 For more detailed analysis of the parties to a documentary credit, see Ewan McKendrick (ed), Goode 
on Commercial Law (4th edn, Penguin 2009) 1087. 
27
 Note that in United City Merchant (Investment) Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada [1983] 1 AC 168, 182, 
Lord Diplock identified only four autonomous but interconnected contract in a documentary credit 
sales. Lord Diplock here excluded the contract between the issuing bank and the seller/beneficiary 
embodying the issuing bank’s undertaking to pay upon presentation of complying documents. 
28
 Roy Goode, Commercial Law (Penguin 2004) 978. 
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provided that the seller has presented the stipulated documents in accordance with the 
terms of the credit.29  
 
Figure 2: The Diagram below illustrates the five parties to documentary credits. (Own 
Illustration) 
 
 
 
The above diagram represents (barring the addition of other parties in the contract 
through negotiation of draft or transfer of credit) the five main parties to a 
                                                 
29
 See Standard Chartered Bank v Pakistan National shipping corporation (No 2) [1998] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 
218 and [2001] 1QB 167; Bank of Credit & Commerce Hong Kong Ltd (in Liquidation) v Sonali Bank 
[1995] 1Lloyd’s Rep 227. 
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documentary credit in a hypothetical case of a Nigerian importer/buyer and an English 
Exporter/seller in London. Note the double-arrowed lines showing the two-way 
relationship between the parties to documentary credits –leading to the five 
contractual relationships that arise in a typical transaction in which an irrevocable 
documentary credit is issued. 
 
2. 3.1. The Underlying Contract of Sale 
 
Basically, the contract between the buyer and seller is the root contract from which all 
contracts stem. The seller’s right to demand a letter of credit, and the nature of the 
credit to which he is entitled, depends on the terms of the contract of sale. On the 
other hand, the buyer must ensure that the letter of credit issued to the seller is that 
prescribed by the contract. Fulfilment of this obligation is a condition precedent to the 
seller’s duty to perform his delivery obligations.30 For example if the letter of credit 
stipulates a bill of lading as one of the shipping documents when the contract permits 
seller to tender a delivery order, the letter of credit will be defective and can be 
rejected by the seller.31 If a nonconforming letter of credit is tendered and rejected, the 
buyer may cure the defect by procuring the issue of a new and conforming letter of 
credit if still within the time limit.32 However, if he fails to do so or is out of time, he 
commits a repudiatory breach, which entitles the seller to treat the contract as 
discharged33and to recover damages from him. It may also be noted that if the seller 
                                                 
30
  Garcia v Page & Co Ltd (1936) 55 LI L Rep 391; Etablissments Chinbaux SARL v Harbourmaster 
Ltd [1955] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 303. 
31
  See Roy Goode Commercial Law (3rd edn, Penguin 2004) 979, (4th edn, Pengiun 2009) 1087. 
32
 Forbes, Forbes, Campbell & Co v Stanley & Co (1921) 9 LI L Rep 202. 
33
 Trans Trust SPRL v Danubian Trading Co Ltd [1952] 1Lloyd’s Rep 348. 
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elects to waive the breach and accept a nonconforming letter of credit, he loses his 
right to complain of breach34 
 
It should be noted that a term in the contract of sale providing for payment by letters 
of credit is for the interest of both parties. Hence, the seller is not ordinarily entitled to 
demand payment in any other way nor to sue for the price during the pendency of the 
credit or complain of non-payment by the buyer during this period.35 The letter of 
credit, like the bill of exchange, is considered to be taken as conditional payment 
unless otherwise agreed, and during the lifetime of the credit, the seller’s right to sue 
for the price is suspended. If the credit is honoured, that constitutes payment under the 
contract of sale. If it is dishonoured, the seller’s right to sue the buyer for the price or 
for damages revives.36 
 
In the same vein, the buyer is generally not entitled to call for the tender of documents 
in a manner inconsistent with the letter of credit arrangements prescribed by the 
contract of sale. So, if pursuant to that contract (or a later arrangement or 
understanding by the parties) the letter of credit issued to the seller calls for the tender 
of document to the advising bank, the seller is not obliged to tender the documents 
directly to the buyer or to the issuing bank or to anyone other than the advising 
bank.37 
 
                                                 
34
 In this regard, no question of damages as for breach of warranty arises; by waiving the breach, the 
seller assents to the letter of credit in the form in which it is issued. 
35
 See exception as expressed in Mann (E D and F) Ltd v Nigerian Sweets and Confectionery Co Ltd 
[1977] 2 Lloyd's Rep 50, in situation where the letter of credit has failed due to the issuing bank going 
into administration. In this case, the claimant/ beneficiary could proceed against the buyer directly for 
the price agreed in the contract of sale or sue for damages for breach of their contractual promise to pay 
by letter of credit. See also WJ Alan &Co v L Nasr Export [1972] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 313. 
36
 See EP Ellinger, ‘Does an Irrevocable Credit Constitute Payment’ (1977) 40 MLR 91. 
37
  Roy Goode, Commercial Law (3rd edn, Penguin  2004) 980. 
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As to the time of the opening of the credit, subject to any express provisions in the 
contract which gives the parties the liberty to contract according to their own terms, 
the letter of credit has to be opened within reasonable time38 This means a reasonable 
time calculated back from the date of the shipment, not calculated forward from the 
date of conclusion of the contract.39 Taking the first date of shipment as the starting 
point, the buyer has, it is thought, to open the credit a sufficient time in advance of 
that event to enable the seller to know before he sends the goods to the docks that his 
payment will be secured by the credit for which it is stipulated.40 
 
The duration of credit or the date of expiration is a very vital statement in the letter of 
credit. In the absence of such a statement, the implication is merely that the credit 
endures for a reasonable time, a somewhat vague concept that leaves the seller in a 
state of uncertainty as to whether he is covered for the full shipment period and as to 
the latest date by which a tender of document is acceptable. 
 The UCP 600 re-emphasized the crucial nature of this statement in letter of credit. 
Article 6(d)(i)41 provides: 
 
‘A credit must state an expiry date for presentation. An expiry date stated for honour 
or negotiation will be deemed to be an expiry date for presentation’ 
 
                                                 
 
39
 This is an implied term of the contract. See Diamond Cutting Works Federation v Triefus & Co Ltd 
[1956] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 216, 225. 
40
 Sinaison- Teicher Inter-American Grain Corporation v Oilcakes and Oilseeds Trading Co Ltd [1954] 
1WLR 935. 
41
 UCP 500 Art. 42(a).  
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The UCP further contains detailed provisions for the ascertainment of the expiry date 
and its extension should it fall on a day when the bank is closed42 or in case of 
interruption of the bank’s business. 43 
 
Finally, in terms of rejection of the goods, the acceptance of documents under a letter 
of credit does not preclude the buyer from subsequently rejecting the goods 
themselves if on arrival they are found not to conform to the contract of sale.44 
 
 
2.3.2. The Contract between the Buyer and the Issuing Bank 
 
Here, pursuant to the contract of sale, the buyer requests his own bankers to open a 
documentary credit in favour of the seller. The relationship between the issuing bank 
and the buyer is that of a banker and customer.  The buyer completes an application 
form provided by the banker. The terms of the contract are set out in details in the 
Issuing Bank’s standard form of application, which normally incorporates the UCP. In 
English practice, the contract is usually a unilateral contract in which the buyer’s 
submission of the application constitutes an offer which the issuing bank accepts by 
conduct in issuing the letter of credit.45 The issuing bank owes the usual duties of a 
banker strictly to observe the terms of the mandate,46 and to act in other respects with 
reasonable care and skill in relation to the credit, except so far as these duties are 
                                                 
42
 See Art.29 (a) and (b), UCP 500 Art.44. 
43
 UCP 600, Art.36, UCP 500 Art. 17. 
44
  Here, the buyer’s right to reject defective or nonconforming goods is not affected by the fact that the 
defect or nonconformity was apparent on the face of the documents accepted by the issuing bank. One 
rational explanation for this is that in accepting the documents, the paying or confirming bank acts as 
principal, not as the buyer’s agent. Hence, it would seem that the buyer is entitled to reject even for 
defect apparent on the face of the documents, which he would not be entitled to do if the documents 
had been accepted by him or his agent. 
45
 Ewan McKendrick (ed), Goode on Commercial Law (4th edn, Penguin 2009) 1089. 
46
 ibid 1089. 
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effectively qualified by the contract. In particular, the issuing bank is responsible for 
ensuring that the letter of credit issued to the seller complies strictly with the 
instructions contained in the application for the credit and that payment, acceptance or 
negotiation is effected only on presentation of documents which fully accord with the 
terms of the credit. 
 
It need not be over-emphasized that the letters of credit issued by the issuing bank to 
the seller constitutes an autonomous engagement in which the issuing bank acts as 
principal, not as the agent of the buyer.47 It simply follows from the above that the 
buyer is not entitled to give instructions to the issuing bank to withhold payment or to 
deviate from the terms of the credit. The issuing bank is both entitled and obliged to 
ignore any such instructions so long as the documents are presented within the period 
of the credit and duly comply with its provisions.  
 
Also, if the credit is not honoured, the issuing bank is obliged to indemnify the buyer 
against any liability he may incur from the seller.48 On the contrary, where the issuing 
bank makes payment without authority against non-complying presentation, 49  the 
buyer, though not entitled to reject conforming goods from the seller, may as between 
himself and the issuing bank decline to adopt the transaction, on account of breach of 
mandate.50 In this case, the issuing bank cannot debit the buyer with the price paid or 
with remuneration for its services, while the buyer for his part is taken to have 
                                                 
47RM Goode, Commercial law (3rd edn, Penguin 2004) 982. Note also that in some authorities like 
Bank Melli Iran v Barclays Bank [1951] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 267, a relationship between the issuing bank 
and the instructing bank which is similar to the relationship between an issuing bank and applicant was 
referred to as that of agency. Note also the dictum of Devling J. in Midland Bank v Seymour [1955] 2 
Lloyd’s Rep 147, 153. 
48
 Ewan McKendrick (ed), Goode on Commercial Law (Penguin 2009) 1090. 
49
 If he acts promptly, the buyer may be able to obtain an injunction to restrain such payment. 
50
 Ewan McKendrick (ed), Goode on Commercial Law (Penguin 2009)1090. 
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rejected (abandoned) the goods to the issuing bank, in whom they will then vest51 In 
addition, the buyer may claim damages for any loss reasonably foreseeable by the 
issuing bank as likely to flow from the breach.52 
 
The buyer as an alternative to rejecting the documents may waive the breach or accept 
the documents without prejudice to his right to damage for any resulting loss. Here the 
buyer will be deemed to have waived any nonconformity if he obtains delivery of the 
goods from the carrier without production of the bill of lading53 in circumstances 
where this needs to be tendered under the credit. Where this is the case, it may be 
noted that the buyer has no right to take the goods from the carrier and it would be 
fraud on the seller from the buyer, having wrongfully procured the goods, to prevent 
payment under the credit. At the moment, there seems not to be any English case law 
on the subject of acceptance of documents under reservation of the right to damages54 
and thus no adequate guide to the measure of damages. 
 
2. 3.3. The Contract between the Issuing Bank and the Advising Bank 
 
The issuing bank begins the inter-bank contractual relationships when it asks another 
bank, usually in the seller’s country, to advise the seller (beneficiary) of the credit or 
to confirm the credit. The contract is made between the issuing bank and the advising 
                                                 
51
  R Goode, Commercial Law (Penguin  2004) 980.  
52
 Here damages are recoverable under the rule in Hadley v Baxendale (1854) 9Exch341. 
53
  It may be noted that at present, carriers sometimes agree to release goods without the bill of lading 
against guarantees and warranties. This takes care of situations where the preparation and delivery of 
the bill of lading is delayed with the result that goods arrive before it. See generally RM Goode, 
Proprietary Rights and Insolvency in Sales Transactions (2nd edn 1989); For latest edition, see Roy 
Goode and Simon Mills, Proprietary Rights and Insolvency in Sales Transactions (3rd edn, Sweet and 
Maxwell 2009). 
54
 This may be due to allegation of wrongful honour of credit being resolved mainly through out of 
court settlement. 
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bank when the later signifies its acceptance of the terms to the issuing bank.55 Once 
acceptance has taken place, then, the banks are bound to carry out the terms of their 
obligation. The advising bank must comply strictly with the instructions in the letter 
of credit, failing which it cannot claim reimbursement or remuneration from the 
issuing bank.56 
 
In terms of the duty or role of the advising bank, it is principally to advise the 
beneficiary about the opening of the credit on his behalf by the issuing bank. In doing 
so, the advising bank is acting on the mandate of the issuing bank and is commonly 
perceived as the agent of the issuing bank.57 In the capacity of the advising bank as 
the issuing bank’s correspondent, no contract exists between the advising bank and 
the beneficiary and in relation to the credit, it does not promise to honour the credit. 
Also, the advising bank does not have a contractual relationship with the applicant. 
The reason for this is that the issuing bank, although opening the credit at the request 
of the applicant and using the advising bank to notify the beneficiary of the opening of 
the credit, it (issuing bank) deals with the advising bank in its own capacity and not as 
an agent of the applicant.58 
 
So far as communications between the banks are concerned, the UCP now provide for 
“teletransmissions”,59 a term that appears to cover cable, telegram and telex, as well 
as telefax and telephone. 
                                                 
55
 The confirming bank acts as the agent of the issuing bank: Credit Agricole Indosuez v Muslim 
Commercial Bank Ltd [2002] 1 All ER (Com) 172. 
56
 However, the advising bank’s wrongful acceptance of the documents will probably bind the issuing 
bank and the seller if within the scope of the advising bank’s apparent authority. 
57
 See Peter  Ellinger and Dora Neo, The Law and Practice of Documentary Letters of Credit ( Hart 
Publishing 2010) 177. 
58
 ibid 178. 
59
 Article 11, UCP 500. 
23 
 
 
Where the issuing bank instructs an advising bank ‘by any teletransmission’ to advise 
a credit, and intends the mail confirmation to be the ‘operative credit instrument’, the 
teletransmission must state ‘full details to follow’ or some similar expression. The 
“operative credit instrument” must then follow without delay.60 
 
If the advising bank receives instructions that are not clear, they have a choice either 
to give the beneficiary a preliminary notification for information only, and, of course, 
without responsibility; or not saying anything.61 Much, however, will depend on the 
circumstances, but usually the advising bank is expected to verify the facts contained 
in the issuing bank’s instruction before making any notification. 
 
 
2.3.4. The Contract Between the Issuing Bank and the seller 
 
At this level in the chain of relationships, the issuing bank undertakes that payment 
will be made on due presentation of documents.62 The issuing bank’s undertaking to 
make payment, though given in response to the buyer’s request, is given by the 
issuing bank as principal and not as an agent. It follows that if the issuing banker 
accepts inadvertently a tender of nonconforming documents, then, while this may be a 
breach of his duty to the buyer under the agreement between them, the buyer, as a 
stranger to the separate contract generated by the letter of credit, has no locus standi 
to complain that the issuing bank’s acceptance of the tender was not valid and binding 
                                                 
60
  Article 11C, UCP 500. 
61
 UCP, Art. 12. 
62
  For some exceptional cases in which payment may be refused despite the conformity of the 
documents, - see Group Josi Re v Walbrook Insurance Co Ltd [1966] 1Lloyd’s Rep 345; Mahonia Ltd 
v J P Morgan Chase [2003] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 911; Solo Industries Ltd v Canara Bank [2001] 1WLR 1800. 
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for the purpose of the contract.63 The buyer must base any claim he wishes to make on 
breach of his contract with the issuing bank, and/ or breach of the underlying contract 
of sale with the seller.64  
 
If the documents do not conform to the credit, the issuing bank has various options 
open to it. It may consult its customer, the buyer,65 to see whether he is willing to 
waive the discrepancy, which in most cases he will as the commercial motive of the 
buyer is to obtain the goods and not to rely on technical points to reject the documents. 
However, the issuing bank may reject the documents66 or pay under reserve. The 
effect of paying under reserve is to safeguard itself in circumstances where the buyer 
fails to ratify its action. In this case, it may be entitled to recover the payment.67  
Where the issuing bank decides to reject the documents, as not in conformity with a 
credit, it must inform the party from whom it received the documents within a 
reasonable time, not exceeding seven banking days following the receipt of the 
documents.68 The notice must state all the discrepancies in respect of which the bank 
refuses the documents.69 The bank must also state whether it is holding the documents 
at the disposal of or is returning them to the presenter and if the bank fails in this duty, 
                                                 
63
 See the legal perception of the relationship between the issuing bank and buyer as it relates to the 
seller from the dictum of Sir Christopher Staughton in Credit Agricole Indosuez v Muslim Commercial 
Bank [2000] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 87 where the learned judge stated that the undertaking given by the issuing 
bank, though given in response to the buyer’s request, is given by the issuing bank as principal or at 
best a commission agent. 
64
 As it is on the terms of those contracts that any remedy which it pursues against the issuing bank can 
legally be predicated 
65
 Note that where the documents are presented to the advising bank as the confirming bank, the 
advising bank’s consultation (if any) will be with the issuing bank who, in turn, may consult the buyer. 
66
 See Bankers Trust Co v State Bank of India [1991] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 443 where Lloyd LJ expressed the 
view that the issuing bank cannot rely on any consultation with the buyer as extending its time of 
rejection. Note that the UCP 600 in Article 16 (b) has endorsed the position adopted by Lloyd LJ. 
67
 Banque de l’Indochine et de Suez SA v J.H Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd [1982] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 476. 
68
 Note that UCP 600 has jettisoned the use of  “reasonable time”, see also Article 13(b), 14(d)(ii) 
69
 UCP 500. Art.14 (d) (ii).  UCP 600 Art. 16 
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it is precluded from claiming that the documents do not constitute a complying 
presentation.70 
 
2. 3.5. The contract Between the Advising Bank and the Seller 
 
It may be noted that English law does not recognize any privity of contract between 
the advising bank and the buyer.71 It then follows that if the advising bank advises the 
letter of credit in erroneous terms or pays the credit against non-complying 
presentation, the buyer’s remedy is against the issuing bank. 
 
The advising bank, by adding its own confirmation is undertaking that the credit will 
be honoured on due presentation. This is a separate undertaking from that given by the 
issuing bank and is given by the advising bank as principal, not as the issuing bank’s 
agent. Here the promise of the issuing bank and that of the advising bank are separate 
and distinct. It follows that if the terms of the confirmation are more restricted than 
those of the credit as issued by the issuing bank, the advising bank’s liability to the 
seller is limited accordingly.72 
 
2. 4. The Principle of Autonomy 
 
The autonomy doctrine is central to the operation of documentary credits. Its primary 
function in a documentary credit transaction is to create an abstract payment 
obligation that is independent of and detached from the underlying contract of sale 
                                                 
70
 UCP 600 Art. 16 (f) 
71
 GKN Contractors Ltd v Lloyds Bank PLC (1985) 30 BLR 48. 
72
   A careful look at the sentence, will raise the question whether, the advising bank, by giving a 
restricted mandate, will not be in breach of its mandate from the issuing bank.  
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between the seller/beneficiary and the buyer/applicant and the separate contract 
between the buyer/applicant and the issuing bank. It then follows as a cardinal rule of 
documentary credits that the conditions of the bank’s duty to pay are to be found 
subject to the defences on only the terms of the documentary credits. The implication 
is that the right and responsibility of the bank to make payment to the beneficiary does 
not depend on the seller/beneficiary’s obligations under the contract of sale. It follows 
in particular that a breach of those obligations by the seller/beneficiary by shipping 
goods which fail to correspond in a material respect to the contract description or are 
of unsatisfactory quality does not entitle the bank under instruction by the applicant to 
refuse payment under the credit. 
 
It needs to be stated that the perception accorded the autonomy doctrine, mostly in 
English documentary credit law which states that the letter of credit contract is 
detached from the underlying contract that gave rise to it, is at the root of so many 
practices which as noted in decided cases 73  have made this area of law wholly 
unsatisfactory. 74  The practice which inflexibly seeks to detach the documentary 
credits contract from the underlying contract that gave rise to it, if pursued to its 
extreme, may even call into question the basis of recognising any exceptions in the 
first place. It is submitted that the basis of the autonomy principle is to provide an 
assurance of payment to the seller/beneficiary on the implicit understanding that the 
                                                 
73
 Because the letter of credit contract is perceived to be completely detached from the underlying 
contract that gave rise to it, the standard of proof required to prove the exception(s) is set very high as 
to make it somewhat unattainable. The difficulty of proof of the exceptions (principally the fraud 
exception) which remotely lay in the way the exception to the autonomy principle is perceived has led 
to an approach that is not uniform. Relying on the exception as the basis of an injunction , Staughton 
L.J noted the differences of opinion that have arisen with respect to whether the beneficiary or the bank 
itself is being injuncted. While the Lord Justice noted that there is no difference whether the bank or 
the beneficiary is injuncted, the court agreed with the Balcombe LJ in Themehelp v West & Others 
[1996] QB 84. that the law in this area is wholly unsatisfactory.  See generally, Staughton L.J in Group 
Josi Re v Walbrook Insurance Co. Ltd. and Others [1996] 1 Lloyd's Rep 345, 361.  
74
 Balcombe LJ in Themehelp v West & Others [1996] QB 84. 
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seller/beneficiary will comply with the agreed terms of the underlying transaction that 
gave rise to the credit contract.75 It is not to provide an assurance of payment where 
no underlying contract exists at all.  
 
Having noted the above, it may be pertinent to look at the common law position as 
well as some instruments that have emphasized the autonomy doctrine.  
  
2. 4.1. Common Law Position 
 
Many common law cases76 have enunciated the autonomy doctrine. Prominent in the 
list is the English case of United City Merchant (Investment) Ltd v Royal Bank of 
Canada where Lord Diplock noted that the fundamental principle that underlies the 
autonomy doctrine when his Lordship stated thus  
 
‘The whole commercial purpose for which the system of confirmed irrevocable 
documentary credits has been developed in international trade is to give to the seller 
an assured right to be paid before he parts with control of the goods that does not 
permit of any dispute with the buyer as to the performance of the contract of sale 
being used as a ground for non-payment or reduction or deferment of payment’.77 The 
importance of this assurance of payment lies principally in the fact that that the buyer 
who has contracted with the seller is usually from a different country thereby making 
                                                 
75
 This position has been adopted by D Horowitz in criticism of the pronouncement of Lord Diplock 
that the sole purpose of the autonomy principle in documentary credits is to provide the seller with an 
assurance of payment. Horowitz added in support of the position adopted above that the purpose of the 
autonomy principle does not exclude assuring the buyer that the goods which are the reason for the 
opening of the credit would be delivered. Hence, the autonomy doctrine does not exclude 
considerations involving the buyer’s interest. See Deborah Horowitz, Letters of Credits and Demand 
Guarantees Defences to Payment (Oxford University Press 2010) 20. 
76
 Hamzeh Malas & Sons v. British Imex Industries Ltd [1958] 2 QB 127; [1958] 2 WLR 100; 
[1958] 1 All ER 262, C.A. 
77
 United City Merchants (Investments) Ltd v Royal Bank Of Canada [1983] 1AC 168,183. 
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legal action to recover the price inconvenient. Also, in Trans Trust SPRL v Danubian 
Co Ltd,78 Denning LJ hinted at the reason for the autonomy doctrine by referring to 
situations where the seller obtains goods or components of the goods from a third 
party and hence is relying on the letters of credit given by the buyer to finance the 
purchase either directly or through his own bank. 
 
More recently, in the United States of America, the autonomy doctrine was again 
illustrated in the American case of Semetex Corporation v UBAF Arab American 
Bank.79 Here Semetex contracted to supply an ion implanter to a factory in Baghdad. 
Payment was arranged to be made by an irrevocable letter of credit. The conditions of 
payment were that Semetex present to UBAF (a) commercial invoices and a 
certificate of origin and (b) freight prepaid air waybill from the United States to 
Baghdad via Iraqi Airways or carrier authorised by Iraqi Airways (c) a telex cable to 
the buyer advising him of the flight number and date of arrival at Baghdad airport. 
The letter of credit did not require an on board bill of lading or other evidence that the 
ion implanter had actually been received by the designated carrier.  On July 31, 1990 
the ion implanter began its journey by truck from Austin Texas, to JFK airport in New 
York where it was to be flown to Iraq. On August, 1 1990, while the truck was in 
transit, the freight forwarder hired by Semetex presented the documents called for by 
the credit to UBAF. On the night of August 1, Iraq invaded Kuwait. Early on August 
2, 1990, President Bush issued an Executive Order blocking all Iraqi assets in the 
United States. To comply with the Executive Order, the manufacturers whom 
Semetex had engaged to build the ion implanter, instructed the carriers to divert the 
truck to a warehouse in Massachusetts. 
                                                 
78
 [1952] 2QB 297 at 304. 
79
 [1995] 2Bank LR 73. 
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On application for summary judgment by Semetex, the US District court relied on the 
autonomy doctrine and granted Semetex’s motion for summary judgment against 
UBAF for payment under the letter of credit on the ground that they had complied 
with the terms of the letter of credit. The court, however observed that the buyer 
would have been protected if he had stipulated in the credit for a document evidencing 
shipment on board the designated carrier. The court further held that since such a 
document was not required, it did not matter that the goods, the subject of the 
underlying contract, were still lying in a warehouse in Massachusetts. 
 
The above case exemplifies the autonomy doctrine.  Owing to the autonomy doctrine, 
the case did not consider the rights of the buyer/applicant against the 
seller/beneficiary under the underlying contract. It was also held in Power Curber 
International Ltd v. National Bank of Kuwait SAK80 that the concept of autonomy in 
documentary credits is the basis for the general rule which prevents the issuing bank 
or the buyer/applicant from resisting the seller’s claim for breach of the underlying 
sale contract. This position enunciated in many decided cases has also been giving 
statutory effect by some instruments that deal with documentary credits. One of such 
instruments is the Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits.  
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 [1981]2 Lloyd’s Rep 394. 
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2. 4.2. UCP 600 
 
Accepted banking practice relating to documentary credit is standardised by the 
Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits (UCP),81 which are a set of 
rules issued by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC). The UCP was first 
published in 1933 and have seen many revisions of which the most current is the UCP 
600 that came into force on the July 1, 2007.82 
 
The principle of autonomy that remains one of the cardinal principles of documentary 
credits’ practice was precisely articulated in Arts 4 and 5 of the UCP 600 in these 
terms: 
 
A credit by its nature is a separate transaction from the sale or other contract 
on which it may be based. Banks are in no way concerned with or bound by 
such contract, even if any reference whatsoever to it is included in the credit. 
Consequently, the undertaking of a bank to honour, to negotiate or fulfil any 
other obligation under the credit is not subject to claims or defences by the 
applicant resulting from its relationships with the issuing bank or the 
beneficiary.83 
 
It further states that 
A beneficiary can in no case avail itself of the contractual relationships 
existing between the banks or between the applicant and the issuing bank. An 
                                                 
81
 The latest edition is the UCP 600. 
82
 Documentary credits opened before the July 1, 2007 date will continue to be governed by the 
previous edition of the UCP known as the UCP 500. 
83
 UCP 600 art 4. 
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issuing bank should discourage any attempt by the applicant to include, as an 
integral part of the credit, copies of the underlying contract, proforma invoice 
and the like. Finally, banks deals with documents and not with the goods, 
services or performance to which the document relate.84 
 
 
These respective articles cited above provide the UCP 600 provisions with respect to 
the autonomy principle.  
 
2. 4.3. Uniform Commercial Code (USA) 
 
The above position reflected in the UCP 600 regarding the autonomy principle is 
replicated in the American Uniform Commercial Code of the United States. It states 
precisely in Section 5- 103(d) that ‘the rights and obligations of an issuer to a 
beneficiary or a nominated person under a letter of credit are independent of the 
existence, performance, or non-performance of the contract or arrangement out of 
which the letter of credit arises or which underlie it, including contracts or 
arrangements between the issuer and the applicant and between the applicant and the 
beneficiary’. Section 5-108(f)(1) underlies the importance of the doctrine of 
independence by further stating that ‘an issuer is not responsible for the performance 
or non-performance of the underlying contract, arrangement, or transaction’. 
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 UCP 600 art 5. 
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2. 5. Does the Autonomy Doctrine Operate without Exceptions? 
 
The autonomy doctrine operates on the established premise that between parties to 
documentary credit transactions, issues related to the underlying transaction have to 
be pursued by the buyer bringing a separate action for breach of the underlying 
contract and not by withholding all or part of the credit. Put differently, the autonomy 
doctrine operates on the principle of ‘pay now, sue later’. The effects of this approach 
to the autonomy doctrine have been overwhelming and have at times being interpreted 
in a manner that appears literalistic.85 The approach to the autonomy doctrine has led 
Professor Goode to argue that ‘English courts have become beguiled by the autonomy 
doctrine that they decline to allow refusal of payment in favour of a beneficiary acting 
in good faith even where the documents are forged or otherwise fraudulent, on the 
supposed principle that the beneficiary’s duty is to tender documents which appear to 
conform to the credit even if they are in fact fraudulent and worthless’. 86  This 
argument of Professor Goode, a testament to his disagreement to how the exceptions 
have been applied in English law, partly foreruns the issues discussed in this research. 
The research further investigates whether it can be persuasively argued that in all 
                                                 
85
 Literalism as an interpretative tool is being discouraged because in most cases it does not capture the 
commercial expectation of the parties.  There is a shift from literal methods of interpretation towards an 
approach that captures the real intention of the parties. See Antaios Compania Naviera SA v Salen 
Rederierna AB [1985] AC 191, 201, per Lord Diplock. By literalism, such example given in the moral 
philosophy of Paley comes to mind. In that work which has influenced thinking on contract since the 
19th century, “the tyrant Temures promised the garrison of Sebastia that no blood would be shed if they 
surrendered to him. They surrendered. He shed no blood. He buried them all alive.” This is literalism at 
work as the tyrant, Temures live up to his promise not to shed any blood by burying his captives alive. 
But the question must be asked if such treatment from the tyrant represented the mutual expectation of 
the parties when they struck an agreement to surrender? Borrowing from this approach, autonomy 
doctrine ought not to be understood in a manner that makes it too literalistic. 
86
 Roy Goode, Commercial Law (Penguin 2004) 972. 
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cases, issues related to the underlying transaction have no part to play as to whether 
the beneficiary is entitled to payment? 
 
It has to be noted that despite the force of authority which the principle of autonomy 
commands in documentary credits, it operates with recognised exceptions. Put 
differently, its application in documentary credit is not absolute. Fraud of the 
beneficiary or his agent whether in relation to obtaining of the credit or presentation 
of the documents, entitles the bank if on notice of it to withhold payment.87 
 
On the other hand, it is the position of the English courts88 that the autonomy principle 
is not undermined in a case where the beneficiary has expressly and contractually 
agreed with the other party to the transaction not to draw down on the credit unless 
certain conditions are fulfilled and the draw-down is sought to be prevented on the 
ground of non-fulfilment of such express contractual terms. 
 
An exception to the autonomy doctrine exists where the honouring of the credit would 
be illegal according to the law of the place where the bank’s performance is due.89 
Moreover, it has been demonstrated in a series of Singaporean90 and Australian cases, 
that an independent ground forming a basis for an exception to the autonomy doctrine 
exists where in the particular circumstances of the case, the beneficiary would be 
guilty of unconscionable conduct in presenting the documents and collecting payment 
on the instrument. 
                                                 
87
 This exception applies only where the fraud is that of the beneficiary or his agent. The bank is not 
obliged to investigate a mere suspicion of fraud. 
88Sirius Insurance International Ltd v FAI General Insurance [2003] 1 WLR 87.  
89
 Mahonia v Chase Manhattan Bank (No. 1) [2003] EWHC 1927 (Comm.) [2003] 2 Lloyd's Rep 911.  
90
 Bocotra Construction Pte Ltd v Unitrack Building Contruction Pte Ltd[1995] 2 SLR 733; GHE Pte 
Ltd v Unitrack Building Construction Pte Ltd[1994]4 SLR 904. 
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Finally, there is another exception, which has been dismissed in English law but 
recognised in Singapore 91  in the form of a nullity exception. In support of this 
exception, Professor Goode has argued that it is a distortion of the autonomy principle 
to allow a beneficiary so far as he acts in good faith, to tender documents which 
purport to be what they are not and collect payment against worthless pieces of 
paper. 92  This thesis will seek to examine these exceptions to the principle of 
autonomy in detail. The thesis would endeavour to answer the research question 
whether the application of the exception(s) is satisfactory. 
 
2. 6. Conclusion 
 
The chapter examines the basic issues relating to documentary credit and its 
importance in international trade. In analysing the nature of the instrument 
(documentary credit), the cardinal role of the autonomy doctrine was highlighted as 
well some of the instruments that govern documentary credits practice. The current 
perception with respect to the role the autonomy doctrine plays in documentary 
credits has led to so many different and at times conflicting interpretations of the 
circumstances under which autonomy principle could be displaced by way of an 
exception.  In English law, the circumstances under which the autonomy doctrine 
could be displaced have primarily been in the case of fraud of the beneficiary or his 
agent and its scope remains very restrictive. 93  But case law and academic 
                                                 
91
 See Beam Technology Pte Ltd v  Standard Chartered Bank [2003]1 SLR 597. 
92
  See Roy Goode, Commercial Law (Penguin 2004) 996. For current edition see E. Mckendrick 
Goode on commercial Law (4th edn, Penguin  2009). 
93
 Though some case laws in the current English documentary credit practice may question to what 
extent this traditional restrictive approach remains the law. For the preceding comment,  see Themehelp 
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commentaries continue to highlight the existence of some other exceptions. The 
object of the thesis is to critically examine these exceptions to the principle of 
autonomy. In the course of this intellectual enterprise, (analysing the exceptions to the 
autonomy principle) the research pursues the primary and specific research goal of 
addressing the question as to how satisfactory the application of these exceptions are, 
and pays special attention to English documentary credits law. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
v West &Others [1996] QB 84, where there is an arguable case that the fraud exception might not be so 
limited based on the principle enunciated in the case. 
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Chapter Three 
 
3.0    The Fraud Rule  
 
3. 1. Introduction 
 
Having examined in the preceding chapter the juridical basis of the autonomy doctrine, 
which represents a fundamental principle in documentary credits, this chapter 
analyses the first recognised exception to the autonomy doctrine known as the fraud 
rule, its nature, application and the basis for its recognition. It need not be over-
emphasized that the phenomenon of fraud presently applied in documentary credits94 
is ‘timeless and universal’.95 So are human efforts for the control of fraud. However, 
despite being regularly seen in legal contexts, there seems to be no universally 
accepted definition of fraud.96 The reason for this lies mostly in the inherent difficulty 
associated with attempting a catchall definition of fraud.97 In documentary credits, the 
phenomenon of fraud is also a vexed issue. The enormity of its effect obliged a 
learned judge98 to characterize it as a cancer in international trade.  
 
                                                 
94
 Has its origin in general law and has for centuries represented a very slippery and sometimes difficult 
legal concept to deal with. 
95
 See L.H Leigh The Control of Commercial Fraud (Gower Pub Co1982) 3. 
96
 J. Ulph Commercial Fraud (University Press 2006) 6. 
97
 See R v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1975] AC 819, 834, per Viscount Dilhorne, where he 
said that ‘there has always been a great reluctance among lawyers to attempt to define fraud, and this is 
not unnatural when we consider the number of different kinds of conduct to which the word is applied 
in connection with different branches of law, and especially in connection with the equitable branch of 
it. I shall not attempt to construct a definition which will meet every case which might be suggested, 
but there is little danger in saying that whenever the words 'fraud' or 'intent to defraud' or 'fraudulently' 
occur in the definition of a crime two elements at least are essential to the commission of the crime: 
namely, first, deceit or an intention to deceive or in some cases mere secrecy; and, secondly, either 
actual injury or possible injury or an intent to expose some person either to actual injury or to a risk of 
possible injury by means of that deceit or secrecy’. 
98
 See  Cresswell J in Standard Chartered Bank v Pakistan National Shipping Corporation and Others 
[1998] 1 Lloyd's Rep 684, 687. 
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It is to deal with this problem that the fraud rule was developed. Ordinarily, the 
obligation to pay under a documentary credit is independent of the underlying 
transaction in respect of which the credit is issued. However, as an exception to the 
principle of independence, fraud may be raised as a ground for non-payment. 
 
This chapter is concerned principally with the principles relating to the application of 
the fraud exception in documentary credits. It critically examines some aspects of the 
fraud rule by discussing its meaning and scope. It looks at the rationale and standard 
of proof. It also considers the question whether the English approach to the exception 
is satisfactory having regard to the approach that is obtainable in other jurisdictions.  
 
The chapter is divided into eight main sections with each section dealing with a 
specific aspect of the fraud rule. Apart from section 3.1 which is the general 
introduction, section 3.2 outlines the rationale for the fraud rule as a guide to 
understanding the different approaches to its scope. Section 3.3 examines the scope of 
the exception. Section 3.4 discusses the standard of proof required to trigger the 
exception in English law. Sections 3.5 undertakes a comparative analysis of the fraud 
rule in Canada, Singapore and Malaysia respectively with the view to understanding 
how the exception has been understood and applied in those jurisdictions. Section 3.6, 
draws a conclusion based on the above examined issues. 
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3. 2. Rationale 
 
This section discusses the rationale for the fraud rule in documentary credits. It 
contends that based on case law99 and academic commentaries,100 the rationale for the 
fraud rule has attracted divergent opinions. It highlights the pitfalls associated with the 
main views and concludes by aligning with the view that is based on strong public 
policy requirement of the law for the prevention of fraud.  
 
The basis of the fraud rule in the law of documentary credit seems to have been 
captured by Lord Diplock when he stated that ‘the exception for fraud on the part of 
the beneficiary seeking to avail himself of the credit is a clear application of the 
maxim ex turpi causa non oritur actio or if plain English is to be preferred, “fraud 
unravel all”. The court will not allow its process to be used by a dishonest person to 
carry out a fraud’101 However, if the rationale for the fraud rule is that ‘fraud unravels 
all,” one would have thought that a fraud of a loading broker in the United City 
Merchants which affected the conformity of the credit would have been capable of 
enjoining payment. The decision of the court was that fraud of a loading broker of 
which the beneficiary was innocent would be incapable of stopping the beneficiary 
from getting paid. If the decision is correct, would it not be more appropriate to say 
that on the basis of the exception propounded in United City Merchants it would be 
                                                 
99
 See specifically the rationale in these two cases: American Accord [1983] 1 AC 168,184 and 
Czarnikow-Rionda Sugar Trading Inc v Standard Bank of London Ltd [1999] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 187.   
100
 X Gao, The Fraud in Letters of Credit; A Comparative study (1999, Kluwer Law international, New 
York) See also Boris Kozolchyk, “The immunization of Fraudulently Procured Letter of Credit 
acceptances: All Services Exportacao, Importacao Comercio S A v Banco Bamerindus do Brazil S.A 
and First Commercial v. Gotham Originals”, 58 Brook. L. Rev, 369,370. See also K. Donnelly, 
‘Nullity for Nothing: a Nullity Exception in Letters of Credit’ (2008) JBL 316. 
101
  See United City Merchant v Royal Bank of Canada [1983] 1 AC 168, 184. 
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more accurate to say that only some fraud unravels all, namely fraud perpetrated by 
the active dishonesty of the beneficiary.102  
 
The rationale for the fraud rule evident in the American Accord has been considered 
more recently by Rix J in Czarnikow-Rionda Sugar Trading Inc v Standard Bank of 
London Ltd103 where he disagreed with the rationale propounded by Lord Diplock.104 
Rix J stated that the basis of the fraud exception is premised on an implied contractual 
term. He reasoned that the claim for an injunction (between the applicant and the 
issuing bank) is based on a breach of contract by the bank and not as contended by the 
claimant that the power to grant an injunction arises from the court’s unwillingness to 
avoid its process being used by a dishonest person to commit fraud.  According to Rix 
J,105 the basis for the exception is that there is an implied term in the contract between 
the paying bank and the beneficiary that documents presented do not, to the 
presenter’s knowledge, make any statements of fact which are false, and that the 
documents are not being presented as part of a fraud against the bank or the buyer. 
According to Rix J ‘… if the source of the power to injunct were purely the law’s 
interest in preventing the beneficiary from benefitting from his own fraud, I do not see 
why the there should be the added requirement that the fraud be patent to the bank’.  
 
Commentators106 have premised the rationale for the fraud rule on so many grounds 
ranging from the desire to close the loophole in the law,107 the law’s public policy for 
                                                 
102
 Indeed if fraud unravels all, does it matter who perpetrated the fraud? See also K. Donnelly, ‘Nullity 
for Nothing: a Nullity Exception in Letters of Credit’ (2008) JBL 316, 321. 
103
 [1999] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 187. 
104
 See Czarnikow-Rionda Sugar Trading [1999] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 187, 203; See also K Donnelly, 
‘Nullity for Nothing: a Nullity Exception in Letters of Credit’ [2008] JBL 316, 322. 
105
  See Czarnikow- Rionda Sugar trading Inc v Standard Bank of London Ltd [1999] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 
187 199-203. 
106
  See X Gao, The Fraud in Letters of Credit; A Comparative study (New York, Kluwer Law 
international, 1999) See also Boris Kozolchyk, ‘The immunization of Fraudulently Procured Letter of 
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the control of fraud,108 maintaining the commercial utility of letter of credit and that 
based on an implied contract term between the beneficiary and the paying bank. All 
these mentioned rationales closely examined would most likely expose their strengths 
and weaknesses. However, it is argued that the fraud exception is based on the strong 
policy ground of providing an ‘extra- contractual defence’109 in cases of fraud to the 
contractually unqualified payment obligation. It constitutes the most convincing 
rationale for the fraud exception in letters of credit law. The reason for this may not be 
farfetched. First, as noted by Cresswell J, fraud and fraudulent documents constitute 
what he termed a ‘cancer’ in international trade and should be discouraged in the 
strongest terms possible. Secondly, the rationale based on an implied contract term 
between the beneficiary and the paying bank adopted in Czarnikow- Rionda Sugar 
Trading Inc v Standard Bank of London Ltd 110  raises unanswered questions. 111 
Thirdly, the contention that the fraud exception is founded on the rationale that fraud 
unravels all cannot be true in all circumstances.112 Although, the above mentioned 
public policy stance of the law in controlling fraud remains the basic rationale, the 
application of the exceptions has attracted divergent opinions with respect to its scope. 
Hence the scope of the exception is considered to ascertain the approach adopted in 
English law. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Credit acceptances: All Services Exportacao, Importacao Comercio, S.A. v. Banco Bamerindus do 
Brazil S.A and First Commercial v. Gotham Originals’ 58 Brook L Rev 369,370. 
107
 See X Gao, The Fraud in Letters of Credit; A Comparative Study (Kluwer Law international 1999). 
56. 
108
 See NE Enonchong, ‘The Autonomy Principle of Letter of Credit: An Illegality Exception?’ (2006) 
LMCLQ 404-405. 
109
 See Deutsche Ruckversicherung Aktiengeslleschaft v Walbrook Insurance Co ltd  [1995] IWLR 
1017, 1029. 
110
 [1999] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 187. 
111
 It could be argued that it belies the purpose of the fraud rule introduced by the first American case 
of Stejn v Henry Schroeder Banking Corporation (1941) 31NYS 2d 631. 
112
 If it is, the fraud of a third party should displace the autonomy principle. 
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3. 3. The Scope of the Fraud Exception in English Law 
 
The treatment of the ambit of the fraud exception in letters of credit could touch on a 
multiplicity of issues. However, in this section, an aspect of the scope specifically 
dealing with the nature of fraud that would justify breach of the autonomy doctrine is 
examined. It answers the question whether in English law the letter of credit fraud is 
the equivalent of the common law tort of deceit?113 It is in this light that the section 
considers the extent to which letter of credit fraud is equivalent to the tort of deceit 
and whether such comparison is in any way helpful. Secondly, it considers whether 
fraud in the transaction is an aspect of the fraud rule; and if so, whether it is capable of 
leading to an enjoinment of credit under the fraud rule. It finally assesses the scope of 
fraud in the context of a deferred payment credit and whether the UCP 600 has 
effectively addressed the problem generated by the Banco Santander Case114 
 
3. 3.1.  Letters of Credit Fraud and Tort of Deceit 
 
Fraud may justify a breach of the autonomy principle. However, the scope of the 
fraud that will warrant such a departure from the principle has in some respects 
differed in the different jurisdictions. In England,115 the position is that letter of credit 
fraud is akin to the common law tort of deceit.116 This perception is evident in Lord 
                                                 
113
 This comparison was made by Professor Goode  in  Goode Commercial Law ( Penguin 2004).  see 
latest edition by E. Mckendrick, Goode on Commercial Law (Penguin 2009) 1100. 
114
 See Banco Santander SA v Bayfern Ltd & Ors [1999] CLC 1321, Banco Santander SA v Banque 
Paribas [2000] CLC 906. 
115
  See United City Merchants (Investments) Ltd and Glass Fibres and Equipments Ltd v Royal Bank 
Of Canada [1983] 1 AC 168. 
116
 See Goode, Commercial Law (Penguin Press 2004) 991; See also R. Jack, et al Documentary 
Credits (3rd edn, 2001) 266; Ali Malek and David Guest Jacks Documentary Credits (4th edn,Tottel 
2009) 254 where it was stated that Lord Diplock’s formulation is very close to a statement of the 
element of fraudulent misrepresentation that constitute the tort of deceit. 
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Diplock’s formulation of the exception 117  from the standpoint of fraudulent 
misrepresentation by referring to ‘documents that contain, expressly or by implication, 
material representations of facts that to his knowledge are untrue.’ If the fraud rule 
capable of displacing the autonomy doctrine is akin to common law tort of deceit, 
does it presuppose that for a party to be capable of pleading the fraud rule successfully, 
it must prove the common law tort of deceit (fraud)?  
 
Addressing the above issue, David Steel J in Uzinterimpex JSC v. Standard Bank 
Plc118 identified the elements of the tort of deceit otherwise known as fraud as (a) the 
defendant must have made a representation, which can be clearly identified; (b) It has 
to be a representation of facts; (c) the representation has to be false; (d) it must have 
been made dishonestly in the sense that the representor had no real belief in the truth 
of what he stated, so that there was conscious knowledge of the falsity of the 
statement; (e) the statement must have been intended to be relied upon; (f) it must 
have in fact been relied upon leading to a loss.119  
 
One issue that arises in the context of perceiving letter of credit fraud as akin to the 
common law tort of deceit120 is whether it is possible to prove all its ingredients. Is it 
possible to prove the legal ingredients of ‘reliance and damage’ associated with the 
tort of deceit in all cases of letters of credit fraud? This becomes necessary in view of 
                                                 
117
 United City Merchants v Royal Bank of Canada [1983] 1 AC 168-183. 
118
 [2007] 2 Lloyd’s Rep.187,188. 
119
 See Hornal v Neuberger Products Ltd [1954] 1 QB 247. 
120
 See the comment of Roy Goode where he defined the fraud required in documentary credits by 
stating that “fraud does not necessarily mean that the maker of the statement should be dishonest in the 
sense used in criminal law. It suffices that it constitutes the tort of deceit in that it is made knowingly 
and with intent that it should be acted upon by the person to whom it is addressed”. For this see Roy 
Goode Commercial Law, (3rd edn, Penguin 2004) 991, Ewan McKendrick  Goode on Commercial Law 
(4th edn, Penguin 2009) 1100. 
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the dictum of Croke J in Baily v. Merrell121 which was restated by Buller J in Pasley v. 
Freeman.122 Buller J while considering whether an action based on deceit can be 
sustained without damage noted as follows ‘Fraud without damage, or damage 
without fraud, gives no cause of action; but where these two concur, an action lies’.123 
In similar vein, Lord Tucker noted in Briess v Woolley 124 that ‘the tort of fraudulent 
misrepresentation (fraud) is not complete when the representation is made. It becomes 
complete when the misrepresentation is acted upon by the representee’. 
 
It is against this backdrop that the propriety of the assertion that letter of credit fraud 
is equivalent to the common law tort of deceit125 is considered, as there are cases in 
which letter of credit fraud can be established without some of the ingredients that 
need to be present to make the tort of deceit complete. Some of these cases where the 
ingredients of tort of deceit need not be present could be seen in letter of credit fraud 
cases. It is not necessary to prove reliance and damage which are key ingredients of 
the tort of deceit in some instances where letter of credit fraud has been successfully 
pleaded. However, for an action in the tort of deceit to succeed, all the legal 
ingredients need to be proved to the required standard. This position of the law was 
generally articulated in Re: H and others (minors) 126  where it was held that all 
ingredients of the tort of deceit need to be proved only to the required balance of 
probabilities for an action to succeed. 
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 3 Bulst. 95. 
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 (1789) 3 Term Reports 51. 
123
 (1789) 3 Term Reports 51,56. 
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  [1954] AC 333, 353. 
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 See Roy Goode Commercial Law, (3rd edn, Penguin 2004) 991; see also Ewan McKendrick  Goode 
on Commercial Law (4th edn, Penguin 2009) 1100. 
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 [1996] AC 563 at 586, compare with the earlier case of Hornal v Newberger Products Ltd [1957] 1 
QB 247. 
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Having noted the above, it is necessary at this point to consider some instances of 
letters of credit fraud to ascertain whether all the ingredients of the tort of deceit could 
be established in all cases. In Banco Santander SA v Banque Paribas,127 a decision 
which is primarily on letter of credit fraud, an issuing bank refused payment to a 
confirming bank which had discounted a beneficiary’s presentation prior to its due 
date under a deferred payment undertaking. What was assumed to be a letter of credit 
fraud, upon which the confirming bank’s reimbursement was denied, was information 
from the applicant to the issuing bank that the certificates of quality and quantity 
relating to the cargo were false. In this instance of letter of credit fraud, there was no 
reliance on the confirming bank’s presentation by the issuing bank nor did the issuing 
bank suffer any damage before a finding of fraud was made. More so in the American 
Accord,128 what was held to be the fraud of the shipping broker by the House of Lords 
was nothing but an intentional and dishonest misrepresentation in a document by a 
shipping broker. Any analysis of the circumstances that led to the fraud would not 
reveal any kind of reliance or damage before it was dubbed fraud. 
 
In similar vein, Hirst J129 in Rafsanjan Pistachio Producer’s Cooperative v Bank 
Leumi UK Plc recognised the difficulty of proving all the ingredients of the tort of 
deceit in letters of credit fraud. Against the contention of the plaintiff’s counsel that 
there was no reliance since the bank did not rely on the misrepresentation having 
rejected the documents, the learned judge held that what is needed in letter of credit 
fraud is the proof of potential reliance by the bank as no interlocutory injunction for 
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 [2000] CLC 906. 
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 [1983] 1AC 168. 
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 See Rafsanjan Pistachio Producers Cooperative v Bank  Leumi UK Plc [1992] I Lloyd’s Rep 513, 
542; See also Solo Industries v Canara Bank [2001] 2 Lloyd's Rep 578 where the bank successfully 
resisted the application for summary judgment by the beneficiary of a bond on the ground of fraud. The 
bank did not prove reliance or its loss resulting from the misrepresentation. 
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fraudulent presentation could ever be obtained if there is an insistence on the proof of 
reliance by the bank. It is submitted that a careful analysis of the instances of letters of 
credit fraud reveals a crucial distinction. It reveals that a bank that refuses to pay on 
the ground of letters of credit fraud in some situation has not relied on any 
misrepresentation or suffered any loss as a result of the beneficiary’s presentation. Its 
refusal to perform the contract which it has with the beneficiary is because there is 
fraud and not because the bank has relied on or has been duped by any fraud130. Put 
differently, the power to grant an injunction or resist summary application by a bank 
on grounds of fraud131 arises from the perceived fraudulent conduct of the presenter of 
the documents and not on any reliance on the deceit of the alleged fraudster. In 
Themehelp v West,132 what was held to be fraud in the words of Waite LJ consisted of 
nothing but ‘deliberate or reckless failure on the part of the sellers (West and Ors) to 
inform the buyers (Themehelp Ltd) of the full extent of the falling-off of future 
demand from Sony (a major customer) of which they were aware by the date of the 
contract and of which, to their knowledge, the buyers were not aware’.133 Hence an 
arguable case of fraud was established and interlocutory injunction granted against the 
seller/beneficiary from making a demand for payment under an unconditional 
guarantee. 
 
In Solo Industries v Canara Bank134 the Court of Appeal refused an application for 
summary judgment by the beneficiary for payment on the ground that the letter of 
credit was issued as a result of fraudulent misrepresentation between the beneficiary 
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 See Rafsanjan Pistachio Producers Cooperative v Bank  Leumi UK Plc [1992] I Lloyd’s Rep 
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 Solo Industries v Canara Bank [2001] 2 Lloyd's Rep 578. 
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 [1996] QB 84. 
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 [2001] 2 Lloyd's Rep 578. 
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and the applicant for the credit. For the issuing bank to resist summary judgment on 
the grounds of fraud, it was not possible to establish damage on the part of the issuing 
bank since the beneficiary in the circumstance has not yet being paid. 
 
It is submitted that the proof of reliance and damage suffered by the representee can 
be dispensed with in some instances of letters of credit fraud. This is particularly so if 
fraud is alleged for the purposes of injunctive relief and contesting of a summary 
judgment application. The bank’s refusal to pay the fraudulent beneficiary either as a 
result of injunction from the applicant or by contesting a summary judgment 
application by the beneficiary for payment is at the heart of documentary credit fraud 
rule. Does it not raise doubt as to the propriety of the assertion that letter of credit 
fraud is equivalent to common law tort of deceit if fraud can be established without 
proof of all the ingredients of tort of deceit? The justification for this arises from the 
fact that the proof of the tort of deceit cannot be complete without the proof of all its 
ingredients without fail.  
 
An aspect of letter of credit fraud that compares favourably with the tort of deceit can 
be seen in a situation where payment has already been made and the paying bank is 
coming to court to recover payment because payment is alleged to have been 
fraudulently obtained by the beneficiary. This situation particularly arises where there 
is a claim for damages by the paying bank on the ground that the beneficiary in 
presenting the documents and obtaining payment committed fraud.135 It is in this 
situation that the tort of deceit and its ingredient can be complete. However, when the 
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 See KBC Bank v Industrial Steels (UK) Ltd [2001] 1All ER (Comm) 409; Komercni Banka AS v 
Stone and Rolls Ltd [2003] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 383; Niru Battery Manufacturing Company v Milestone 
Trading Ltd [2002] 2All ER (Comm) 705; See also the Singapore case of  DBS Bank Ltd v. Carrier 
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fraud exception is invoked in practice, what usually happen is that the fraudulent 
beneficiary is restrained from obtaining payment. The beneficiary is prevented from 
taking advantage of his own wrong doing at the expense of the paying bank or the 
applicant. Hence the core of letter of credit fraud is to restrain the fraudulent 
beneficiary from obtaining payment and not the recovery of damages occasioned by 
the payment of a fraudulent beneficiary. For it cannot be said that the autonomy 
principle has been breached on the grounds of fraud in claims for damages arising 
from payment resulting from the beneficiary’s fraudulent presentation of documents. 
 
It has to be finally stated that judging from case law, the ingredients needed to prove 
fraud within the context of injunctive relief consist of two key elements. First the 
document must contain expressly or by implication a material representation that is 
untrue.136 Secondly the seller must fraudulently present the document for the purpose 
of drawing on the credit with the knowledge of the untruth.137 With respect to the first 
requirement, what does the document containing expressly or by implication a 
material misrepresentation mean? Can such material misrepresentation be gleaned 
only from the documents themselves or both the documents and the underlying 
transaction that gave rise to the credit? 
 
 3. 3.2.  Ambit of Fraud-Fraud in the Transaction 
 
Relying on the American Accord, it can be argued that the approach of the English 
court is to restrict the fraud exception to misrepresentation in the document alone.138 
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Hence there is no English authority 139  which discusses specifically whether the 
exception extends to a situation where the documents presented are truthful but there 
is fraud in the underlying transaction. 140  However, recent cases suggest a trend 
towards extending the exception to fraud in the underlying transaction.141 In Solo 
Industries Ltd v Canara Bank,142 the Court of Appeal refused to grant a summary 
judgment in favour of a beneficiary of a performance bond against the bank seeking to 
avoid payment on the ground that its issue (the bond) was induced by a fraudulent 
conspiracy and/ or misrepresentation to which the beneficiary was a party. Analysing 
the Solo Industries cases, the fraud that necessitated the issuance of the performance 
bond was such fraud that took place in the underlying transaction. Also, in Themehelp 
v West & Others, 143a case on performance bonds, fraud in the underlying transaction 
sustained the fraud exception.144 
 
Looking at these cases and the grounds for decision, they suggest an approach which 
supports an extension of the fraud rule to a situation where the documents show an 
apparent conformity but the underlying transaction is tainted with fraud. But the 
extent to which these decisions can alter the pronouncement of the House of Lords is 
still not yet very clear. Many145 have suggested that in the light of the current trend 
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evidencing fraud in the procurement of letters of credit, it is doubtful whether Lord 
Diplock’s formulation of the rule in the American Accord by restricting the fraud rule 
to only fraud in the documents is still sustainable.146 It is submitted that until there is 
an express decision to the effect that English letter of credit’s fraud exception 
encompasses fraud in the documents as well as fraud in the underlying transaction, the 
traditional position is that it restricts its enquiry to fraud in the documents. It is 
however submitted that if the fraud exception is such that seeks to prevent an 
unscrupulous seller/beneficiary from benefitting from his own wrong, an approach 
that extends the fraud rule to fraud arising from the underlying transaction rather than 
restricting it to fraud arising from the presentation of documents should be 
welcomed. 147 However, even if the fraud rule is restricted to fraudulent 
misrepresentation in the documents in English law, another class of problem with 
respect to the scope of documentary credit fraud has been generated by the decision of 
the English court in the Banco Santander case which for the purposes of this study 
ought to be examined. 
 
3. 3.3.  Ambit-Fraud in Deferred Payment Obligation 
 
Where a credit provides for deferred payment, the obligation of a nominated bank148 
is to pay on maturity date(s) ascertainable in accordance with the terms of the credit. 
Since payment is not immediate, cash may not be available to the seller of goods till 
                                                                                                                                            
procurement of the letter of credit, letter of credit fraud cannot be restricted to fraud in the documents 
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the maturity date for payment. 149  In this kind of situation, it becomes the 
responsibility of the seller to ship the goods and wait for the maturity period for 
payment.  
 
The financial burden of shipping the goods and waiting for the maturity period is huge 
on the seller and in consequence a practice known as forfaiting developed whereby a 
nominated bank may be willing to pay the beneficiary and take up the documents by 
way of discounting arrangement and expecting reimbursement at the maturity date of 
payment. Under the UCP 500, as the facts and the decision in Banco Santander SA v. 
Banque Paribas 150  revealed, this forfaiting or discounting arrangement posed a 
serious problem to the discounting bank where fraud, perpetrated by the beneficiary, 
is uncovered just after the nominated bank has discounted the credit, taken up 
discounted documents and paid the beneficiary,151 but before the maturity date as 
stipulated in the deferred payment credit. 
 
In Banco Santander v Banque Paribas, a decision under the UCP 500 where 
documentary credit fraud was tested in a deferred payment obligation, it was held that 
a nominated bank that has discounted a fraudulent beneficiary’s documents or right to 
payment could only be seen as an assignee of the fraudulent beneficiary’s right and 
stood in no better position than the assignor of such right. The facts of the case could 
be summarized as follows: Under a deferred payment credit, Napa Petroleum Trade 
Inc (Napa) was the applicant for a credit that was issued by Banque Paribas (Paribas) 
in favour of the beneficiary, Bayfern Ltd (Bayfern). Paribas requested Banco 
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  Take for example, where the seller does not negotiate the documents to his banker for presentation 
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 Such discounted documents remain his security for payment and it is on the strength of these 
documents that he waits for the maturity period to be paid the sum agreed under the credit. 
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Santander (Santander) as the nominated bank to advise the credit and add its 
confirmation. The deferred payment was due 180 days from the date of the bill of 
lading. Santander’s advice of the credit to Bayfern offered, in addition to the deferred 
payment, the possibility of discounting the full value of the credit at Santander’s 
offered rate of discount. 
 
On 15 June 1998, the beneficiary presented documents to Santander. The presentation 
was found to be conforming, and the obligation of Paribas (issuer) and Santander 
(confirmer) to pay Bayfern (beneficiary) the amount of the credit after 180 days in 
accordance with the deferred payment credit thereupon crystallised on the 27 
November 1998. But before the maturity date for the deferred payment credit, 
Santander informed Bayfern’s bank that it had discounted the documents and had paid 
the sum of money less the discounting fee into Bayfern’s bank account. In return, 
Bayfern irrevocably and unconditionally assigned its right under the deferred payment 
credit to Santander. However, before the maturity date of the credit, Paribas as the 
issuer of the credit, informed Santander that the documents that it (Santander) had 
presented included forged documents. On the maturity date, Paribas refused to pay 
Santander, on the ground of fraud on the part of Bayfern prior to the maturity date of 
the credit. Accordingly, the central issue before the court was whether such refusal on 
account of fraud of Bayfern was justified. 
 
The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial judge’s finding that Bayfern had assigned its 
right under the credit to Santander. In consequence, Santander as an assignee of 
Bayfern’s right, took subject to equities of the assignor and could not be in a better 
position than the assignor (Bayfern). It was a matter of common understanding by the 
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parties that if the beneficiary as the assignor had sought payment at maturity, it would 
have failed because Paribas as the issuer of the credit would have had a good defence 
based on the fraud exception. In the alternative, an argument was made that Santander 
was entitled to reimbursement as a confirming bank when the confirming bank paid 
under the deferred payment credit under the UCP 500. This alternative argument was 
equally rejected by the Court of Appeal on the ground that the issuing bank was only 
required to reimburse the confirming bank when the confirming bank paid the money 
due at the maturity date rather than before it is due. This position of law defined the 
scope of the fraud rule under English law152 in a case of deferred payment undertaking 
prior to the introduction of UCP 600 and actually became an unwelcome development 
to a banking community who for commercial reasons153 were making the discounting 
of payment a common practice. 
 
However, with the coming into effect of the UCP 600, the UCP 600154 has resolved 
the dilemma created by the decision in Banco Santander and fraud could no longer be 
used as a ground to refuse payment to a nominated bank that has discounted payment 
prior to maturity even if fraud is discovered before the due date of the credit. This 
position of the UCP 600 undoubtedly has further implications for documentary credit 
practice in England. It applies where the credit has adopted the UCP 600. The 
question may then arise as to what happens in a deferred payment credit where the 
parties have opted out of the UCP 600. Which position applies- the position 
recognised in Banco Santander or the recent provision of the UCP 600 which has 
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been expressly excluded? Moreover, what happens where a bank that seeks to 
discount payment before maturity is not a nominated bank within the definition of 
UCP 600?   Lastly, what does art.12 (b) of the UCP 600 imply when it states ‘that 
once a bank is nominated to incur a deferred payment credit, the bank is authorised to 
prepay’? Has the provision in the UCP 600 rendered redundant the literal meaning of 
a deferred payment credit as payment due after a certain period of time on the 
presentation of complying documents? 
 
The above presented situations create legal difficulties with respect to the scope of the 
fraud rule in deferred payment credit in English law. However, it is submitted that the 
position reflected in UCP 600 art 12 (b) which states that ‘by nominating a bank to 
accept a draft or incur a deferred payment undertaking, an issuing bank authorises that 
nominated bank to prepay or purchase a draft accepted or a deferred payment 
undertaking incurred by that nominated bank’ is preferred to the position adopted in 
Banco Santander as it protects the interest of banks involved in the forfait market. 
 
Having assessed the scope of the fraud exception in English law, another issue that 
has troubled the court is the standard of proof required to establish fraud. For the 
purpose of succinctly analysing the standard of proof, the subject will be treated under 
three broad heading viz: application for interim or interlocutory injunction, standard 
of proof at full trial and finally summary judgment application. 
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3. 4. Standard of Proof 
 
This section explores the standard required to justify the proof of fraud in English law. 
This section deals with the standard of proof required in documentary credit fraud in 
three separate headings viz (i) application for interim/ interlocutory injunctions (ii) 
summary judgment application and (iii) proof required at full trial. 
 
3. 4.1. Injunctive Relief 
 
In documentary credits, whether the action is instituted by the applicant on its own 
accord or on the instruction of the paying bank that is unwilling to make payment, it is 
at times the case that the applicant for the credit seeks a remedy where he considers 
that the beneficiary is likely or has made a presentation under the credit which the 
beneficiary should not make and which the applicant feels ought not to be met with 
payment by the paying bank. Where the above situation arises, the applicant may seek 
to prevent the presentation or payment or both by applying for an injunctive relief155 
against either the bank to stop it from making payment or against the beneficiary to 
stop the beneficiary’s presentation. 
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 This application is sometimes made ex parte (without notice) and upon affidavit evidence. It has to 
be noted that the leading English authority on injunctions is the House of Lord’s decision in American 
Cyanamid Co v Ethicon [1975] AC 396, but care must be taken as letters of credit cases are perceived 
to be special cases which ought to be viewed somewhat differently from the American Cyanamid 
guidelines. See Staughton L.J in Group Josi Re v Walbrook Insurance Company [1996] 1 WLR 1152 at 
1160 quoting with approval the view of Lloyd LJ in Dong Jin Metal Co Ltd v Rayment Ltd Unreported, 
13 July 1993 Court of Appeal (Civil Division) transcript No 945 of 1993. 
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If the above situation arises, the standard of proof required in England in documentary 
credit fraud cases with respect to injunctions156 has been considered in some cases.157 
The cases emphasize that for fraud to be capable of restraining payment under the 
fraud rule, it must be clearly established both as to the fact of fraud and the bank’s 
knowledge. In Edward Owen158 the position was re-emphasized by Lord Denning MR 
when he held that ‘the only exception is where there is clear fraud of which the bank 
has notice’159 Geoffrey Lane LJ restated the opinion of Lord Denning MR when he 
said ‘If it has been clear and obvious to the bank that the buyer has been guilty of 
fraud’160 
 
The standard of proof required to establish fraud in letter of credit transaction was 
also considered in the United City Merchants (Investment) Ltd v Royal Bank of 
Canada,161 where the court adopted a rigid approach towards the application of the 
fraud rule by setting a high standard of proof which requires ‘clear,’ ‘obvious,’ or 
‘established’ fraud known to the issuer or confirmer of the letter of credit. 
Accordingly, fraud has been very difficult to establish in English courts.  
 
The restrictive standard of proof required in fraud cases in the American Accord has 
been followed by subsequent cases. In Themehelp Ltd v West and Others,162 one of 
the few English cases (though on demand guarantees) where an injunction was 
granted, the Court of Appeal followed the approach in American Accord with respect 
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to the standard of proof (in relation to injuncting an issuing bank) and affirmed the 
trial court’s decision. Balcombe, Evans and Waite LJJ, in the Court of Appeal citing 
the dictum of Ackner LJ in United Trading Corp. SA v Allied Arab Bank Ltd,163 noted 
that the standard of proof required of an applicant seeking to bring itself within the 
fraud rule was stated in the United Trading Case.164 The court pronounced that: 
 
…The evidence of fraud must be clear, both as to the fact of the fraud and as to 
the [guarantor’s] knowledge. The mere assertion or allegation of fraud would 
not be sufficient…We would expect the court to require a strong corroborative 
evidence of the allegation, usually in the form of contemporary documents, 
particularly those emanating from the buyer.165  
 
The court further stated that in general, for the evidence of fraud to be clear, it would 
be expected that the buyer was given the necessary opportunity to answer the 
allegation against him and he (buyer) fails to provide any, or any adequate answer in 
circumstances where one could properly be expected. If the court considers that on the 
material before it the only realistic inference166 to draw is that of fraud, then the seller 
would have made out a sufficient case. 
 
Also in Banco Santander SA v. Bayfern Ltd167 the confirmer discounted the obligation 
of a deferred payment letter of credit before its maturity. Shortly after the discounting, 
some of the documents presented were found to be fraudulent. Subsequently, the 
issuer refused to pay the confirmer. The confirmer brought the action against the 
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issuer for reimbursement and sought summary judgment, claiming it should be 
immune from the fraud rule despite fraud. At the trial of preliminary issues, fraud was 
assumed to have been established in the case. The trial court ruled for the issuer on the 
basis of established fraud. On appeal, the decision was upheld by the Court of Appeal. 
Both courts cited with approval, Lord Diplock’s above passage relating to the 
standard of proof. 
 
Another aspect, which is not much different from the above position with which the 
English law looks at the standard of proof, was evident in Solo Industries UK Ltd v. 
Canara Bank.168 In the Court of Appeal, Mance LJ in responding to the contention of 
the respondent bank as to the standard of proof, which must preclude ‘any possibility 
of innocent explanation,’ drew from the earlier case of United Trading Corp. SA v 
Allied Arab Bank Ltd169 and stated a position that directly confirms the position as 
postulated in the case of United Trading Corp. SA. 
 
Mance LJ recognized that the letter of credit is an essential machinery of international 
trade and to delay payment strikes not only at the proper working of international 
commerce but also at the reputation of the international banking community. He 
however, cited the observation of Mr. Justice Neill170 that it cannot be in the interest 
of the banking community as a whole if, having established an important exception to 
what had been previously been thought an absolute rule, the courts in practice were to 
adopt so restrictive an approach to the evidence required as to prevent themselves 
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from intervening. He also noted that if this was to be the case, then impressive and 
high sounding phrases such as ‘fraud unravels all’ would become meaningless. 
 
One notable academic171 commented as follows 
  
Material misrepresentation’ thus appears to have been settled as the standard 
of fraud in the law governing letters of credit in the United Kingdom. In 
language the English position is close to that of the United States in Revised 
U.C.C. Article 5, Section 109: “material fraud.” As both of them have not 
been sufficiently tested, it is too early to make a reasonable comparison. If a 
comparison has to be made, however, the difference between the two appears 
to be that the U.S. position is enshrined in a statute, but the U.K. position is 
embodied in the common law. 
 
From the above, what does suffice as the standard of proof has been formulated in 
different ways by the courts in England. Part of the reason being the court’s attempt to 
balance between setting a standard high enough to safeguard the autonomy principle 
but not so high as to be unattainable. This has led to differences of emphasis, ranging 
from ‘established or obvious’ fraud172 to ‘a good arguable case that on the material 
available the only realistic inference’ is that the beneficiary/seller was fraudulent173 or 
simply a ‘real prospect’ of establishing fraud.174  
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Another important issue that has been given consideration in ascertaining the standard 
of proof is the stage of proceeding at which the matter comes for consideration before 
the court. The above position applies if the proceeding is at the interlocutory stage. 
More so, even if the interlocutory injunction’s standard of proof is satisfied, the 
balance of convenience must favour the grant of injunction, and otherwise it will be 
refused.175  
 
3.4.2 Summary Judgment- Standard of Proof 
 
A bank may refuse to pay the beneficiary on grounds of what it perceives to be fraud 
affecting the letter of credit.176 Where the bank has refused payment, an aggrieved 
beneficiary 177  may seek a remedy in a court of law through an application for 
summary judgment against a bank that has refused payment upon the presentation of 
apparently conforming documents. Where the above position is the case, what is the 
level of proof required for this application to either fail or succeed? 
 
In England, summary judgment applications are governed by the English Civil 
Procedure Rules (CPR). Part 24.2 of the CPR states that ‘the court may give summary 
judgment against a claimant or defendant on the whole of a claim or on a particular 
issue if –  
(a)     it considers that –  
                                                 
175
 See Czarnikow-Rionda Sugar Trading Inc. v Standard Bank of London Ltd. and Others [1999] 2 
Lloyd’s Rep 187. 
176
 The fraud may be in the document themselves or from the underlying transaction that gave rise to 
the credit. 
177
 Aggrieved because payment has been refused in a manner that is inconsistent with a right which the 
beneficiary believes he legitimately has to be paid upon the presentation of conforming documents. 
60 
 
 
(i)     that claimant has no real prospect of succeeding on the claim or issue; or 
(ii)     that defendant has no real prospect of successfully defending the claim or 
issue; and  
 
(b)     there is no other compelling reason why the case or issue should be disposed of 
at a trial’.178  
 
In a letter of credit, the recent case of Enka Insaat Ve Sanayi AS v Banca Popolare 
dell'Alto Adige SpA179 ascertained the required standard of proof where an application 
for summary judgment is made by a claimant against a bank. The court noted that the 
proof required in a summary judgment by a beneficiary has previously been 
considered in three180 decided cases. However the court expressed the view that the 
standard of proof required with respect to how Part 24(2) of the (CPR) should be 
applied in a letter of credit where a summary judgment application is brought against 
a bank is not entirely clear. 
 
The court in Enka Insaat noted that in two previous authorities (Solo Industries v 
Canara Bank181 and Banque Saudi Fransi v Lear Siegler Services Inc) the standard of 
proof required by a defendant to refute a summary judgment application by a claimant 
was held to be higher than that required under CPR part 24.2. The standard of proof 
required was a heightened standard of proof as the courts considered the realistic 
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prospect of success to be a low test to satisfy. 182  After reviewing the above 
authorities,183  the court held that “the test to be applied must be that of a “real 
prospect” because that is the test set out in CPR Part 24. The court noted that it is 
bound to apply a “heightened test”.184 In arriving at this decision the court noted that 
it was mindful that in applying the test reflected in CPR Part 24 (2), the Court ought 
to be wary of the principle that banks, when sued on a letter of credit or performance 
bond or guarantee, need particularly cogent evidence to establish the fraud 
exception.185 
 
 
3.4.3 Full Trial 
 
At the trial stage, the bank has to prove fraud only on a civil standard requiring proof 
on a balance of probabilities. 186  However, Lord Nicholls clarified the necessary 
ingredients of this standard of proof in Re: H and others (minors)187 when he noted 
that ‘the balance of probability standard means that a court is satisfied an event 
occurred if the court considers that, on the evidence, the occurrence of the event was 
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more likely than not’.188 Lord Nicholls went further to give clarity to this standard 
required in civil cases by asserting that the court  
 
when assessing the probabilities the court will have in mind as a factor, to 
whatever extent is appropriate in the particular case, that the more serious the 
allegation the less likely it is that the event occurred and, hence, the stronger 
should be the evidence before the court concludes that the allegation is 
established on the balance of probability. Fraud is usually less likely than 
negligence. Deliberate physical injury is usually less likely than accidental 
physical injury. A step-father is usually less likely to have repeatedly raped 
and had non-consensual oral sex with his under age stepdaughter than on some 
occasion to have lost his temper and slapped her. Built into the preponderance 
of probability standard is a generous degree of flexibility in respect of the 
seriousness of the allegation.189 
 
By stating the above criteria, the court noted that it does not mean that where a serious 
allegation is in issue the standard of proof required is higher. It means only that the 
inherent probability or improbability of an event is itself a matter to be taken into 
account when weighing the probabilities and deciding whether, on balance, the event 
occurred.190 
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3. 5. Fraud Rule in Some Common Law Jurisdictions 
 
Section 3.5 takes a comparative analysis of the fraud rule in Canada, Singapore and 
Malaysia. The examination of the scope and standard of proof in these jurisdictions is 
the main thrust of the analysis. The objective is to ascertain the extent to which the 
practice in these jurisdictions is similar to or different from the English approach. 
 
3. 5. 1.  Canadian Approach to Fraud Rule 
 
The Canadian courts have recognised the fraud exception to the principle of autonomy 
of documentary credit. The recognition of the fraud rule in Canada is traceable to the 
US case of Sztejn v Henry Schroeder Banking Corporation.191 In Sztejn, an applicant 
for a credit claimed an injunction against the issuing bank to prevent the issuing bank 
paying on the documents which had been presented. The credit had been advised to 
the seller in India by the issuing bank’s correspondent in India. The correspondent 
bank had not confirmed the credit. The applicant alleged that what had been shipped 
was rubbish rather than bristle that was contracted for. The bank applied to dismiss 
the claim for an injunction on the ground that there was no cause of action.  
 
For the purpose of hearing the motion, Shientag J of the Supreme Court of New York, 
assumed that all the allegations of the complainants were true, namely, that the Indian 
seller was engaged in a scheme to defraud the plaintiff. Hence the buyer did not face 
the difficulty of establishing the fraud which he alleged with sufficient certainty to 
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satisfy the court. Based on the assumed facts that fraud had been committed in the 
transaction, the court rejected the bank’s motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint 
and decided in favour of the plaintiff. The court held that ‘in a situation where the 
seller’s fraud has been called to the bank’s attention before the drafts and documents 
have been presented for payment, the principle of the independence of the bank’s 
obligation under the letter of credit should not be extended to protect the unscrupulous 
seller.’ Following the Sztejn case, the Supreme Court of Canada in Bank of Nova 
Scotia v Angelica- Whitewear192 unanimously recognized the fraud exception to the 
independent nature of the bank’s obligation to the beneficiary. However, the 
application of the exception in terms of its scope has differed in some respect in 
different jurisdiction.193 
 
I. Scope of Fraud 
 
Arguably, the Canadian courts’ application of the fraud exception in documentary 
credit is wider than that of the English courts. The central issue is whether fraud 
should be restricted to documents or extended to the underlying transaction? For some 
time in England, the conventional view194 was that the fraud exception confines its 
enquiry to documents presented by the beneficiary for payment.195 This has been the 
position adopted by the English House of Lords in United City Merchant v Royal 
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Bank of Canada196  
 
However, the Canadian Courts have departed from the above position. In stating its 
fraud rule, it adopted a broad view that does not restrict the fraud to the tendered 
documents alone but will include fraud as evidenced in the underlying transaction. 
The exception broadly stated, was invoked in the Canadian case of Rossen v Pullen.197 
A woman who lived in Houston Texas agreed to live with and subsequently marry a 
man who resided in Toronto after about eleven months of cohabitation. Subject to the 
understanding that she would reside with him for the agreed period, an unconditional 
performance bond was opened in her favour. In flagrant abuse of the underlying 
agreement,198 she presented a demand for payment within just a few days of the date 
when the performance bond had been arranged. Craig J relying on fraud in the 
underlying transaction held that the action of the defendant in calling on the bond 
within two business days of its receipt when prima facie she knew she was not entitled 
to the proceeds of the letter of credit before the agreed period of cohabitation had 
expired, constituted fraud.  
 
In Henderson v Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce; Bruchet v Canadian Imperial 
Bank of Commerce199 the broad view of the fraud exception was also adopted. This 
case concerned an application for an interlocutory injunction brought by the plaintiff 
on ground of fraud. The plaintiff arranged an irrevocable letter of credit to fulfill his 
obligation relating to the purchase price of a unit entitlement in 20 episodes of two 
television shows from a production company. Although the shows were never 
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produced before the production company went into bankruptcy, the receiver made 
demand on the bank for payment under the letter of credit. Berger J in granting the 
injunction and deprecating the approach of the English court held 
 
Lord Diplock has rendered the exception in language that would limit it to 
cases where there is material misrepresentation of fact in the call documents. If 
the exception is to be understood in this way it means that the exception will 
be narrowed to the point of virtual insignificance… If Lord Diplock's 
statement of the exception to the rule is adopted, the exception becomes 
illusory. This court is not bound by the judgments of the courts in England, 
even those proceeding from highest authority. 
 
Hence the position of the court is that the fraud exception applies to what amounts, in 
the particular circumstances of a case, to a fraudulent demand for payment, and it has 
been said that the exception should not be confined, as possibly suggested in United 
City Merchants, to fraud in the tendered document200 
 
In the Canadian case of Bank of Nova Scotia v Angelica Whitewear Ltd,201 Le Dain J 
also noted, ‘In my opinion the fraud exception to the autonomy of documentary letters 
of credit should not be confined to cases of fraud in the tendered documents but 
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should include fraud in the underlying transaction of such a character as to make the 
demand for payment under the credit a fraudulent one . . ..’202 
 
It is submitted that if the rationale for the fraud exception is the law’s public policy 
stance on the control of fraud, an approach which includes fraudulent 
misrepresentation in the presented document as well as material fraud in the 
underlying transaction is a better approach.  
 
II. Standard of Proof 
 
As to the standard of proof of fraud required to establish the fraud exception, the 
Canadian courts initially started off adopting the English position as decided in 
Edward Owen Engineering Ltd v Barclays Bank Ltd,203 namely that of clear and 
established fraud. In Aspen Planners Ltd v Commerce Masonry and Farming Ltd,204 
Henry J of the Ontario Supreme Court cited the Edward Owen standard of obvious 
fraud known to the bank and dismissed an application for an interim injunction to 
restrain the contractor from drawing down the final payments of the contract price 
under the letters of credit and an interim injunction to restrain the bank from paying 
under the letters of credit. The reason of the court was that there was no established 
fraud of which the bank had knowledge. In Lumcorp Ltd v Canadian Imperial Bank of 
Commerce205 the court206 shared the same position when reference was made to the 
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case of Discount Record Ltd v Barclays Bank Ltd207 as to the standard of obvious 
fraud. 
 
However, more recent cases, have adopted a less onerous test of a ‘strong prima facie 
case’ of fraud on applications for interlocutory injunction, as exemplified by Galligan 
J in CDN Research and Development Ltd v Bank of Nova Scotia.208 The case involved 
a contract for the delivery to the Iranian government of five fire-fighting vehicles. 
Performance was secured via a standby letter of credit arranged by the Canadian 
sellers, which could be called upon in the event of their failure to deliver. A demand 
was made, but evidence indicated that it was long after delivery. The sellers applied to 
have the bank enjoined from paying out and the injunction was granted.209 The court 
reasoned that the potential harm of the plaintiff being defrauded without any realistic 
hope of redress weighed greater than the defendant bank’s potential harm of 
reputational damage in international banking circles. 210  Based on the foregoing 
reasoning of the court, it found a prima-facie proof of fraud sufficient to warrant an 
interlocutory injunction. This is contrary to the test of clearly established fraud 
advocated by the case of Edward Owen Engineering Ltd v Barclays Bank Ltd.211 
 
In the leading Canadian case of Bank of Nova Scotia v Angelica Whitewear,212 Le 
Dain J. drew a distinction as to the standard of proof required based on the stage 
and/or type of injunction being sought.  On the issues of what the account party must 
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show to justify the conclusion that the issuer was not obliged to pay out under the 
letter of credit because of prior knowledge of fraud by the beneficiary, the court found 
a prima-facie proof of fraud as sufficient. In a unanimous decision of the Supreme 
Court of Canada, it was held that a strong prima facie case of fraud is sufficient on an 
interlocutory injunction.213 However, on the application before the court, concerning 
whether the bank was entitled to reimbursement from the applicant when it has paid 
the beneficiary, it was held that the standard of fraud is that of established fraud. The 
reason is that since the bank had to exercise its own judgment as to whether or not to 
honour the draft, the test should be the stricter one as laid down in Edward Owen, 
namely: ‘whether fraud was so established to the knowledge of the issuing bank 
before payment of the draft as to make the fraud clear or obvious to the bank’.214 
On the facts of this case, it was held that the inflation of the prices in the invoice by 
some 17 dollars per dozen above those agreed to in the underlying sales contract did 
constitute sufficient fraud. However, the evidence had not been clearly brought to the 
bank’s attention prior to payment and it had no duty to undertake its own investigation 
on such matters.215 
 
3. 5.2.  Singapore 
 
The Singapore court’s approach to the fraud rule has been consistent with the 
approach of the English Courts as there has been a serious effort to streamline its 
letter of credit fraud practice with the approach in United City Merchants. To this 
extent, Brody White & Co Inc v Chemet Handel Trading (S) Pte Ltd216 confirmed the 
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trend of restricting letter of credit fraud to fraudulent misrepresentation in the 
documents as the applicable position of the law in Singapore. However, the general 
approach of the Singapore jurisdiction to the exceptions to the principle of autonomy 
in documentary credit appears to have ignored one of the core reasons for English 
restrictive approach to fraud rule.217 
 
I. Scope of Fraud 
 
As to the kind of fraud that will constitute an exception to the autonomy principle, the 
Singapore Court of Appeal in the case of Brody, White & Co Inc v Chemet Handel 
Trading (S) Pte Ltd218 followed the position in the United City Merchant. The court 
held that the kind of fraud sufficient to constitute an exception to the autonomy of 
irrevocable credits is fraud in the presentation of the required documents to the bank, 
that is, where the beneficiary, for the purpose of drawing on the credit, fraudulently 
presents to the bank documents that contain material representations of fact that to his 
knowledge are untrue. Hence the court categorically held that fraud in respect of the 
underlying contract of sale would not affect the contract of documentary credit 
between the seller and the issuing/ confirming bank.219 
 
The facts arose from a commercial relationship between Chemet Ltd (a Singapore 
Company) and Brody, White and Co (a US commodity trading company) in which a 
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letter of credit was utilized to finance a transaction between the parties. The appellants 
were commodity traders appointed by the respondents as their commodity brokers to 
trade in the New York Commodities Exchange and in the London Metal Exchange. 
Disagreements between the parties led to the appellant closing the market position of 
the respondent resulting in losses. The respondents commenced proceedings against 
the appellants for the loss suffered. The respondents also applied for an interim 
injunction to restrain the appellants from collecting or receiving any moneys under the 
letters of credit opened in their favour. The appellants filed a defence and 
counterclaim. The appellants also applied to discharge the interim injunction. 
However, Goh Joon Seng J ordered that the injunction was to be continued. The 
appellants appealed against the decision. The central ground of appeal was that the 
learned judge had failed to realize that a finding of fraud was the only ground for 
enjoining encashment of a letter of credit. 
 
The Singapore Court of Appeal, allowing the appeal, held that the kind of fraud 
sufficient to constitute an exception to the autonomy of irrevocable credits is fraud in 
the presentation of the required documents to the bank. Fraud in respect of the 
underlying contract of sale would not affect the contract of documentary credit 
between the seller and the issuing/confirming bank. 
 
On the facts of the case, the decision of the court should be applauded as it held that 
there was no letter of credit fraud. However, to hold that fraud in the underlying 
transaction does not form part of the fraud rule is with respect a judgment that could 
justifiably be argued to be flawed. It represents a misunderstanding of the fraud rule 
and its public policy stand for the prevention of fraud. Despite the Singapore courts 
72 
 
adopting the position in England that seeks to restrict fraud in the documents alone, 
recent case law220 in England suggest that fraud in the underlying transaction is part of 
the fraud rule. 
 
On a proper analysis of the grounds for judgment, it seems the reason for the decision 
solely lies in the House of Lords pronouncement in United City Merchants v Royal 
Bank of Canada. 221  The Singapore Court of Appeal relying on the United City 
Merchants held, ‘It would seem that fraud as perpetrated by the seller on the buyer in 
respect of the underlying contract of sale between them would not affect the contract 
of documentary credit between the seller and the issuing/ confirming bank.’222 The 
pronouncement of the court, with respect appears to lack conviction, as it seems the 
court is not sure if the pronouncement of Lord Diplock meant that fraud in the 
underlying transaction is not part of the fraud rule.223 It also seems to be out of 
position with modern documentary credit practice in other jurisdictions. 224  Also, 
persuasive in this regard is the Scottish case of Royal Bank of Scotland v Homes225 
where Lord Macfadyn in answering the question as to whether fraud inducing the 
underlying contract will “infect” the claim for payment, enabling the customer to 
resist the bank’s claim for reimbursement on the ground that fraud brought to the 
knowledge of the bank was furnished with adequate material evidencing that fraud 
before it met the beneficiary’s demand, made this insightful comment.  ‘my initial 
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impression was that fraud at that earlier stage would not support the fraud exception, 
but on reflection it seems to me that it might do so’226 His lordship went on to reason 
that if fraud induced a party to enter into an underlying contract upon which a demand 
guarantee was issued, then the beneficiary’s subsequent demand on the guarantee was 
in a derivative sense also fraudulent.227 
 
However, if the approach of the Singapore court was to restrict the fraud rule in the 
same manner as in England, one would have thought that the reason why the English 
court adopted a restrictive approach to the scope of fraud would have been taken into 
consideration. The English approach tends to emphasize the autonomous nature of 
documentary credits and the importance of international trade. But the recognition in 
Singapore of another exception228 to the autonomy of documentary credit calls for a 
re-thinking as to whether its jurisdiction actually favours the restrictive approach of 
the fraud rule as adopted by English Court. It is submitted that the recognition of 
another exception in Singapore is an indication that the court is not comfortable with 
the restrictive approach of the English fraud rule as a grounds for withholding the 
beneficiary from payment even though the decision of Brody, White & Co is to that 
effect. It suggests that its approach favours conditions that are not so restrictive as to 
encourage abusive drawing, bad faith and generally ignore what the credit calls for as 
well as the competing interest of the parties in the transaction. 
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II. Standard of Proof 
 
The standard of proof needed to withhold payment under a documentary credit 
appears somewhat different from that of demand guarantees. As a result the position 
adopted in Singapore may call for a serious reflection as it has been far from being 
harmonious.229 In line with its common law background, the courts seek to adopt the 
position in England. Hence, the Singapore Court of Appeal in Korea Industry Co Ltd 
v Andoll Ltd230 held that for fraud to be adduced as a ground for withholding payment, 
it must be clear fraud. The court held that ‘where fraud was alleged at an interlocutory 
stage, there had to be clear evidence to support the allegation, with strong 
corroborative evidence in the form of contemporary documents; the buyer also had to 
be given an opportunity to answer the allegations and to have failed to answer 
adequately’.231 
 
It is the position of the law that letters of credit stand on the same footing with 
performance bonds. However, in the case of Chartered Electronics Industries Pte Ltd 
v Development Bank of Singapore,232 the Singapore High Court had the opportunity to 
consider the standard of proof required in fraud cases so as to enjoin the beneficiary 
from receiving payment. It held, choosing to adopt the position applicable in Canada, 
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that the required standard of proof is not that of obvious or clear fraud but the less 
onerous ‘strong prima-facie case of fraud.’ The case relates to an application made by 
the plaintiff to continue two separate interlocutory injunctions, which, were obtained 
ex-parte restraining the defendant from paying any money under a performance 
guarantee and an indemnity issued by them on the grounds of the beneficiary fraud.  
 
Keong J, of the Singapore High Court compared the test evident in the Canadian case 
of CDN Research and Development Ltd v Bank of Nova Scotia233 of ‘strong prima-
facie case of fraud’ with the standard of proof articulated by Lord Denning in Edward 
Owen Engineering Ltd v Barclays Bank International Ltd. And Another234 (Standard 
of clear or obvious fraud) and held that ‘there is no reason why the less onerous test of 
a “strong prima case” should not suffice for instruments given purely to secure the 
performance of contracts.’ 235  The learned Justice reasoned that a performance 
guarantee could be an oppressive instrument if abused. Such abuse is given 
encouragement if the court, by laying down a standard of proof at the threshold, 
which a plaintiff can seldom (if ever) cross, is often unable to grant relief.  
 
He went further to state that in Edward Owen Engineering;236 Lord Denning MR 
realized the dilemma of his own decision237 as he was moved to observe that abuse 
was such a real possibility that ‘the English supplier, if he is wise, will take it [the 
10% or 5% performance guarantee] into account when quoting his price for the 
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contract’.238 In justification of his decision, he cited Smith J in CDN Research and 
Development Ltd v Bank of Nova Scotia239 to the effect that ‘it may well be that the 
test of ‘clear fraud’ is too high for it takes us beyond the interlocutory into the realm 
of final determination. And more importantly, it purports to facilitate international 
transactions without sufficient regard for the clear signal that a refusal to enjoin may 
send to those who would engage in unscrupulous and fraudulent activities’.240 
 
He concluded that the injunction would be extended on the grounds that the demand 
for payment under the performance guarantee by the buyers (defendant) was not made 
bona fide. As to the applicable standard of proof, the learned judge noted that ‘the test 
applied by Galligan J of a strong prima facie case appears to be more apt and is less 
onerous than that of Lord Denning in Edward Owen Engineering Ltd v Barclays Bank 
International Ltd,241 of clear or established fraud.’ 
 
On proper reflection on the issues raised in the case and the decision reached, it 
appears inconsistent with the earlier Court of Appeal decision in Korea Industry Co 
Ltd v Andoll Ltd242 that set the standard of clear and obvious fraud. As performance 
guarantees stand on the same footing with letter of credit in terms of applicable 
principles,243 one would have thought that under the doctrine of precedent, the High 
Court in Chartered Electronics Industries Pte Ltd v Development Bank of 
Singapore 244  would have adopted the earlier position as enunciated in Korea 
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Industry’s case, which reflects the position of the Court of Appeal. However, it did 
not. The apparent inconsistency in decisions appears to be linked with the imprecise 
and unsatisfactory manner in which the issues of fraud and fraud rule in letters of 
credit have been handled in England.245 But the inevitable consequence of the above 
scenario is that the position of the law as to the standard of proof  in Singapore is far 
from being clear as conflicting decisions make legal clarity an illusion. 
 
 
3. 5.3.  Malaysia 
 
Documentary credit fraud has not been a subject of detailed decisions in Malaysian 
Law.246 Due to the want of detailed decisions on documentary credits, an effort will 
be made to use decisions on performance bond, which have been held247 to stand on a 
similar footing with documentary credit to analyze the Malaysian position. To this 
extent, the Malaysian courts have recognized the existence of the fraud exception to 
the principle of autonomy in documentary credit.  In Nafas Abadi Holdings Sdn Bhd V 
Putrajaya Holdings Sdn Bhd &Anor,248 it was held that ‘the performance guarantee 
stands on the similar footing to a letter of credit. A bank which gives a performance 
guarantee must honour that guarantee according to its terms. It is not concerned in the 
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least with the relations between the parties to the transaction. The bank must pay 
according to its guarantee, on demand, if so stipulated, without proof or conditions. 
The only exception is where there is clear fraud of which the bank has notice’249 
 
However, the understanding of the fraud rule in Malaysia has not been free from 
controversy. Judicial decisions in the area, with respect, seem inconsistent and 
irreconcilable.  In some cases, authorities seem to favour the high standard of proof 
adopted in England. In others, there is the trend of following what is considered to be 
capable of doing justice in the particular circumstances 250  of each case, thereby 
lowering the standard of proof of fraud.  An effort will made to discuss these issues 
under the heading of the scope of fraud and the standard of proof required in Malaysia. 
 
I. Scope of Fraud 
 
No attempt has been made by Malaysian courts to set the scope of fraud capable of 
withholding payment under the fraud rule. 251  Will fraud only be evident in the 
document or will it include fraud in the underlying transaction? Secondly, what kind 
of fraud is capable of enjoining payment? For the purposes of the fraud rule in 
Malaysia, is fraud that is capable of enjoining payment akin to the common law tort of 
deceit,252 as contended in England by some writers, or will it include the concept of 
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abusive drawing as some writers have posited? Many cases253 have given an insight254 
into the way the fraud rule is construed in Malaysia. The trend in the line of decided 
cases in Malaysia suggests that the fraud that will entitle the issuing bank or the 
confirming bank to refuse payment to the beneficiary will not only relate to fraud as 
evident in the documents but will include fraud in the underlying transaction. The 
attitude of the courts has been that what will constitute fraud as to warrant an 
injunction has to be arrived at taking the whole circumstances of the matter into 
consideration.255 
 
 In The Radio and General Trading Co Sdn Bhd v Wayss & Freytag256 the Malaysian 
High Court upheld the existence of the fraud exception and took the position that 
while an injunction could not be granted against a bondsman- in this case the bank-, it 
was available against the beneficiary to restrain him from calling on the bond in 
circumstance where he had no right to payment.  
 
However, the position adopted in Radio and General Trading is contrary to the earlier 
position adopted by the Malaysian court in Bains Harding (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd v Arab 
Malaysian Merchant Bank Bhd257 where the court readily granted an interlocutory 
injunction in favour of an account party to restrain the beneficiary of the bond from 
receiving payment under the performance bond on the basis that the defendants 
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(beneficiary) were guilty of fraud and had acted in bad faith.258 The facts were that the 
plaintiff contracted to carry out certain insulation and painting work as sub-
contractors to the defendants in respect of the defendants’ contract with the main 
contractor. The services were highly specialized which meant that only the plaintiff 
and very few others including a company called  Meisei Corporation of Japan was 
capable of doing the work. Two performance bonds were provided by the plaintiff and 
issued by the first defendant (Malaysian Merchant Bank) in the form of guarantee.  
 
The defendants subsequently terminated the contract, relying on a clause which 
provided that the contractor had a right at any time, for any reason and at its absolute 
discretion to terminate the contract by notice in writing. There was no allegation by 
the defendants that the plaintiff was in default in the performance of its work. After 
the termination of the contract, Meisei Corporation took over the plaintiff's work, and 
the defendants demanded that the plaintiff pay its creditors (the lower-tier 
subcontractors), failing which the defendants would seek payments under the bank 
guarantees. The plaintiff contended that the defendants were not entitled to make such 
claims. The plaintiff further argued that the defendants had conveniently terminated 
the contract, and gave it to Meisei Corporation with which the defendants had a 
financial connection, and that the defendants called on the bank guarantees to pay off 
the lower tier subcontractors so that Meisei Corporation could continue to utilize the 
lower tier subcontractors' services to complete its work, at the expense of the plaintiff.  
 
Based on the above ground and pending trial of the issues in question, the plaintiff 
applied to the court for an interlocutory injunction restraining the defendants from 
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accepting any money from the bank under the guarantees. The Malaysian High Court 
granted the injunction on grounds of the defendants’ fraud and bad faith. On the facts 
of the case, the court’s ruling has many implications. One, fraud cannot be restricted 
in the documents alone. Secondly, the approach to the fraud capable of enjoining 
payment is not common law fraud as there is a continuous reference to what is 
equitable. Also the readiness with which Malaysian courts are willing to grant 
injunction on grounds of perceived fraud of the beneficiary at the interlocutory stage 
raises doubt as to its appreciation and understanding of the English position of ‘clear 
and established fraud’ which, in most cases, the courts seek to adopt in many decided 
cases.259 More so, granting an interlocutory injunction against the bank seems to have 
neglected many of the core reasons of the restrictive approach of the English Courts. 
It downplays some of the pertinent issues that have been raised in the English Court in 
line with the ‘Siskina’260 doctrine and balance of convenience test. In the granting of 
an interlocutory injunction against the bank, are the necessary questions being asked 
as to whether the account party has a cause of action against the bank which has a 
mandate to pay once a call has been made or complying documents has been 
presented? 
 
As there is no Malaysian decision that has categorically ruled on the scope of fraud, 
an insight into the scope of fraud can only be inferred from the decisions so far held 
on fraud rule. Judging from the courts’ penchant to use fraud and bad faith 261 
sometimes interchangeably, and the consideration of whether a call or documentary 
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presentation is inequitable262 or not, it may not be unreasonable to contend that the 
scope of the Malaysian fraud rule extends to bad faith or equitable fraud. This in 
effect means that the Malaysian fraud rule may not be as restrictive as some of its 
decided cases suggest but will include a consideration of issues in the underlying 
contract to determine whether fraud exist.263 
 
II. Standard of Proof 
 
The standard of proof of fraud is not very clear. In Nafas Abadi Holdings Sdn Bhd v 
Putrajaya Holdings Sdn Bhd264 the court in answering the question of the required 
standard of proof for the grant of an injunction stated that the answer lies in the 
judgment of Ackner LJ in United Trading,265 which is ‘have the plaintiffs established 
that it is seriously arguable, that on the material available, the only realistic inference 
is that the beneficiary could not honestly have believed in the validity of its demands 
on the letter of credit’.266 However, the court after considering the standard approved 
by the dictum of Ackner LJ that it cited, went on to state its view in the following 
terms; ‘on the contrary, I consider the correct contractual inference that should 
normally be drawn is that the beneficiary will be entitled to draw on the letter of credit 
provided that he has a bona fide claim to payment under the underlying contract.’267 
Though this statement does not properly reflect the actual standard of proof adopted 
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by the court, the overall stance of the court in the case suggested an approach that did 
not favour the high standard of proof adopted by Ackner LJ in United Trading. 
 
From the foregoing position of the court, it seems the standard of proof adopted by 
Ackner LJ is at variance with the inference drawn by the Malaysian High Court.268  
While the test of Ackner LJ promotes a high standard based on the common law proof 
of fraud; the reference made to ‘bona fide claims’ suggests an adoption of the 
equitable standard to the proof of fraud. The position thus adopted on the standard of 
proof seems to have departed from the earlier stand taken by the Malaysian courts269 
on the fraud exception. Hence, in Kirames Sdn Bhd v Federal Land Development 
Authority,270 the court consistently referred to the test propounded by Ackner LJ in 
United Trading Corp271 and Lord Denning Edward Owen272 which points to clearly 
established fraud as the only requirement for a restraint on payment.  
 
 
3. 6. Conclusion 
 
The fraud exception to the principle of autonomy in documentary credits remains 
largely controversial in terms of definition and application. In English law, the 
perception that the fraud rule is akin to the tort of deceit is not established because 
letter of credit fraud can be established without the proof of the ingredients of reliance 
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and damages required to prove the tort of deceit. Hence a bank that has refused to pay 
the beneficiary as a result of fraud has not relied on any misrepresentation on the part 
of the beneficiary but is refusing payment because the representation is fraudulent. So, 
if there is a summary judgment application against the bank, to establish fraud, the 
bank need not show its reliance on the misrepresentation or that it has been damaged 
by it. Hence this may be an invitation to check the propriety of the assertion that letter 
of credit fraud is akin to the tort of deceit.  It is submitted that, what is necessary to 
establish letter of credit fraud is to prove the dishonesty of the beneficiary in tendering 
the false documents. 
 
The question of whether the fraud exception includes fraud in the underlying 
transaction is still open in England despite recent cases pointing towards recognizing 
fraud in the transaction as part of the fraud rule. However, the Singapore Court of 
Appeal273 relying on the House of Lords decision in American Accord held that fraud 
in the transaction is not part of the fraud rule. If regard is had to recent trends in 
documentary credits practice in England, the Singapore Court of Appeal position on 
the fraud rule, despite its restatement of the English position as the position in 
Singapore may not represent the current state of the law in England. 
 
In England, the task of establishing letters of credit fraud at the interlocutory stage 
becomes even more arduous by the usual insistence, on the requirement of clear fraud. 
Plausible as this requirement might be as it promotes the mercantile objective of the 
assurance of payment to the beneficiary without unnecessary recourse to minor 
underlying contractual disputes, it leaves one wondering whether such a requirement 
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has not raised the level of proof to a point where its practical utility becomes illusory. 
In England, the fraud rule is part of the common law and to establish fraud, an enquiry 
into the mind of a suspected fraudster as to determine his intent, knowledge and 
dishonesty poses tremendous difficulty in terms of proof. As a result, a disturbing 
feature is that fraud is very difficult to prove even in the absence of good faith on the 
part of the defendant. However, in Malaysia, fraud is most often confused with bad 
faith and has encouraged what seems like a lower standard of proof. 
 
Finally, the fraud rule in documentary credit will continue to be a source of 
conflicting application until there is uniformity of perception as to the two competing 
considerations. The differences of view with respect to fraud issues, particularly the 
kind of fraud and proof required, reflect the tension between the two principal policy 
considerations: the importance to international commerce of maintaining the principle 
of the autonomy of documentary credits and the limited role of an issuing bank in the 
application of that principle; and the importance of discouraging or suppressing fraud 
in letter of credit transactions. Until there is a clear signal as to which policy 
consideration is superior to the other, the era of conflicting decisions274 and apparent 
irreconcilable treatment of the fraud rule is still far from being over. However, it is 
respectfully submitted that between the competing considerations, the public policy 
stand of the law in discouraging fraud should be encouraged. Hence Galligan J275  
posited: ‘I do not think a Court can live in a vacuum and close its eyes completely to 
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world events;’ commercial fraud is on the increase and assuming boundless and 
unpredictable level of sophistry. If the trend is left unchecked by the rigid application 
of the fraud rule, the inevitable outcome might as well pose a more potent danger to 
the commercial utility of letter of credit. 
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Chapter Four 
 
4.0.                                                    Nullity 
 
4. 1. Introduction 
 
This chapter examines the nullity exception in documentary credits. It analyses the 
exception, having the primary objective to establish whether the nullity exception 
is or should be an exception to the principle of autonomy in documentary credit 
and whether it merits the recognition which a common law jurisdiction276 and 
some commentators 277  have accorded it. In order to accomplish this task and 
further our understanding of the exception, it may be helpful to remind ourselves 
of a point raised in the introductory chapter in respect of the definition of 
documentary credit offered by Professor Kozolchyk. 278 Documentary credit was 
once described by Professor Kozolchyk279 as a new type of mercantile currency 
embodying an abstract promise of payment, which possesses a high, though not 
total, immunity from attack on the ground of breach of duty of the seller to the 
buyer. This apt definition of documentary credits, for the curious mind, raises a 
further question inherent in the definition itself as to the circumstance(s) 
contemplated in the definition under which the high immunity evident in the 
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abstract promise to pay will be not total.280 Established circumstances exist in 
documentary credits that are capable of breaching the autonomy (immunity of 
abstract promise) rule and it is undisputed in English law that fraud of the 
beneficiary displaces the abstract promise to pay the beneficiary or the 
impregnability of documentary credit.  
 
Put differently, the abstract promise to pay is not immune from the fraud of the 
beneficiary in England. Despite the traditional English position (that it is only in 
the case of fraud of which the beneficiary is culpable that the impregnability of 
documentary credit could be broken), other issues (regarding the circumstances 
under which the impregnability of documentary credit could be displaced) continue 
to generate much judicial attention and debate within the courts and academic 
circles.  One of those issues is whether a null document, presented by the 
beneficiary and or a third party is an independent ground, different from fraud, 
upon which the autonomy doctrine could be displaced. It is against this background 
that nullity (considered in Singapore as a separate exception to the principle of 
autonomy, but currently, at least in practice, rejected in England for constituting no 
separate exception) will be analyzed in this chapter. 
 
The cases and judicial dicta generating the debate whether nullity is an exception 
to the principle of autonomy in documentary credit are demonstrably articulated 
mainly in two English decisions- United City Merchant Ltd v Royal Bank of 
Canada281 and Montrod Ltd v Grundkotter.282 The established view is that nullity 
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is not part of English documentary credit law. This view, reflected in judicial 
decisions in England represents the current position of English documentary credit 
law.  
 
However, a thorough analysis of nullity as reflected in judicial dicta in English 
documentary credit law may point to some issues of nullity (as an exception to the 
principle of autonomy) still unresolved. This unresolved issue283 regarding nullity 
together with the difficulty 284  inherent in utterly rejecting a separate nullity 
exception, necessitated a Singapore court to authoritatively hold that null document 
presented by the beneficiary in seeking payment under documentary credits are an 
exception to the principle of autonomy, and may lead an issuing bank/confirming 
bank presented with null documents to refuse payment to a good faith beneficiary 
in circumstances where his moral blameworthiness could not be established. This 
decision is apparently in conflict with established English authorities. However, 
despite its conflict with established English authorities, it raises crucial issues on 
the question of nullity in documentary credits that are the object of this chapter. 
What reason/rationale underpins the conflicting decisions reached by two common 
law jurisdictions on the same legal issue? Which position represents a better 
approach considering the nature of documentary credit and principles that govern 
its application in financial transactions? Is it possible to ascertain with identifiable 
clarity, the scope of a general nullity exception? What are the arguments, if any, in 
favour of a nullity exception in documentary credits and how they compare with 
                                                 
283
 Whether there is room for judicial recognition of a separate nullity exception in documentary credits 
law. Also because Lord Diplock did leave the issue of nullity open in the United City Merchants v 
Royal bank of Canada [1983] 1 AC 168. 
284
 Difficulty in the sense that null document does not generally become conforming document 
primarily because the presenter of the document is not implicated in any way in the document being a 
nullity. 
90 
 
the counter-arguments against its recognition? The above issues will be considered 
in detail in this chapter. 
 
For the sake of structural clarity, the chapter is divided into five sections. Section 
4.1, introduces the topic and highlights the structure and basis of the entire 
argument undertaken in the entire chapter. Section 4.2, discusses the nature of 
nullity exception. In discussing the nature of nullity exception, the analysis will 
draw from the perception of nullity in general law. The objective is to assess the 
extent to which the understanding of nullity in general law assists in giving clarity 
to the proper understanding of the concept as the basis of the exception to the 
principle of autonomy in documentary credits. . In Section 4.3, the crux of the 
analysis is to critically examine the merits and demerits of nullity as an exception 
to the principle of autonomy in documentary credit. Section 4.4, examines the 
sometimes difficult question of the applicable scope of the nullity exception in 
documentary credit. Here, the study will examine in detail some of the grounds that 
need to be met before a nullity exception would apply. In analyzing the scope, it 
considers to what extent, if any, the contention that a general nullity exception 
would be incapable of definition defeats the essence of the exception in 
documentary credit.  Section 4.5, presents a conclusion based on the foregoing 
analysis. 
 
4. 2. Nature of Nullity Exception 
 
This section discusses the meaning of nullity in two contexts. It examines the 
meaning and effect of nullity in general law. The analysis of nullity in general law 
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provides an introduction to the analysis of nullity in documentary credits. In the 
course of the chapter, the cases that have addressed the nullity exception will be 
used as a yardstick for analysing the merits of the contention (in subsequent 
sections) whether a general nullity exception has any future in the law of 
documentary credits.   
 
4. 2.1. Nullity in General Law 
 
Nullity in general law provides a seemingly difficult and complex legal puzzle285 
in terms of articulating precisely its meaning. To this extent, its use in law has been 
seen in different spheres with varied and at times conflicting meaning.286 In general 
law, the use of the term nullity, in reference to many legal situations is not novel 
and it is accepted that there are different types of nullities, judging from the 
different ways in which the term has been used in legal situations. Take for 
example, the use of the term absolute and relative nullities are known in law to 
have varying legal consequences.287 Apart from the consequences arising from 
distinguishing types of nullities, nullity is perceived to arise in law through a 
variety of ways. It could arise through mistake, lack of consent or incapacity. It 
also could arise through fraud, forgery or even illegality. 288  Despite the ways 
through which nullity could arise, ascertaining what a nullity is in general law 
remains a difficult question.289 Looking at its literal meaning, it has been defined 
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differently though in many respect, the definitions share similar characteristics. 
Nullity is defined as ‘nothing, … an act or proceeding in a cause which the 
opposite party may treat as though it had not taken place or which has absolutely 
no legal force or effect.’290 It has also been seen as ‘want of force- efficacy, an 
error … which is incurable, and this differs from an irregularity, which is 
amenable’291 The meaning of nullity is perceived in a similar light to the legal 
phrase null and void.  These words when used in a statute or legal document 
indicate that the usual expected legal consequences will not follow upon the act or 
thing in connection with which they are used. They are the exact contrary of the 
words ‘full force and effect.’  
 
The central message that derives from these definitions is that nullity once 
established has the effect of invalidating the legal obligation and expectation of the 
parties. However, since ascertaining what a nullity is depends largely on the factual 
matrix of each individual case, opinion has been divided as to whether its use in 
law is helpful. 
 
 
4. 2.2.  Nullity in Documentary Credits 
 
The issue of nullity in documentary credit292 usually manifests itself in the form of 
documents that are perceived to be forged, valueless or false so as to destroy the 
essence of the document. Determining the extent of falsity in a document as to 
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classify it as a nullity has been uncertain. Take for example, Devlin J. in Kwei Tek 
Chao v British Traders and Shippers293 who described a misdated bill of lading as 
being ‘valueless but not a complete nullity’.294 Conversely Leggatt J. in Egyptian 
International Foreign Trade Co v Soplex Wholesale Supplies (The Raffaella)295 was 
of the opinion that a misdated bill of lading which additionally included a 
misstatement of the vessel's name as a ‘sham piece of paper’296 The uncertainty with 
respect to what actually is a nullity appear to be at the root of the criticism levelled 
against recognising this exception.  
 
However, the nullity exception (as well as other exceptions like fraud and illegality) 
in documentary credit is invoked to challenge the underlying reason for the autonomy 
principle- that the letter of credit is independent of the underlying contract in respect 
of which it is issued. It is this cardinal principle evident in the autonomy principle that 
forms the bedrock of the documentary credit. The principle as captured by Lord 
Diplock is to ‘give the seller an assured right to be paid before he parts with control of 
the goods that does not permit of any dispute with the buyer as to the performance of 
the contract being used as a ground for non payment or reduction or deferment of 
payment’.297 This autonomy principle ensured the smooth and speedy utilization of 
letter of credit with issues in the underlying transaction being no bar to immediate 
payment. However, to ensure that the principle of autonomy operates without problem 
in documentary credit, it is equally complimented by another crucial principle, that is 
the principle or doctrine of strict compliance. The compliance by the beneficiary 
strictly with the presentation requirements as stipulated in the strict compliance 
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doctrine ensures that there is no recourse to the underlying sale contract with respect 
to payment for the goods.  
 
These two doctrines (autonomy and strict compliance) have been neatly captured by 
stating that the letter of credit is independent from the underlying sale contract and 
that the beneficiary will be paid by the issuing/confirming bank provided that he 
presents documents that conform strictly to the requirement of credits. This principle 
operates regardless of any dispute that the seller may have with the buyer, for example 
in respect of the quality of the goods. Once the above principle is complied with, the 
beneficiary must be paid and the buyer/ applicant must seek his remedies against the 
beneficiary separately. A point that needs to be emphasized is that the principle of 
independence in intrinsically interwoven with the doctrine of strict compliance in 
order to be effective and produce the required certainty in documentary credits. Where 
this is so, is it correct to argue that the autonomy principle trounces all countervailing 
arguments 298  even where it could be established that a document has failed the 
compliance test by reason of being a nullity. To this effect, one of the key questions 
that will be pursued subsequently in this chapter is whether the principle of autonomy 
actually trounces all countervailing arguments where a presentation is a nullity. Put 
differently, whether the presentation of a document, which by the circumstances of 
that document is agreed to be a null document could be said to represent a conforming 
document stipulated by the credit. If it is not a conforming document by reason of 
failing the strict compliance test which is intrinsically interwoven with the autonomy 
doctrine as to make it effective, does the nullity exception not survive the autonomy 
doctrine? 
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It is in the above context that nullity is discussed as an exception to the principle of 
autonomy. It is an exception that is separate from fraud that arises as a result of fraud 
of the beneficiary of the credit in a situation where for example, he (beneficiary) has 
falsified the documents. Hence, the nullity exception arises where the document 
tendered is a nullity but the beneficiary is free from any fraud on his part. What is 
crucial in the nullity exception is that a tendered document is a nullity that has arisen 
through various ways. It could arise due to a mistake, 299  incapacity or lack of 
consent; 300  it could even arise through fraud, 301  forgery or illegality rendering a 
required document a nullity. Where this is the position, what then is the effect of the 
null document in documentary credit? Will the beneficiary still be paid regardless of 
the null document since it could not be established that he is guilty of any fraud on his 
part? 
 
One of the strongest criticisms of the nullity exception is that it is imprecise in terms 
of definition. Part of the reason for the imprecision is that the concept of nullity is not 
developed in documentary credit law. However, this has not deterred the finding of 
nullity in documentary credit cases.302 As early as 1993, Goh Phai Cheng303 of the 
Singapore High Court has precisely identified the problem of nullity occasioned by 
the forgery of a document caused by an imposter. The court relied on the grounds that 
the documents were discrepant, but however observed that the nullity of the document 
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would be a serious ground upon which payment could be denied to the beneficiary in 
circumstances where his moral turpitude could not be impeached.  
 
The court noted in Lambias Co v HSBC304 as follows, ‘In the present case, the QWI 
certificate cannot be said to be anything but a nullity. First, it was issued by the 
beneficiary instead of the applicant as required by the letter of credit. Secondly, it 
failed to state the necessary particulars to relate it to the goods which were the subject 
of the letter of credit. Thirdly, it failed to contain the necessary statement as to the 
quality or weight of the goods ostensibly inspected, and most important of all, it had 
been counter-signed by an imposter and not by the party appointed to sign it. All these 
elements taken together made the QWI certificate a nullity ab initio. There was no 
question of the certificate having been accepted by any party as a valid document’.305 
The decision in Lambias (Importers & Exporters) Co v Hongkong & Shanghai 
Banking Corporation306  indicates that the court considers some issues in determining 
whether a document is a nullity. The extent and nature of the falsity in a document are 
factors that the courts are likely to consider in determining if a document is an utter 
nullity.307 It has been suggested that, if the falsity in the document destroys the ‘whole 
or essence of the instrument,’ it will be considered a nullity.308 
 
Also in the American Accord, Lord Diplock remarked that it may be that the 
American Accord does not apply to a document which is a nullity, a document ‘so 
worthless to the confirming bank as a security for its advances to the buyer.’ Hence 
Lord Diplock described a null document as such document whose fault deprived it of 
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all legal effects.309 Regarding the document tendered, Lord Diplock opined as follows, 
‘the bill of lading with the wrong date of loading placed on it by a carrier’s agent was 
far from being a nullity. It was a valid transferable receipt for the goods giving the 
holder a right to claim them at their destination… and was evidence of the terms of 
the contract under which they were carried.’ It was evident from the above passage of 
Lord Diplock that since the incorrect date of loading did not prevent the document 
tendered from performing the essential function of a bill of lading, it could not have 
been said to be a nullity.  
 
The lesson supposedly derived from Lord Diplock’s statement is that what constitutes 
a nullity in that circumstance depends to a large extent on the legal right conferred on 
the holder of the bill against the carrier. If it still properly confers on the holder of the 
bill, the right to claim the cargo on arrival, it could, by implication not be said to be a 
nullity because of the incorrect date of shipment. The justification for this is that the 
incorrect date on the bill of lading in the circumstance (the right to claim the cargo on 
presentation of the bill of lading was still available to the holder of the bill) does not 
deprive the document of all its legal effects. 
 
On the above parameters set by Lord Diplock, a bill of lading for an invented ship and 
cargo would be a classical example of nullity, since it would clearly not perform any 
of the functions identified by Lord Diplock in the above passage.310 Based on the 
same reasoning of Lord Diplock, a document would be a nullity if a bill of lading 
incorrectly identifies a ship or bears a forged master’s signature. It could also be a 
nullity if it was entirely forged for a non existing cargo on an existing ship since the 
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document could not bind the carrier or perform any of the functions identified above. 
The analysis of what amounts to a nullity as seen above depends on the factual matrix 
of each individual case and goes to prove that there are situations when what amounts 
to a nullity is not difficult to define as contended by some authorities.311 
 
4. 2.3.  Different Jurisdictions- Issues and Legal Positions 
 
To enhance a proper understanding of the nullity exception and the issues raised, the 
position of the different jurisdiction will be set out below. 
 
4. 2.3.1. English Position 
 
In English law, the nullity question that went beyond the fraud exception was 
deliberately left open by Lord Diplock in the House of Lords in the case of United 
City Merchant Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada. 312  However, the most current 
pronouncement on this issue was made by Potter LJ in 2001 in the case of Montrod 
Ltd v Grundkotter Fleischvertriebs GmbH,313 where his Lordship held that there is no 
general nullity exception in English law whether as a separate ground or as an 
extension of the fraud exception. The facts involved a document presented under a 
letter of credit, which had been signed by the beneficiary believing that it was 
authorized to do so by the applicant. Here, the applicant (Montrod) in the letter of 
credit was an English finance company that financed the purchase of frozen pork meat 
by a Russian buyer. One of the documents required under the credit was an inspection 
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certificate signed by the applicant. This was a device to ensure that the applicant 
(Montrod) was put in funds by the beneficiary to cover its liability when the credit 
was operated. The Russian buyer informed the seller that one of its employees should 
sign the inspection certificates on behalf of Montrod. The seller honestly believing 
that it had the applicant’s authority to sign the credit, presented certificate so signed. 
The frozen pork meat was delivered to the buyer in Moscow. However, between the 
date of presentation and the date of payment, it became clear that the applicant had 
not given its authority for the seller to sign the certificates. The issuing banker decided 
to pay the beneficiary, but the applicant disputed its right to reimbursement. The 
applicant’s (Montrod) nullity arguments were that the inspection certificates were a 
nullity despite the absence of fraud on the part of the beneficiary and that , since the 
bank was aware of the nullity before payment, it was not entitled or bound to make 
payment to the seller . 
 
Both the court of first instance and the Court of Appeal rejected the argument on the 
ground that the ‘nullity exception’ which was argued to operate even in the absence of 
fraud on the part of the beneficiary, formed no part of English law. 
 
The first instance judge, HHJ Raymond Jack QC, was of the view that the applicant’s 
position was neither supported by authority nor the UCP 500, the terms of which were 
imported into the credit, and held that the seller was entitled to payment under the 
credit and the issuing banker was entitled to reimbursement from the applicant.314 The 
Judge observed that the proposition ‘provides a further complication where simplicity 
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and clarity are needed. There are problems in defining when a document is a nullity. 
The exception has unfortunate consequences in relation to the right of third parties.’315 
 
In the Court of Appeal Potter LJ, who gave the only judgment, and with whom the 
other members of the court concurred, stressed that there were ‘sound policy reasons’ 
for rejecting a general nullity exception. He opined that in the law relating to letters of 
credit, precision and certainty were paramount, and ‘the creation of a general nullity 
exception, the formulation of which does not seem…susceptible to precision, involves 
making undesirable inroads into the principle of autonomy and negotiability 
universally recognised in relation to letters of credit transaction’. He also noted that if 
a general nullity exception were to be introduced, ‘it would place banks in a further 
dilemma as to the necessity to investigate facts, which they are not competent to do 
and from which the UCP 500 is plainly concerned to exempt them’. Further, a nullity 
exception ‘would be likely to act unfairly upon beneficiaries participating in a chain 
of contracts in cases where their good faith is not in question,’ and such development 
would ‘undermine the system of financing international trade by means of 
documentary credits’.316 
 
4. 2.3.2. The Position in Singapore 
 
The basis of the decision 317  in the Montrod’s case presented itself in another 
jurisdiction in the Singapore Court of Appeal case of Beam Technologies v Standard 
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Chartered Bank.318 Here the court took a contrary position to that adopted in England. 
In a very bold and novel manner, the court upheld the nullity exception and held that 
there is a nullity exception, separate and distinct from the established fraud exception.  
The situation in which the Court of Appeal was prepared to recognise the nullity 
exception is best stated thus: 
 
It is our opinion that the negotiating/ confirming bank is not obliged to pay if 
it has established within the seven- day period that a material document 
required under the credit is forged and null and void and notice of it is given 
within that period 319 
 
Hence, the issuing/ confirming bank is entitled to reject payment, apart from fraud on 
the part of the beneficiary, on the basis that the documents presented are forged and 
therefore an utter nullity.  
 
The Facts 
In the case of Beam Technologies, a letter of credit was opened by an Indonesian 
buyer, PT Mulia Persada Permai (“the buyers”) in favour of Beam Technologies (Mfg) 
Pte Ltd (“sellers”); a Singapore company. The letter of credit was to facilitate the sale 
of electronic components. The buyers obtained the issue by PT Bank Universal HO 
Jakarta (“PT bank”) of a letter of credit for the sum of US $277, 500 in favour of the 
sellers. This was subject to the terms of the UCP 500. Standard Chartered Bank 
confirmed the credit. One of the documents required under the credit was a ‘full set of 
clean air waybills’. The buyers notified the sellers that the air waybill would be issued 
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by their freight forwarders, ‘Link Express Pte Ltd.’ When the seller presented the 
documents, the confirming bank rejected them on the ground that the air waybill was 
a forgery because Link Express Pte Ltd., the freight forwarders who purportedly 
issued the air waybill, was a nonexistent entity. The seller brought an action against 
the confirming bank to claim payment under the letter of credit. The question for the 
determination of the court as recast by the Court of Appeal could be summarized as 
follows: can a confirming bank, in a case where there is no discrepancy in the 
document tendered, nevertheless refuse payment because they have reliably 
established that a material document is forged even where the seller/ beneficiary was 
innocent of the forgery, having obtained and tendered the document in good faith?320 
 
The Singapore Court of Appeal took a robust approach in addressing this issue.  The 
court observed that only two English cases had expressly dealt with the issue before 
them- the United City Merchants and the case of Montrod. However, the court was of 
the view that neither of these cases was a direct authority on the question. The House 
of Lords in United City Merchants deliberately left the existence of the nullity 
exception open. Though the Court of Appeal’s decision in Montrod seems to be an 
authority in the negative, the Court of Appeal in Beam Technologies distinguished the 
Court of Appeal decision in Montrod on the ground that it concerned a bank’s 
obligation to pay against an unauthorized document, that is, a certificate issued by the 
seller in honest belief that he had the authority to so act, as opposed to a null 
document, that is, a document that is forged and of no legal effect. Secondly, Chao 
Hick Tin JA also noted that, while the autonomy principle and the commercial 
requirement of international trade financing necessitate the issuing/confirming bank to 
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pay against apparently compliant documents, such that the banks are entitled to 
reimbursement even if those documents subsequently turn out to be false,321 it does 
not follow that the issuing/conforming  bank is obliged to pay against documents 
which the bank can establish conclusively at the time of presentation to be false. 
The court’s most visible justification for the finding that there existed a nullity 
exception that is distinct from fraud in Beam Technologies v Standard Chartered 
Bank322 is evident in this compelling statement of the Singapore Court of Appeal 
where Chao JA opined that: 
 
To say that a bank, in the face of a forged, null and void document (even 
though the beneficiary is not privy to that forgery), must still pay on the credit, 
defies reason and good sense. It amounts to saying that the scheme of things 
under the U.C.P 500 is only concerned with commas and full stops or some 
misdescriptions, and that the question as to the genuineness or otherwise of a 
material document, which was the cause of the issue of the letter of credit is of 
no consequence.323 
 
The Court further emphasized that implicit in the requirement of a conforming 
document is the assumption that the document is true and genuine.324 As noted by 
Teck JC, in the court of first instance, a forged document is not a “document” at all 
and is indistinguishable from a ‘blank piece of paper’.325 
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4. 2.3.3. United States of America 
 
On the basis of the Revised Article 5-109, of Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) the 
United States jurisdiction recognises that the forgery resulting in nullity of document 
is a ground upon which the autonomy principle could be displaced.  Art. 5 -109 (b) 
which supports the nullity exception states as follows: ‘If an applicant claims that a 
required document is forged or materially fraudulent or that honor of the presentation 
would facilitate a material fraud by the beneficiary on the issuer or applicant, a court 
of competent jurisdiction may temporarily or permanently enjoin the issuer from 
honoring a presentation or grant similar relief against the issuer or other persons ...’.326 
It is evident from the above wording of Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) that a 
required document that is forged is a ground for enjoining payment regardless of 
whether the forgery is that of a third party or the beneficiary. The emphasis is on the 
required document being a forgery. Hence, art.5-109 of UCC in defining the context 
in which payment may be withheld recognises the nullity exception. 
 
 However, decided cases in America are yet to acknowledge the above provision of 
the UCC by expressly holding that nullity exception is part of United States Law. 
 
4.3. The Nullity Arguments 
 
Since the English case of Montrod v Grundkotter327 has arguably discountenanced 
the nullity exception, despite its recognition by the Singapore court in Beam 
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Technology,328 the apparent basis for these parallel decisions have generated an 
argument either for or against the nullity exception. This section explores these 
arguments with the aim of determining to what extent, if any, a compelling case 
can be made for the nullity exception in documentary credit. It is observed that the 
arguments supporting the nullity exception may well be primarily justified on the 
wider basis of non-conformity of documents. This approach has the merit of 
keeping distinct the exception arising from beneficiary fraud and the obligation and 
right to refuse payment on ground of non-conformity of the documents. 
 
4.3.1.  Arguments against the Nullity Exception 
 
The arguments against the nullity exception will be considered first. The issues 
analysed, which constitute the reasons for the rejection of the nullity exception 
would form a springboard to explore the arguments in favour of the nullity 
exception.  
 
4.3.1.1. Want of Certainty 
 
The most enduring reason for rejecting the nullity exception in England has been 
the lack of certainty argument. This reason was evident in the Court of Appeal 
decision of Montrod Ltd v Grundkotter Fleischvertriebs GmbH,329 where Potter LJ 
noted that in the law relating to documentary credit, precision and certainty were 
paramount; the creation of a general nullity exception, the formulation of which 
does not seem susceptible to precision, involves making undesirable inroads into 
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the principle of autonomy and negotiability universally recognized in relation to 
letter of credit transactions.330   
 
Some reasons account for the want of certainty argument. One of such reasons is 
the problem of defining with precision when a document is a nullity.  Rejecting the 
exception for want of certainty could arise from the problem of defining when a 
document is a nullity. The apparent difficulty in this area could be seen in the 
different definitions that already exist as to what a null document is. Lord Diplock 
described a null document as ‘such a document whose fault deprived it of all legal 
effect’.331 The basis for the formulation of this definition of nullity is that the bill 
of lading in the American Accord, though apparently altered to reflect an incorrect 
date of shipment, was however a valid receipt which entitled the consignee to the 
goods at the port of discharge. Hence, the fraudulent alteration of the bill of lading 
by the loading broker of the date of shipment did not completely deprive the 
document of all legal effects. The difficulty with this definition is the criteria for 
ascertaining when the document would be said to be deprived of all its effects. 
Does it relate to the procedure for obtaining the document or does it pertain 
generally to the substance of the document? 
 
The above difficulty was apparent in Heskell v Continental Express Ltd,332 where 
Devlin J, described an issued bill of lading as a nullity in the absence of any 
apparent fraud333 but on the ground that, though the ship and cargo existed, the 
cargo had been left behind. The bill of lading covering the cargo where the cargo 
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has been mistakenly334  left behind was described as a nullity. The position in 
Heskell was described as a nullity despite the apparent lack of fraud. A contrasting 
situation was evident in Kreditbank Cassel GMBH v Schenkers Limited335 where 
Bankes LJ described a bill of lading as a nullity just because the signature was 
proved to be obtained through fraud of the company denying liability.336 In the 
case of fraud, it has to be noted that the nature of fraud is also crucial as it relates to 
whether it makes the documents a nullity. In Kwei Tek Chao v British Traders and 
Shippers Ltd,337 Devlin J held a bill of lading that had been fraudulently backdated, 
though not by the CIF seller, not to be a nullity. The rationale for this decision was 
that the alteration did not go the whole essence of the document.  
 
A thorough investigation into some of the cases dealing with whether a document is a 
nullity reveals the difficulty associated with attempting such legal analysis.  Crucially, 
if there is difficulty in ascertaining when a document is a nullity, it may be reasonable 
to infer that such attempts (whether failed or successful) would introduce some degree 
of uncertainty in the law. However, compelling as this assertion might seem, it 
neglects what is crucially part of the legal process. Many legal processes are in fact 
not certain and some of the uncertainty and illusoriness of the legal process are 
understood based on the facts of each particular case. As posited by the Court of 
Appeal judgment in the Beam Technologies case, questions of nullity are not that 
much more difficult to answer than the question whether something is reasonable, an 
assessment that courts are used to making.338 Here the ‘thrombosis of international 
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trade’ 339  resulting from want of certainty, caused by more cumbersome and less 
efficient banking verification procedures seems to have been exaggerated. The bank 
would not be in any worse a situation than that already faced by it in a situation when 
there might be fraud on the part of the beneficiary under the fraud exception. Looking 
at Potter LJ’s judgment in Montrod case, part of the solution to the problem is 
contained in that decision. The Court of Appeal made the point that in the context of 
the fraud exception, a bank was not expected to make its own enquiries about 
allegations of fraud brought to its notice. The court opined that if a party wished to 
establish that a demand was fraudulent, it had to place before the bank evidence of 
clear and obvious fraud.340 There is nothing that stops the same rule being applied to a 
nullity exception. It may be noted that even in Beam Technologies where the court 
recognised the ‘nullity exception,’ it was stated that that the bank would not be 
expected to make any investigations other than to examine the documents and see that 
they conform to the credit.341 Dora Neo342 considered the bank’s duty as regards the 
nullity exception and noted that:  
 
The nullity exception would merely mean that when a bank is satisfied 
(because it has come to its notice by whatever means) that a required material 
document is clearly a nullity, it need not pay even if the documents on their 
face conform to the credit. In any case, the idea of protecting banks from the 
dilemma of whether to investigate facts or to pay is not relevant in cases where 
the bank is not in any dilemma because it is sure that a material document is 
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forged and a nullity and wishes to withhold payment. The lack of nullity 
exception in such cases is a hindrance rather than a help.343 
 
Another variant of the certainty argument is the contention that there will be great 
difficulty in defining what constitutes nullity in the first place. Opponents of the 
nullity exception have posited that whether a document is a nullity or not is a real 
issue a bank often faces and the difficulty in determination may be compounded 
where the documents presented are of varying degrees of nullities, e.g., where only 
certain alleged facts on the document are false as opposed to the whole document 
being forged.344 
Take for an example, how false must a bill of lading be in order that it constitutes a 
serious nullity to justify a bank’s rejection? Devlin J. in Kwei Tek Chao v British 
Traders and Shippers345 was of the opinion that a misdated bill of lading is ‘valueless 
but not a complete nullity’.346This could be contrasted with the position taken by 
Leggatt J in The Raffaella 347  who described a misdated bill of lading which 
additionally includes a misstatement of the vessel’s name as a ‘sham piece of 
paper’.348 The approach adopted by the Beam Technologies case was that the question 
of what document is a nullity is one that ought to be answered based on the factual 
context of the underlying transaction. 349  However, there are situations where a 
document sought to be presented could be established within the time available to the 
bank to be a null document with the bank having little or no dilemma as to its duty. 
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4. 3.1.2. That the Principle of Autonomy should generally prevail 
 
This point against the nullity exception has been recently made by Professor Todd,350 
who, relying on the American Accord, argued in a recent article that the logic of the 
autonomy principle trounces all countervailing arguments regarding the application of 
the nullity defence. 351  He reasoned that the autonomy principle works on the 
assumption that parties to a documentary credit contract on the basis that the bank 
would neither wish nor be able to concern itself with disputes under the underlying 
transaction, and the seller’s assured right to payment should be independent of the 
underlying contract. Proceeding on this basis of the independence of the contracts, he 
reasoned that the rationale of the autonomy principle is inconsistent with the 
application of the nullity exception. 352  But inherent in the requirement for the 
exceptions in documentary credit is the incontestable notion that in certain condition 
the otherwise impregnability of documentary credit could in certain circumstances be 
displaced. This point was noted as far back as 1941 in Sztejn v Henry Schroder 
Banking Corporation where the court restated the autonomy principle but stated that    
‘Although our courts have used broad language to the effect that a letter of credit is 
independent of the primary contract between the buyer and seller, …when the issuer 
of a letter of credit knows that a document, although correct in form, is, in point of 
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fact, false or illegal, he cannot be called upon to recognize such a document as 
complying with the terms of a letter of credit’353                                                                                                                             
 
In similar vein, Lord Diplock in the American Accord, after restating the autonomy 
principle, recognised that certain grounds could displace it. The exception of fraud 
was founded on the principle that fraud unravels all. In the same case, Lord Diplock 
left open the issue of whether nullity of document should be a separate ground on the 
basis of which the impregnability of documentary credit could be displaced. That a 
certain kind of nullity was capable of breaching the autonomy principle was remotely 
evident in Lord Diplock’s dictum  when  his Lordship stated ‘But even assuming the 
correctness of the Court of Appeal's premise as respects forgery by a third party of a 
kind that makes a document a nullity for which at least a rational case can be made 
out, to say that this leads to the conclusion that fraud by a third party which does not 
render the document a nullity has the same consequence appears to me, with respect, 
to be a non sequitur.’ It is evident from this statement that Lord Diplock accepted that 
a rational case could be made out of certain kind of forgery by a third party that 
rendered the document a nullity. This implicit admission was regardless of Lord 
Diplock’s restatement of the autonomy rule. It then, becomes really difficult to see 
from the foregoing how the autonomy principle should trounce all arguments 
regarding the nullity exception in documentary credit.  The autonomy principle, while 
designed to protect the seller from defences based on the underlying sale contract, 
does not mean that the seller should also be protected from defences that are related to 
the documents themselves.354  Accordingly, it is suggested that a third party fraud in 
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relation to a document that renders it a nullity must surely be linked to the document 
itself rather than a matter confined to the underlying contract.355 
 
 
 
4.3.1.3. The Absence of the Logic of Ex Turpi Causa Doctrine in Nullity 
Exception 
 
One of the arguments put forth recently against the nullity exception by Professor 
Todd is that in the fraud exception, the logic of the ex turpi causa doctrine demands 
that the bank should only take the risk of refusing payment where fraud is involved.356 
His reasoning is that the fraud exception operates as an application of the principle of 
public policy, rightly intended to prevent proven fraudsters from claiming payment. 
He further argues that no such public policy applies in the case of a nullity where a 
non-fraudulent beneficiary tenders an apparently conforming document which 
happens to be a nullity. There are many reasons why this argument with respect might 
not be tenable.  If the logic of the ex turpi causa rule justify the fraud exception, why 
will a null document which results from the fraud of a third party not have the same 
effect? It may not be relevant to distinguish whether the fraud is that of the 
beneficiary or not. Since, in some instances of nullity, fraud or forgery may be 
involved, this ex turpi causa argument does not survive those instances of nullity 
where the null document results from the fraud or forgery of some sort. It is likely that 
cases where the nullity of document results from a non- fraudulent act may be 
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difficult to justify with respect to the ex turpi causa rule.357 It is submitted that though 
this kind of situation is likely to exist, its existence should not deter the finding of 
nullity where it involves a fraudulent act. 
 
4.3.1.4. Seller/ Beneficiary being in a Worse Position than a Holder in 
Due Course 
 
The point more prominent among the reason for anti-nullity sentiments is the 
contention by the opponents of the nullity exception that allowing the exception 
would result in the seller/ beneficiary being in a worse position than a holder in due 
course. In the United City Merchant v Royal Bank of Canada, 358  Lord Diplock 
expressed the view in the House of Lords that even where the documents under a 
credit were a forgery, the American Uniform Commercial Code protects a person who 
has taken a draft drawn upon the credit in circumstances that would make him a 
holder in due course. His Lordship added that there was nothing in the Uniform 
Commercial Code to suggest that a seller/beneficiary who was ignorant of the fraud 
should be in any worse position because he had not negotiated the draft before 
presentation.359 In the case of Montrod v Grundkotter,360 Potter LJ in reference to 
Lord Diplock’s views noted as follows: 
 
As I understand it, Lord Diplock was of the view that a seller/ beneficiary who 
was ignorant of forgery by a third party of one of the documents presented, or 
of the fact that the document contained a representation false to the knowledge 
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of the person who created it, should not be in a worse position than someone 
who has taken a draft drawn under a letter of credit in circumstances which 
rendered him a holder in due course.361 
 
The summary of the argument of Lord Diplock which was adopted by the Court of 
Appeal in the Montrod case is that a holder in due course would have been entitled to 
payment where fraud is perpetrated by a third party without his knowledge. To that 
extent, the seller/beneficiary should also be so entitled. 
The above argument, commendable as it might seem, has been criticized by Professor 
RM Goode who commented as follows: 
 
It is trite law… that a holder in due course is in a favoured position and is 
insulated from defences not available to holders of the bill, let alone to a seller 
whose documents and draft have been rejected. Moreover, the Uniform 
Commercial Code, far from protecting the seller in this situation, provides no 
fewer than four exceptions to the autonomy principle, including forgery, the 
presentation of fraudulent documents and fraud in the transaction362 
 
The learned Professor, in strong criticism of Lord Diplock’s view, further stated, 
 
Unhappily, Lord Diplock’s influence manifested itself in a subsequent 
decision of the Court of Appeal in Montrod Ltd v Grundkotter Fleischvertriebs 
GmbH, 363  where it was held that the nullity of the document was not an 
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independent ground for refusal of payment and that a beneficiary who 
tendered documents in good faith was entitled to payment even if the 
documents were fraudulent or otherwise devoid of commercial value.364 
 
It may also be noted that dissenting views have also been expressed by the courts. A 
case in point is the Singaporean High Court case of Lambias (Importers & Exporters) 
v Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, where Goh CJ in reference to Lord 
Diplock’s view stated as follows 
 
With respect, I do not think that it is right to say that the seller/beneficiary who 
has not negotiated the draft before presentation should be in the same position 
as a bona fide holder in due course. I think the short answer to this is that as a 
party to the underlying contract, he has an additional recourse against the 
buyer which is not open to a holder in due course.365 
 
Also, in the Court of Appeal case of Beam Technologies, Chao J.A. affirming 
Professor Goode’s view, noted that ‘the beneficiary under a letter of credit is not like 
a holder in due course of a bill of exchange; he is only entitled to be paid if the 
documents are correct’.366 
The above passages suggest that the view of Lord Diplock for rejecting the nullity 
exception which had a ‘spill over’ effect on the Court of Appeal may respectfully 
have been misconceived. 
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4.3.1.5. Unfortunate Consequences to the Right of Third Parties 
 
Potter LJ, noted in his judgment in Montrod Ltd v Grundkotter367 that the recognition 
of a general nullity exception would cause prejudice to innocent beneficiaries 
participating in a chain of contracts in situations where their good faith is not in 
question. This point was summarily made by Potter LJ. One possible situation might 
be where a seller/beneficiary is in possession of apparently conforming documents 
which were passed to him by another seller further up the chain which without his 
knowledge are forged and null documents. As a result of the document that is a nullity, 
the seller/beneficiary fails to be paid because the nullity exception entitles the 
confirming/ issuing bank to withhold payment on such documents. It may be argued 
that there is no question of prejudice to the beneficiary if the beneficiary had been 
aware of the nullity, as he might have withheld his own payment to his sellers in the 
string sale thereby minimizing his losses. Even where the seller/beneficiary’s actions 
can be seen to be blame-worthy; for instance, he has acted recklessly by not vetting 
his source of supply, there appears to be no prejudice to him if the documents are 
rejected for it being a nullity. 
 
However, where the beneficiary does not know about the nullity before paying his 
own seller, this could lead to the prejudice or unfairness referred to by Lord Justice 
Potter where the beneficiary is precluded from claiming under the letter of credit even 
though his ‘good faith is not in doubt’. One salient point needs to be made to the 
effect that, even though the Court of Appeal in the Montrod case singled out 
beneficiaries in string sales as likely to be prejudiced if a nullity exception is 
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recognized because they are innocent, the same situation applies for a beneficiary in a 
single sale transaction. This is so because the context in which the nullity exception is 
discussed includes a situation where the beneficiary is innocent of the forgery but the 
document presented is a nullity whether in a chain or otherwise, and the argument of 
‘unfairness or prejudice’ can be applied to any innocent beneficiary who fails to get 
payment through no fault of his own. 
 
Prejudice or unfairness to the seller/ beneficiary whose good faith is not in doubt is an 
important consideration and a justification for those against the nullity exception. 
However, there are no easy answers to the question of who should bear the loss 
caused by the nullity of the document. If the seller/beneficiary is allowed to claim on 
the credit, it will ultimately be the buyer/applicant who has to bear the loss by taking 
up documents which may be worthless and in no way guarantee the security needed in 
documentary sales. As between innocent parties, the question of who has to bear the 
loss can only be reasonably decided after balancing the interests of all the parties to 
the transaction. It may be reasonably contended that there is no reason in justice to 
allow the buyer/applicant to bear the loss occasioned by the tender of forged 
documents. It is more appropriate in balancing the interest of the parties to the 
transaction to require the seller/beneficiary, though innocent, to bear the loss where a 
document required under the credit is forged and a nullity. This is so if recourse is had 
to the fact that what is required is a conforming document and a forged document 
cannot be said to be it. 
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4.3.1.6. Matching the Bank’s Duty to the Applicant with that of the 
Seller/ Beneficiary 
 
In United City Merchants v Royal Bank of Canada,368  one of the arguments put 
forward by Lord Diplock was that the bank’s duty to the buyer/applicant to honour the 
credit upon apparently conforming documents (even where they in fact contained 
inaccuracies or were forged) should, from a commercial point of view, be matched by 
a corresponding liability to the seller/beneficiary to pay the sum due on the credit 
upon presentation of apparently conforming documents.369 This appears to be one of 
the reasons why the court felt the seller/beneficiary in the United City Merchants case 
should be paid by the bank despite the fraud in the documents. However, Dora Neo, 
affirming the argument of RM Goode, has contended that the first part of the House of 
Lords equation is problematic. She reasons as follows: neither the UCP nor the 
common law imposes any duty on the bank towards the applicant to pay upon 
apparently conforming documents. The rules are directed at the duty of the applicant 
(or the issuing bank) to reimburse the issuing bank (nominated bank) if the bank has, 
despite having exercised all due care, mistakenly paid the beneficiary upon apparently 
conforming documents which were inaccurate or forged.370 The concern of UCP 500 
is the bank’s entitlement to be reimbursed by the applicant, not its duty to the 
applicant to honour a facially conforming credit. Indeed, it is hard to conceive that the 
bank would have a duty to the applicant to honour apparently conforming documents 
even if it knows that these are in fact false or fraudulent, and thereby allow the 
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applicant to be defrauded.371 Even if the first part of the proposition were correct, the 
second part (corresponding liability to the seller/beneficiary to pay the amount due on 
the credit upon the presentation of apparently conforming documents) would be 
suspect. Under Article 9 of the UCP 500, the issuing bank undertakes to pay on the 
credit provided that the stipulated documents are presented and the terms and 
conditions of the credit are complied with. It does not state that conformity on the face 
of the document is sufficient. This point has been made by Professor RM Goode when 
he opined that: 
 
…but the notion that the bank owes a buyer, its own customer, a duty to pay 
against forged or fraudulent documents, thus allowing the buyer to be 
defrauded, is surely bizarre!......But documents which are forged cannot 
conceivably be treated as conforming documents; the bank may be safe in 
paying them if it has examined them with reasonable care and they appear to 
be in order, but to say that the beneficiary has a right to payment against even 
forged documents if he is not a party to the forgery finds no justification in the 
terms of the letter of credit or in the provision of the UCP and has the effect of 
extending to the beneficiaries the benefit of a rule designed exclusively to 
safeguard the bank372 
 
The learned academic has argued that the proposition of Lord Diplock in the House of 
Lords is misconceived. 
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4.3.1.7. Lack of Authority for the Nullity Exception 
 
Finally, another point that was made in Montrod Ltd v Grundkotter373 as a reason for 
not recognizing the nullity exception is the issue of lack of judicial authority or 
decision. Raymond Jack QC commenting on the statement of Lord Diplock where he 
left the issue of nullity exception open in the case of the United City Merchant stated 
thus: 
 
This is very slender support for the submission that there exists in parallel with 
the fraud exception a second exception covering documents which are nullities 
to the knowledge of the bank at the time of payment though the beneficiary is 
innocent of any deception. There is, in my view, no other support that has been 
found in the reported cases. I think that it is wishful to seek to find such 
support in one sentence… 
 
The point sought to be made by the learned judge is that at the time the case of 
Montrod, and by extension the Beam Technology case came before the court, a nullity 
exception was neither supported by judicial decision nor the UCP 500. However, it 
may be noted that the lack of authority under the UCP or in any decided case should 
not be a constraint for the recognition of a nullity exception. This is so because it is 
generally accepted that the UCP 500 was to be supplemented by domestic rules where 
appropriate. Also, the fraud rule which is an established exception to the principle of 
autonomy, is a common law exception that was not governed by the UCP 500. It 
similarly follows that a nullity exception could as well exist independently of the UCP 
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500. Moreover, the absence of a judicial authority for a nullity exception should not 
lead the court to conclude that such an exception should not be recognized. There 
seem to be no legal justification for this as such situations where legal issues are novel 
lead to the growth and better development of the law. The simple reason for the lack 
of judicial authority supporting the nullity exception at the time was that the issue had 
not directly come before the court for a determination. The absence of authority far 
from being an obstacle presents a clear opportunity for the law to be developed. 
 
4.3.2.  Pro- Nullity Argument 
 
In the light of the reasons advanced for not recognizing the nullity exception, is there 
still a room for a separate nullity exception? It may be recalled that the fraud 
exception is justified by the application of the maxim ex turpi causa non oritur action. 
The basic rationale for the recognition of the fraud exception being that the court will 
not allow their processes to be used by a dishonest person to carry out fraud.374 The 
prime justification for the fraud exception may not be applicable for the nullity 
exception. To that extent, the protagonists of the nullity exception like Hooley375 and 
Professor RM Goode376 have sought to justify the nullity exception on some other 
considerations which will be considered below.  
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4.3.2.1. Banks Deal in Documents and not in Goods 
 
One of the arguments that support the nullity exception, contrary to some legal 
opinion377 that has used the same argument against it, is the contention that seeks 
to emphasize the autonomy principle by stating that in credit transaction bank deals 
in documents not in goods. If a bank deals in documents alone, it presupposes that 
what is important, to ascertain whether the demanding party gets payment is on the 
basis of the document alone. Where such document which entitles the beneficiary 
to payment is a mere forgery and thus a nullity, is it necessary to go into the 
circumstances that made the document a forgery and thus a nullity. Put differently, 
does a bank that ought to make payment on the basis of the document alone need 
to investigate whether the beneficiary’s good faith has been impeached by his 
dishonesty in presenting the document? Investigating whether the beneficiary was 
dishonest in presenting the forged document would amount to, as Potter LJ pointed 
out, albeit in another context, creating uncertainty in an area of law where the need 
for precision and certainty are paramount.  
 
4.3.2.2. Duty to Tender Conforming Documents 
 
One of the strongest arguments in support of nullity remains the duty placed on the 
seller/beneficiary in documentary credit to tender conforming documents. This calls 
into question, what is meant by a conforming document. It may be stated that the 
concept of what amounts to a conforming document has elicited different opinions 
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both from the academics and the courts. One of the strongest voices among the 
academics remains Professor RM Goode. The learned Professor has argued that  
 
documents which are forged cannot conceivably be treated as conforming 
documents; the bank may be safe in paying on them if it has examined them 
with reasonable care and they appear to be in order, but to say that  the 
beneficiary has a right to payment against even forged documents if he is not a 
party  to the forgery finds no justification in the terms of the letter of credit or 
in the provisions of the UCP and has the effect of extending to the 
beneficiaries the benefit of the rule designed exclusively to safeguards the 
banks.378 
 
In the same vein, Professor Ellinger commenting on Lord Diplock’s view in the 
United City Merchants case states as follows; ‘the beneficiary is promised payment 
against a set of documents described in the documentary credit. Can it be seriously 
argued that the promise is meant to cover false documents?’ he comments further as 
follows;  
 
It is disturbing that whilst a document stating the true loading date could have 
been rejected by the bank in the light of the doctrine of strict compliance, a 
document in which the loading date was fraudulently misrepresented by its 
maker constituted a valid tender in the beneficiary’s hands.379 
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In the Beam Technology case, the Court of Appeal noted that implicit in the 
requirement of a conforming document was the assumption that the documents were 
true and genuine. Hence, Chao Tin J.A. (who delivered the judgment of the two 
member court, which comprised Tan Lee Meng J.) predicated his reason for finding a 
nullity exception thus; 
 
To say that a bank, in the face of a forged, null and void document (even 
though the beneficiary is not privy to that forgery), must still pay on the credit, 
defies reason and good sense. It amounts to saying that the scheme of things 
under the U.C.P 500 is only concerned with commas and the full stops or 
some misdescriptions, and the question as to genuineness or otherwise of a 
material document, which was the cause for the issue of the letter of credit, is 
of no consequence.380 
 
The same position was adopted by the Court of Appeal in the United City Merchant 
case
381
 which was referred to by the court in the Beam Technology case. Ackner LJ, 
appreciating the importance of documents as security for the bank, was of the view 
that a banker need not be under an obligation to pay against documents which he 
knows to be a waste paper as to ‘hold otherwise would be to deprive the banker of that 
security for his advances, which is a cardinal feature of the process of financing 
carried out by means of the credit’.382 
 
In similar vein with Ackner LJ, Griffiths L.J was of the opinion that where the 
documents were forgeries, the right to of the bank to refuse payment rests upon the 
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fact that the bank’s obligation is to pay upon the presentation of genuine documents in 
accordance with the requirement of the credit. He further noted that ‘if the documents 
were fraudulently false, they are not genuine conforming documents and the bank has 
no obligation to pay’383 
 
A Hong Kong barrister at law, Peter Ho, has voiced support for nullity exception. He 
submitted: 
 
a fortiori and in bearing in mind the wording of the UCP 500, 1993, whilst a 
bank which pays against apparently conforming documents including null 
documents after reasonable examination is entitled to reimbursement, the 
beneficiary however, does not have a right to such payment and a bank is 
entitled to refuse to pay. It is evident that null documents are the very 
antithesis of the stipulated documents required under the UCP 500. 
Accordingly, it is submitted that an issuing bank is under no duty, contrary to 
Lord Diplock’s view, to pay against such null documents.384 
 
The issue of conforming documents might have been expressed in different ways; 
however, the point sought to be made above is that what is required under the letter of 
credit are genuine documents and a forged document does not meet this requirement 
despite the apparent conformity. As a result, the seller/ beneficiary should not be paid. 
This argument becomes more forceful in the context of a forged document that is a 
nullity. Hence, as posited by Peter Ho,385 an issuing bank is not under any duty to pay 
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against such null document on the ground that such null documents could in no sense 
be called the stipulated documents under article 10 of the UCP 500. 
 
4.3.2.3. Discouraging Forgery 
 
Another reason for the recognition of the nullity exception has been the argument that 
in international trade, falsification or forgery of documents should not be tolerated. 
Maritime fraud involving false and antedated bills of lading is a problem in 
international trade.386 This has caused the victims to lose huge amount of money.387 A 
judge, in the United Kingdom has referred to this a ‘cancer in international trade’.388 
With this background in mind, it would seem to be a disservice to the interests of 
letters of credit that a beneficiary who presents a document that is forged and a nullity 
should be allowed to claim on the credit. Indeed, it has been argued that the failure to 
recognize a nullity exception would seem to tolerate the circulation of forged 
documents in the international trade, and that this is undesirable as the proliferation of 
fraudulent and null documents will undermine the trust that forms the foundation of 
international trade.389 
 
The fraud exception already addresses the problem of beneficiaries who commit fraud. 
A fraudulent beneficiary is not entitled to be paid even if the documents conform to 
the credit. A fraudulent beneficiary is not entitled to payment even if the documents 
conform to the requirement of the credit .If the bank knows about such fraud before it 
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has paid on the credit, it can withhold payment. However, where the fraud is that of a 
third party, the lack of a nullity exception obviously leaves a gap. While the 
application of the nullity exception would disadvantage the innocent beneficiary 
without punishing the third party wrongdoer, it would be an important development 
that signals that the law takes the problem of fraud seriously and will not give effect 
to fraudulent documents.390  The court and the bank should not be bound by the 
doctrine of autonomy so as always to bow to the demands of an innocent beneficiary 
presenting clearly forged documents, simply because the forgery was committed by 
someone other than the presenting beneficiary.391 Furthermore, by placing the burden 
onto the sellers/beneficiaries who procure such documents to police those with whom 
they deal, something that sellers should be in a better position to do than the banks or 
applicants, the law might be able to help slow down the spread of fraud and forgery in 
international trade. 
 
4.3.2.4. Documents as Bank’s Security 
 
One of the compelling arguments that favour the recognition of the nullity exception 
is that the documents which the beneficiary tenders to the issuing or confirming bank 
in exchange for payment serves as the bank’s security. In as much as the applicant’s 
creditworthiness is important to the issuing bank, who must look to the applicant for 
reimbursement after paying on the credit, a bank will strengthen its position by taking 
security from the applicant for protection in case the applicant is unable to pay. Bills 
of lading play an important role as documents of title and have primarily formed an 
ideal security for the bank. Although the development of other forms of transport 
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documents that are not documents of title might have weakened the primary security 
function of the documents under a credit,392 bills of lading remains widely used as a 
the bank’s security. Since the bank may be relying on the documents under the credit 
as collateral for any advances that it gives to the applicant (primarily the payment of 
the beneficiary when conforming documents are tendered), it is hard to justify a rule 
that requires the bank to pay the beneficiary when presented with documents that it 
knows are worthless. This would appear unreasonable as worthless documents will 
provide the bank with no security.393 The contention that the bank should not be 
concerned with the worth of the documents should not deprive the bank of the needed 
security for their advances.394 As noted by a Hong Kong attorney at law, 
 
The issuing bank is not under any duty to pay against such null documents on 
the ground that such null documents could in no sense be called the stipulated 
documents under article 10 UCP 1993. To hold otherwise is to compel the 
issuing bank to become the underwriter against the risk of null documents with 
respect to the seller/beneficiary and to deprive the issuing bank, where the bill 
of lading is void, of the security to which it would have been entitled. It is 
submitted that this could not be the intention of the parties to the documentary 
credit transaction or the true effect of the UCP 500.395 
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The point sought to be made is that preservation of the bank security remains a 
relevant factor. This was given recognition even in the seminal case of Sztejn v J 
Henry Schroeder Banking Corporation396 where Shientag J said ‘while the primary 
factor in the issuance of the letter of credit is the credit standing of the buyer, the 
security afforded by the merchandise is also taken into account…..the bank … is 
vitally interested in assuring itself that there are some goods represented by the 
documents’.397 
 
In Singapore, the importance of the documents as security for the bank was 
recognised long before the Beam Technology case in the case of Mees Pierson NV v 
Bay Pacific Pte. Ltd. 398 Here Rajendran J. stated that, ‘to require the bank to make 
payment when the bank knows that the bills of lading are a nullity is to require the 
bank to knowingly forgo its security. That will be tantamount to requiring the bank to 
honour the credit on terms less favourable to the bank than envisaged under the credit 
arrangement’.399  
 
4.3.2.5. Bank’s Agreed Mandate to the Applicant 
 
 It is not in dispute that in letter of credit transactions, the bank has a contract with the 
applicant whereby the bank agrees to issue the letter of credit in favour of the 
beneficiary and to pay the seller/beneficiary the amount of the credit upon 
presentment of conforming documents. The contract provides that the bank is entitled 
to claim reimbursement from the applicant when it has paid upon reasonable 
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examination of the document within the required period. As Ackner LJ stated in the 
Court of Appeal in United City Merchant case:400 
 
The banker’s authority or mandate is to pay against genuine documents and 
that is what the bank has undertaken to do. It is the character of the document, 
not its origin that must decide whether or not it is a conforming document that 
is a document which complies with the terms of the credit.401 
 
Based on the above view, a bank that breaches its mandate and knowingly pays upon 
apparently conforming documents that are not genuine does so at its peril as it would 
not be able to claim reimbursement from the instructing party. The view that the bank 
has a limited mandate is an attractive one. It would be inexplicable that an applicant 
should be willing to authorize a bank to pay the beneficiary upon documents that the 
banks knows are forged and null, thereby allowing itself to be left bearing the losses. 
The bank should be allowed to withhold payment to the beneficiary so as to stay 
within the terms of its mandate from the applicant, and recognizing the nullity 
exception would easily achieve this result. 
 
4.3.2.6. Prejudice to Beneficiaries/Sellers in a Chain 
 
Another point which supports the nullity exception is derived from one of the 
arguments of those against the nullity exception which is to the effect that recognizing 
the nullity exception will prejudice seller/beneficiaries in string situations where their 
good faith in not in doubt. It may be noted that in consideration of fairness and 
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allocation of risk, it is by no means clear that it would be fairer to place the loss on the 
buyer/ applicant. The pertinent question is which of the two innocent parties should 
suffer. No doubt, this question may not be easy to answer. In the United City 
Merchants case, Stephenson LJ made the following pronouncement in the Court of 
Appeal: 
 
Banks trust beneficiaries to present honest documents; if the beneficiaries go 
to others (as they have to) for the documents they present, it is important to all 
concerned that those documents should accord, not merely with the 
requirement of the credit but with facts; and if they do not because of the 
intention of anyone concerned with them to deceive, I see good reason for the 
choice between two innocent parties putting the loss upon the beneficiary, not 
the bank or its customer. 
 
The above passage seems very much persuasive. It represents a rational and more 
realistic judicial opinion on the proper allocation of loss between the beneficiary and 
the applicant. This view seem to have received very little judicial attention but the 
rationale behind it is anchored on the fact that if it is the beneficiary who has the 
obligation to present conforming documents which are genuine and valid, it seems fair 
that he, and not the applicant, should bear the risk that a document presented might be 
a nullity. 
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4.3.2.7. Understanding the Letter of Credit Contract 
 
Finally, mention needs to be made of the support that a nullity exception gathers from 
proper appreciation of the letter of credit contract. A letter of credit transaction 
normally involves more than three contracts. For the purposes of the current enquiry, 
three core contracts that consist of a contract between the buyer/applicant and the 
issuing bank, between the issuing bank and the seller/beneficiary, and between the 
buyer and the seller should be borne in mind. Because a letter of credit is governed by 
well established and generally applicable rules, it is easy to forget that as in all 
contracts, the intention of the parties and the agreement between them should not be 
ignored,402 otherwise, the resultant danger could be that the court might develop the 
law in a way that is completely divorced from the expectation of the parties when they 
entered into the contracts.403 To evaluate the rights and obligations of each party in the 
letter of credit transaction, courts have to construe the contracts made by the parties. 
Express terms must be interpreted, and where necessary implied terms read into it. 
Take for example, if a letter of credit issued by the bank in favour of the beneficiary 
provides that the sale price of the goods is payable against a ‘full set of clean on board 
ocean bill of lading’ drawn to the order of the issuing bank covering the goods sold, 
the court ought to interpret these terms to see if a bill of lading that is forged and a 
nullity falls within the requirements.404 In understanding the letter of credits contracts, 
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the totality of the transaction ought to be borne in mind and a construction of the 
contracts which seeks to detach the credit completely from the underlying contract 
that gave life to it ought not to be favoured. Such construction treats null document 
which provide no security to the applicant as complying documents. 
 
It may also be worthy of note that the reasonableness of a result may be one of the 
factors to be taken into consideration in choosing between different constructions of a 
contract.405 In the word of Lord Reid: ‘The fact that a particular construction leads to 
a very unreasonable result must be a relevant consideration. The more unreasonable 
the result, the more unlikely it is that the parties have intended it…’406  
 
The pertinent question that emanates from the foregoing regarding the construction of 
contracts of documentary credit is whether it is reasonable that a bank which is aware 
that a material document is forged and a nullity should nevertheless be bound to make 
payment to the beneficiary and be entitled to claim a reimbursement from the 
applicant. It is hard to see how a reasonable answer to this will be in the positive. Any 
answer in the affirmative will seek to make mockery of the contractual obligation of 
the bank if the seller/beneficiary can satisfy the obligation to present a particular 
document by tendering forged ones. If the beneficiary has not fulfilled the obligation 
to produce genuine documents, it is unreasonable to expect the bank to make payment 
without any security in the documents, or the applicant to later reimburse the bank for 
worthless documents. Dora Neo407 has argued that it might be imaginable that a buyer 
could agree, in the interest of the smooth functioning of the letter of credit payment 
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system, to bear the risk of third party fraud where this does not render the documents 
a nullity, and sue the seller for any breach of contract afterwards. But it seems most 
unlikely that the buyer would extend this agreement to a situation where a material 
document is a nullity and definitely completely worthless. She further argues that the 
principle of autonomy and the fraud exception is one that is anchored on 
reasonableness. However, the principle of autonomy is more prejudicial to the buyer 
than to the other parties; this is so as it could operate to deprive the buyer of the self-
help option of withholding payment in cases where the goods are defective. It is more 
reasonable to recognize a nullity exception where documents are forged regardless of 
the identity of the forger. 
 
4.4. The Scope of the Nullity Exception 
 
Having identified, the strengths and weaknesses of the nullity exception in the 
preceding section, this section addresses the often difficult question of what the likely 
boundaries of the nullity exception should be in practice and the standard of proof 
required to reach the threshold. In dealing with this thorny question of setting clear 
guidelines for the working scope of the nullity exception, instances will be borrowed 
from documentary credit practice as well as practices in general law. 
 
 
4.4.1.  Formulating Nullity in Documentary Credit 
 
The first question to be addressed is what kind of nullity should be capable of 
triggering the exception. In answering this question, two issues should be considered.  
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First, is the question whether the circumstance leading to the nullity is an important 
factor. Secondly, what is the nature or extent of the falsity in the document that could 
be categorized as a nullity? The answer to this question undoubtedly has either been 
partly answered by some of the cases dealing with the nullity exception or could be 
gleaned by critical analysis of the issues in the cases.  
 
In answering the first question, must the nullity in the document always arise as a 
result of forgery or fraud or could it arise, for example by virtue of innocent mistake? 
It ought to be noted that a great deal of the discussion in respect to a possible nullity 
exception in documentary credit arises in the context of forgery of a third party other 
than the beneficiary to the exclusion of other circumstances in the absence of fraud 
that could give rise to a nullity. However, circumstances leading to a document being 
a nullity might not always arise through forgery or fraud. The Montrod case 408 
exemplifies a situation where a document could be argued to be a nullity albeit 
without fraud or forgery.409 In this situation, the question that cries for an answer is 
whether a possible nullity exception should only include those circumstances where 
the nullity results from fraud or forgery or should include those situations where a 
nullity results from other circumstances like innocent mistake or documents arising 
from a non- existent entity.  
 
In this regard, Dora Neo explores two strands of argument. She opines that ‘where a 
required document is a nullity without being forged, it is important to look at the 
requirement of the credit. If the document that is presented is exactly what is required 
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under the credit, it is arguable that the beneficiary is entitled to payment even if the 
document is a nullity and without legal effect’.410 It is respectfully submitted that it is 
difficult to see how a document can be what is exactly required by the credit if it is a 
nullity and without any legal effect. In the second strand of her argument, she posits 
that where the beneficiary presents a conforming document that is not a genuinely 
conforming document despite the absence of a dishonest intent on the part of the 
maker of the document, it is arguable that the nullity exception should apply. Her 
reason is that the arguments that favour the nullity exception are equally persuasive in 
the absence of fraud or forgery. This position explored in this second strand of her 
argument seems very attractive. In setting the boundary or scope of the nullity with 
regard to its meaning, is it necessary to limit nullity to those arising from fraud or 
forgery? As evident in her analysis, if a document is a nullity and does not conform to 
the requirement of the credit, it should not matter whether it was caused by mistake or 
through a fraudulent act.411 
 
The second question relates to materiality with regard to nullity. Here the argument as 
it concerns ‘destroying the whole essence of the document’ is explored. Let’s take for 
example that one of the required document in a documentary credit transaction is a 
bill of lading,- are there circumstances where what appears to be a bill of lading 
would be so defective that it cannot be regarded  as a bill of lading in real sense so as 
to be capable of being described as a nullity. Lord Diplock, in the American Accord 
addressed this question and viewed a fraudulently backdated bill of lading by a 
shipping broker as not amounting to a nullity. The apparent legal basis for this 
reasoning in the American Accord was that a document could not be said to be a 
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nullity unless its fault deprived it completely of all its legal effects. To drive home this 
perception of nullity from the point of an instrument ‘without any legal effect’ Lord 
Diplock in the American Accord held that ‘the bill of lading with the wrong date of 
loading placed on it by the carrier’s agent was far from being a nullity. It is a valid 
transferable receipt for the goods giving the holder a right to claim them at their 
destination… and was evidence of the terms of the contract under which they were 
being carried’. Hence central to Lord Diplock’s analysis is that the incorrect date of 
loading did not prevent the bill of lading from performing its essential function of 
conferring on the holder of the bill the right to claim the goods at their destination. 
Hence, the insertion of the wrong shipping date by the loading broker, though 
obtained through the fraud of the broker, did not completely destroy the whole 
essence of the bill of lading as to make it a nullity. It is submitted that this approach to 
establishing when a document is a nullity by ascertaining whether the whole essence 
of the document has been destroyed is fundamentally helpful in defining the nature of 
nullity required to trigger the exception. The approach would simplify judicial 
decisions once the legal facts are known. 
 
Another variant of materiality relates to how essential the document argued to be a 
nullity in relation to the letter of credit should be as to make its nullity displace the 
autonomy principle. Put differently, should nullity of any document required for 
presentation be capable of enjoining payment or does it have to be only the very 
essential documents like the bill of lading? Chao JA, in Beam Technology, did not 
disregard the question as to how essential a document412 would be and in response 
used the word ‘essential’ as being synonymous with the word ‘material’. Reflecting 
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on this approach of the court; Dora Neo 413  posed the question as to what the 
materiality should relate to. As rightly pointed by the academic, one possible answer 
may be that the materiality is in relation to the credit. If this is the position, it means 
that any document stipulated in the credit is material. But this seems to run against the 
position adopted by Chao JA in distinguishing Montrod from Beam Technology case. 
In Beam Technology the court, in reference to the Montrod case, saw the required 
certificate of inspection as non-material but made reference to a document which is 
the cause of the issue of the letter of credit as the material document. Hence, from the 
tone of the court, it seems that the court determined materiality on the basis of the 
document that provided security for the bank’s advances. This approach to limiting 
materiality to documents that ‘caused the issue of letter of credit’, while it has the 
potential of setting a high standard of materiality, since not all document required 
under the credit would have the potential of satisfying the requirement of being the 
‘cause of the issue of letter of credit’, it would undermine precision and certainty. It is 
submitted that the approach that treats every document stipulated under the credit as  
material documents whose nullity would displace the autonomy doctrine is preferable. 
The basis for this contention is that parties to a documentary credit, in stipulating the 
documents required for presentation, consider those documents to be material and any 
derogation from the stipulated documents by way of any of the documents being 
established as a nullity should displace the autonomy principle. 
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 Dora Neo ‘A Nullity Exception in Letter of Credit Transaction’ (2004) Sing J LS 46, 68. 
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4.4.2. Standard of Proof 
 
Having set out above the working principles relating to the nature of nullity that could 
bring the nullity exception into place, other primary issues like the standard of proof 
need to be properly defined in order to understand the scope of the exception. In this 
regard, the age-long standard of proof established in decided cases with respect to the 
fraud exception would be helpful to the nullity exception.  With respect to proof and 
the standard which a claimant needs to reach to cross the threshold needed to establish 
the nullity exception, three broad areas of interest come to mind.  
(A) Where the bank has refused payment on the ground that a presented document is a 
nullity and the beneficiary applies to court for summary judgment  
(B) Where the bank has paid the beneficiary despite information from the applicant 
that a tendered document is a nullity, what is the level of proof required for the 
applicant to resist reimbursing the paying bank?  
(C) Lastly, where the applicant for the credit seeks an injunction against the paying 
bank seeking to prevent it from paying the beneficiary on the ground that the 
document sought to be tendered by the beneficiary to obtain payment is a nullity. 
 
 
4.4.2.1.  Summary Judgment 
 
If the beneficiary applies for summary judgment against the bank that has refused 
payment on the grounds of nullity of the document(s), the law is that the standard of 
proof required is that which governs the application for summary judgment. In 
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England, summary judgment application is governed by the Civil Procedure Rules 
(CPR) part 24.2.414  
 
A subsidiary question that has arisen in the context of the fraud exception, which 
would be relevant to the nullity exception, is what the position would be where the 
bank, though having no clear evidence of nullity at the time of presentation of the 
documents and therefore having a choice to pay, nevertheless declines to pay because 
it suspects that the presented document(s) is a nullity. Can it resist an application for 
summary judgment if, by the time the application is heard, it has obtained evidence 
that the presented document is a clear nullity? Waller LJ, in Safa Ltd v Banque du 
Caire,415in the case of fraud, answered the above question in the positive noting that it 
would be absurd for the court to give summary judgment to the beneficiary in the face 
of clear evidence of fraud merely because the evidence was not available at the time 
of the demand. The basis of this decision is persuasive and compelling. It is submitted 
that its application to a nullity exception will ensure that the standard required with 
respect to the exceptions remain uniform. 
 
4.4.2.2.  Resisting Bank’s Entitlement to Reimbursement 
 
Where the bank has paid the beneficiary despite information from the applicant that a 
tendered document is a nullity, what is the level of proof required for the applicant to 
resist reimbursing the paying bank? In this case, the standard required would be 
                                                 
414
 The provision of (CPR) part 24.2 was stated in the fraud rule. Solo Industries Ltd v Canara Bank 
[2001] EWCA Civ 1059. 
[2001] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 578 at 595, Safa Ltd v Banque  Du Caire [2000] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 600, and Banque 
Saudi Fransi v Lear Siegler Services Inc[2007] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 47. 
415
 [2000] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 600 at 606, Waller LJ was restating the earlier court’s position in Balfour 
Beatty Civil Engineering Ltd v Technical &General Guarantee Co. Ltd (1999) 68 Con. LR 180, CA 
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whether it can be proven that the bank had clear knowledge that the document in 
question was a nullity. To succeed, the applicant needs to show that the evidence of 
nullity was clear at the time the bank made the payment.416 
 
Finally, where the applicant for the credit seeks an injunction against the issuing bank 
intending to enjoin payment, the position should not be any different from the fraud 
exception. The prevailing view in England is that there can be no intervention by way 
of injunction unless it is ‘to prevent the alleged breach of a legal duty owed by the 
defendant to the plaintiff or by way of ancillary relief required by a party to 
proceedings who asserts a cause of action’.417 This presupposes that there must be an 
existing cause of action to which the grant of an injunction is merely ancillary.  
 
4.4.2.3.   Injunction against Payment 
 
As the facts of commercial life sometimes reveal, there are situations where the 
applicant for the credit considers that the beneficiary for the credit is likely to make or 
has made a demand for payment which ought not to be met with payment. In this 
circumstance, that applicant may proceed to injunct the beneficiary from presenting 
the document or the bank from making payment. In Group Josi Re v Walbrook 
Insurance Company,418 Staughton L.J. noted that there is no difference with respect to 
the standard of proof where either the beneficiary is injuncted from presenting the 
document or the bank from paying under the credit.419 
                                                 
416
  See Dora Neo ‘A Nullity Exception in Letter of Credit Transaction’ (2004)  Sing. J LS 46, 72. 
417
 Ibrahim Shanker & Co v Distos Compania Naviera S.A. [1978] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 1, per Lord Diplock 
albeit in an application for Mareva Injunction., See also Chief Constable of Kent v  V. [1983] 1QB 34 
per Slade L.J at 49 and Donaldson L.J. at 45 in the case of interlocutory injunction. 
418
 [1996] 1 WLR 1152. 
419
 [1996] 1 WLR 1152, 1161. 
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Despite American Cyanamid Co. v Ethicon420 being a leading case with respect to the 
criteria for the grant of interlocutory injunction,421 letter of credit cases have somehow 
deviated from this landmark decision. A reason for such deviation could be gleaned 
from the comment of Staughton LJ422 when he noted that that letter of credit cases are 
special cases within the American Cyanamid guidelines. With regard to letters of 
credit, most decided cases423 in England support the view that the standard of proof 
required for the purposes of interlocutory injunction is a clear case of fraud of which 
the bank must have notice.424 This position was further validated by Donaldson MR in 
the Court of Appeal case of Bolivinter Oil SA v Chase Manhattan Bank.425 Here the 
Court of Appeal noted that ‘the wholly exceptional case where an injunction may be 
granted is where it is proved that the bank knows that any demand for payment 
already made or which may thereafter be made will clearly be fraudulent. But the 
evidence must be clear both as to the fact of fraud and as to the bank’s knowledge’.426 
It is submitted that this approach that is evident in English documentary credits fraud 
injunction cases should ordinarily be the position where nullity to be recognised in 
English law. However, despite the high standard of proof required for interlocutory 
injunctions, a claimant is still faced with some other difficulties which ought to be 
                                                 
420
 [1975] AC 396. 
421
 The summary of this case with respect to interlocutory injunction is that the grant interlocutory 
injunction has to be taken at the time when the claimant right or the violation of it, or both, was 
uncertain and would remain uncertain till final judgment. Hence the court noted that for an 
interlocutory injunction to be granted, the court only need to be satisfied that there is a serious issue to 
be tried.  Serious issue to be tried in the sense that the court is not interested in prejudging the issue 
before it goes to trial but merely had to be satisfied that that the claimant action is not frivolous or 
vexatious. 
422
 In approving the comment of  Lloyd LJ, in Dong Jin Metal Co Ltd v Raymet Ltd Unreported, 13 
July 1993, (Court of Appeal Division) Transcript No. 945 of 1993. 
423
 RD Harbottle (Mercantile) Ltd v National Westminster Bank Ltd [1978] QB 146, Edward Owen 
Engineering v Barclays Bank International Ltd [1978] QB 159, Bolivinter Oil SA v Chase Manhattan 
Bank [1984] I Lloyd’s Rep 251. 
424
 See Edward Owen Engineering v Barclays Bank International Bank Ltd [1979] QB 159, 171. per 
Lord Denning MR. 
425
 [1984] 1 Lloyd's Rep 251. 
426
 [1984] 1 Lloyd's Rep 251, 254. 
143 
 
satisfied before an injunction would be granted. Such legal consideration will be 
considered briefly below.  
 
4.4.2.4.  Injunction- Other Legal Considerations 
 
Therefore, under the nullity exception, an injunction to restrain payment under the 
credit will be issued by way of ancillary relief to a cause of action which the applicant 
for the credit has against the issuer.427  Under the fraud exception, it was considered in 
United Trading Corporation S.A v Allied Bank Ltd,428 that the cause of action which 
the applicant for the credit can rely on lies in the duty of care429 which the issuer owes 
the applicant. This duty of care arises because the issuer of the credit owes the 
applicant a duty of care not pay out on the credit if it is clear on the evidence that the 
beneficiary demand is fraudulent.  The same applies to a nullity exception. Hence, in 
so far as there is a clear case of nullity, through the presentation of evidence that is 
clear as to the nullity,430 an injunction should be granted to the applicant for the credit 
provided that other conditions for the grant of injunction like the balance of 
convenience test has been satisfied. 
  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
427
 Though the authority of Czarnikow-Rionda Sugar Trading Inc. v Standard Bank London Ltd [1999] 
2 Lloyd’s Rep187, 200 highlighted the difficulty with respect to establishing this cause of action by the 
applicant for the purposes of pre- trial injunction. 
428
 [1985] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 554 at 559 -560. 
429
 Anns v Merton London Borough Council [1978] AC 728. 
430
  There will be clear evidence if it can be shown that the only realistic inference on the evidence 
available is that the presented document is a nullity. 
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4.5. Conclusion 
 
The development of the nullity exception to the principle of autonomy in 
documentary credits partly highlights a tension based on fairness as between the 
parties and the commercial requirement that the parties’ obligation be absolutely 
certain. It has been suggested that allowing a broad judicial discretion which 
recognises the nullity exception would introduce a high level of uncertainty into 
important areas of letters of credit where precision and reliability should not be 
compromised. It is also unlikely that the judgment of the Singapore court in Beam 
Technology has in any way dispelled this myth 431  of uncertainty 432  which 
relentlessly, has been used against the nullity exception. 
 
There is no doubt, that documentary credit is rule-orientated and the assurance of 
payment promised to the seller/beneficiary would be interfered with if the nullity 
exception is recognised without identifiable limits. Equally, an important 
consideration is that the popularity of the letter of credit is based on the faith of its 
users. If the possibility of abuse of the letter of credit system is not curtailed, and 
tender of null documents flourishes, faith in the letters of credit system will fade, as 
will the commercial utility of letters of credit.  
 
Having noted the above, some issues regarding nullity ought to be pointed out. The 
controversy whether nullity in documentary credits should be an exception to the 
                                                 
431
 Myth in the sense that the contention that recognizing  the nullity exception will cause uncertainty 
while looking like a credible reason for not recognizing the exception, might if critically examined, be 
seen to be misplaced. This issue of certainty was addressed by the Court of Appeal in the case of Beam 
Technology where the fear of uncertainty was allayed. 
432
 Certainty in the law is an elusive term that can only be aspired to but difficult to realize. Its 
realization remains elusive because human action (including commercial action), the basis of which 
law operates is by no means definite. 
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principle of autonomy in English law remains both interesting and complex. It is 
interesting, for two principal reasons. The first is that nullity, once established in 
general law, has the effect of fundamentally altering the legal position of the parties 
and in most circumstances, has been used as a ground for avoiding what would, save 
for the nullity, be a legally binding obligation. Despite, letters of credit being a 
specialty contract, it remains curious why a document established to be a nullity 
should not have the same effect as fraud in displacing the autonomy principle.  
 
Secondly, the controversy surrounding the recognition of the nullity exception 
indirectly highlights the difficulty posed by the inflexible nature of the fraud rule in 
English law, particularly the delineation of ‘innocent’ and ‘non-innocent’ 
beneficiaries. An approach that insists on the requirement of beneficiary knowledge 
for the fraud rule to displace the impregnability of documentary credit has far-
reaching implications. This undoubtedly, has led to debate over whether there should 
be a further exception to the autonomy principle to provide for the situation where an 
issuing bank is presented with documents which are nullities.    
 
It may be noted that that the whole thesis of the nullity exception stems from a forgery 
of a document, albeit by a third party, or a non-genuine document that renders the 
document a nullity and thus non-conforming. This third party forgery of documents 
could be subsumed in the fraud rule. However, it has been excluded due to the 
restrictive nature of the English fraud rule, which, in the main excludes third party 
fraud. But, it has to be pointed out that a beneficiary’s duty in a credit transaction that 
entitles him to payment is to tender documents that are in order and strictly conform 
146 
 
to the requirements of the credit. This important requirement complements the 
autonomy rule.  
 
It is submitted that while the requirements of certainty and autonomy are essential to 
the letter of credit system, they are not absolute and may be sacrificed where 
appropriate considerations arise. It may be to the interest of letters of credit that the 
principle of autonomy is further restricted by recognising a limited scope of nullity 
exception so that the cancer of fraudulent document may be drastically reduced. 
 
For now, there may be problems with regard to the scope of the exception. This is 
primarily a difficulty which the dynamic nature of law thrusts upon us. While the 
chapter has endeavoured to analyse and set the benchmark for the scope of the nullity 
exception by borrowing from decided cases, the formulation provided by the 
Singapore Court of Appeal in Beam Technology still remains a relevant guiding light. 
It is a decision that should be welcomed for its stance on forged documents and its 
relevance in restoring trust and sanctity that is the cornerstone of the letters of credit 
system. 
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Chapter Five 
 
 
5.0.    Recklessness of the Beneficiary 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
In chapter three, we noted that it is only the fraud of the beneficiary or his agent in 
presenting the forged or fraudulent documents that comes within the scope of the 
English fraud rule and is capable of displacing the autonomy principle. Chapter Four 
examined the rejection in English law of the nullity exception, which in the main 
concerns fraud of a third party that leads to a stipulated document that is a nullity 
being presented under the credit. This chapter deals with an issue that was highlighted 
by the decision of the Court of Appeal in Montrod Ltd v Grundkotter433 with respect 
to the nullity exception. Potter LJ, while dismissing the nullity exception in Montrod, 
raised an issue that has currently been interpreted to suggest a separate exception434 to 
the principle of autonomy in documentary credits.  The Court of Appeal observed that 
it is possible that the beneficiary, though not actively implicated in the fraud of a third 
party,435 but may be culpable for the fraud because he acted recklessly, in haste or 
somehow was at fault.436 In this kind of situation pointed out by Potter LJ,437 where 
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 [2001] EWCA Civ 1954, [2002] CLC 499. This case dealt extensively with the issue of nullity 
which was left open by Lord Diplock in the United City Merchants case and in the main summarizes 
the English position on the issue of nullity 
434
 See Peter Ellinger and Dora Neo, The Law and Practice of Documentary Letters of Credit (Hart 
Publishing, (2010) 169. 
435
 In this case referring to third party fraud which formed the basis of the discussion under the nullity 
exception 
436
 The circumstance mentioned in the introduction that constitutes the recklessness exception was 
articulated by Potter LJ as having some kind of attraction in the English case of  Montrod v 
Grundkotter Fleischvertriebs GmbH, [2001] EWCA Civ 1954, [2002] CLC 499. In this case, the Court 
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the fraud of the beneficiary is not present but he is deemed to be reckless as to the 
presentation of required documents, will such recklessness leading to the fraud 
prevent the beneficiary from claiming on the credit? The above situation constitutes 
the circumstance under which the recklessness of the beneficiary438 is discussed as an 
exception to the principle of autonomy.  It has to be noted that judicial dicta point to 
recklessness of the beneficiary, either in assisting the tender or actually tendering of 
forged/ fraudulent documents, as a possible exception to the principle of autonomy in 
documentary credits.439 This chapter assesses the merit of this contention to determine 
whether the favourable comment it has received as a possible exception to the 
principle of autonomy is deserved. 
 
The Chapter is divided into four sections. Apart from the introductory Section 5.1, 
Section 5.2 deals with the possible nature of the exception. Section 5.3 examines 
certain considerations that are required for the recklessness of the beneficiary 
exception to apply. It considers issues that are necessary for the recklessness 
exception to be proved, and to achieve this, the section analyses such issues as 
whether the beneficiary owes a duty of care either to the issuing bank or the applicant 
with respect to the documents which it presents for payment. If no such a duty exists, 
can recklessness of the beneficiary be established against him and on what basis will 
such proof be made. If such duty exists, what will be the standard of proof and are 
                                                                                                                                            
of Appeal in rejecting the Nullity exception commented favourably towards the possibility of the 
beneficiary’s recklessness being an exception to the principle of autonomy. 
437
 Note that Potter LJ expressed the view that denying payment to the beneficiary in such circumstance 
articulated above holds some kind of attraction to him. 
438
 For general reading on the exception see Peter Ellinger and Dora Neo, The Law and Practice of 
Documentary Letters of Credit (Hart Publishing 2010) 169. 
439
  See the obiter comment of Potter LJ in Montrod v Grundkotter Fleischvertriebs GmbH [2002]1 
WLR 1975, see also the Singapore case of Lambias Importers & Exporters Co Pte Ltd v Hong Kong & 
Shanghai Banking Corporation[1993] 2 SLR 751. 
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there arguments that work against the recognition of the exception? Section 5.4 
concludes the chapter. 
 
5.2.  Possible Nature of the Exception 
 
Before moving on to ascertain the specific nature of the beneficiary’s recklessness as 
an exception to the principle of autonomy, it may be useful to look at the nature of 
recklessness in general law. 
 
5.2.1. Recklessness in General Law 
 
There seems to be great difficulty440 in analysing the meaning of recklessness in law 
as the term has been given several shades of interpretation by the courts over the years. 
Black’s Law Dictionary defines recklessness as ‘conduct whereby the actor does not 
desire harmful consequences but nonetheless foresees the possibility and consciously 
takes the risk’, or alternatively as a state of mind in which a person does not care 
about the consequences of his or her actions.441It further states that ‘recklessness 
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 As Andrew Ashworth noted in his book Principle of Criminal Law (Clarendon Press Ltd 1991).‘An 
abiding difficulty in discussing the legal meaning of recklessness is that the term has been given several 
different shades of meaning by the courts over the years. In the law of manslaughter, 'reckless' was long 
regarded as the most appropriate adjective to express the degree of negligence needed for a conviction: 
in this sense, it meant a high degree of carelessness. In the late 1950s the courts adopted a different 
meaning of recklessness in the context of mens rea, referring to D's actual awareness of the risk of the 
prohibited consequence occurring: we shall call this “common-law recklessness.” Controversy was 
introduced into this area in the early 1980s, when the House of Lords purported to broaden the meaning 
of recklessness so as to include those who failed to give thought to an obvious risk that the 
consequence would occur….’ More so, it ought to be noted that the courts have hovered between 
objective and subjective definition of recklessness and recently there is a shift by the court from 
objective assessment of recklessness to one that has a subjective test or criteria. 
441Bryan Garner (ed), Black’s Law Dictionary (8th edn, West Publishing Company 2005). 
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involves a greater degree of fault than negligence but a lesser degree of fault than 
intentional wrongdoing’.442 
 
 In English law, though the discussion of recklessness has sometimes been seen in the 
form of obiter dicta, Lord Diplock attempted an objective analysis of recklessness in 
R v Caldwell 443  when his Lordship stated that a defendant is reckless if: (a) he 
commits an act that creates an obvious risk…. , and (b) when he does the act, he either 
has not given any thought to the possibility of there being any such risk or has 
recognized  that there was some risk involved and nonetheless gone on to do it. 
However, reliance on this Caldwell recklessness (an objective test) has declined 
considerably after the House of Lords decision in R v G and Anor.444 The decision 
based on its facts seems to have adopted a subjective test. In reference to its subjective 
meaning, Lord Bingham, noted that a person acts recklessly with respect to (a) a 
circumstance when he is aware of a risk that it exists or will exist; (b) a result when he 
is aware of a risk that it will occur; and it is, in the circumstance known to him, 
unreasonable to take the risk. This recent position emphasizes a subjective test that 
judges recklessness on the basis of identifiable subjective criteria like the age, 
experience and understanding of the person in question rather than on the standard of 
a hypothetical reasonable person who might have better knowledge and understanding.  
Despite, this recent emergence of the subjective test, the test applied in practice 
remains nonetheless a hybrid one, as the credibility of the defendant’s denial of 
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 See further Bryan  Garner  (ed),  Black’s Law Dictionary (Thomson Reuters 2009) 1385. 
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 [1982] AC 341, See also the English Law Commission’s definition which states that   a person 
should be regarded as being reckless as to a particular result of his conduct if, but only if,- a. he 
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knowledge and understanding will always be judged by an objective standard of what 
you would expect a person of the same general age, experience and abilities as the 
defendant to have known.445 
 
The analysis of recklessness above despite involving the use of subjective criteria, 
also involves the consideration of some objective element like reasonableness. In its 
subjective assessment, such issues like understanding the mindset of the defendant 
and whether such conduct deemed to be reckless was foreseen 446   are relevant 
considerations. 
 
5.2.2.  Beneficiary’s Recklessness in Documentary Credits 
 
The emergence of the beneficiary’s recklessness as a possible exception to the 
principle of autonomy is traceable to the dicta of the courts in two common law 
jurisdictions namely England and Singapore. In the Singapore case of Lambias 
(Importers & Exporters) Co Pte Ltd v Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking 
Corporation, 447  the beneficiary unknowingly allowed a quality and inspection 
certificate which it issued to be countersigned by an impostor by bringing the 
impostor to the bank without checking his identity. Cheng JC, despite not relying on 
the alleged beneficiary’s recklessness as a ground for rejecting the beneficiary’s claim 
for payment, noted that ‘the present case is not concerned with the beneficiary's fraud 
for which the common law exception applies, rather it is one where, … the 
relationship between the bank and the beneficiary depends on whether and to what 
                                                 
445
 See generally G Williams, ‘Recklessness Redefined’ (1981) 40 CLJ 252, see also L H Leigh, 
‘Recklessness after Reid’ (1993) 56 MLR 208. 
446
 See generally A R White ‘Carelessness, Indifference and Recklessness’ (1961) MLR 592-595. 
447
 [1993] SLR 751. 
152 
 
extent the beneficiary is responsible for the defects in the documents tendered’.448 The 
court further stated that ‘the law cannot condone actions which, although not 
amounting to fraud per se, are of such recklessness and haste that the documents 
produced as a result are clearly not in conformity with the requirements of the credit. 
The plaintiffs (beneficiary) in the present case are not guilty of fraud, but they were 
unknowingly responsible for having aided in the perpetration of the fraud. In such a 
case where the fraud was discovered even before all other documents were tendered, I 
think it is right and proper that the plaintiffs should not be permitted to claim under 
the letter of credit’.449 
 
In the English Court of Appeal decision of Montrod Ltd v Grundkotter 
Fleischvertriebs,450 Potter LJ despite rejecting a general nullity exception based on the 
concept of a document being fraudulent in itself or devoid of commercial value 
without the beneficiary being implicated in the fraud, however noted that ‘I would not 
seek to exclude the possibility that, in an individual case, the conduct of a beneficiary 
in connection with the creation and/or presentation of a document forged by a third 
party might, though itself not amounting to fraud, be of such character as not to 
deserve the protection available to a holder in due course’.451 These dicta of both the 
Singapore court in Lambias and the English Court of Appeal in Montrod have been 
interpreted as arguably justifying the proposition that the recklessness of the 
beneficiary in presenting a fraudulent document from a third party fraudster could be 
a ground for displacing the autonomy principle and stopping the beneficiary from 
receiving payment when his dishonesty could not be established. The dicta expressed 
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in these cases raise the question as to whether the beneficiary recklessness could in 
fact provide a defence to the right of the beneficiary to get payment upon the tender of 
apparently complying documents. 
 
 
5.3. Applying Beneficiary’s Recklessness: Legal Considerations 
  
 
If the beneficiary’s recklessness is to be recognized as an exception to the autonomy 
principle, the beneficiary’s recklessness exception needs to be precisely identified and 
defined. To resolve what amounts to beneficiary’s recklessness, some legal 
considerations need to be investigated. Such issues might include whether the 
beneficiary whose recklessness is argued to be a ground justifying non-payment, owes 
a duty of care to the applicant in relation to the documents which it presents. Where 
the dishonesty of the beneficiary could not be established, what is the basis for 
asserting that he was reckless as to the tender of document?  Finally, are there some 
justifiable objections to the beneficiary’s recklessness being a ground for non-
payment of the beneficiary? 
  
 
5.3.1. Does the Beneficiary owe a duty to be careful? 
 
The relevance of the above investigation to the question of whether a reckless 
beneficiary can justifiably be denied payment in documentary credits on the basis of 
his recklessness in tendering a forged or fraudulently altered document by a third 
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party is neccessary.452 It is true that carelessness may not in itself be sufficient to 
constitute recklessness, although it is one of the factors that ought to be taken into 
account in ascertaining whether someone is reckless. Clearly, a presentation by a 
beneficiary cannot be both careful and reckless. Hence, carelessness is an important 
ingredient to prove recklessness. If this is so, the question whether the beneficiary 
owes a duty to be careful with respect to the documents which he presents becomes 
relevant. Where the duty to be careful does not exist, on what ground will the 
beneficiary be characterized as reckless, albeit grossly careless, with respect to the 
document which he presents leading to a refusal of payment? 
 
In Montrod v Grundkotter 453  the court held that ‘it cannot be argued that the 
beneficiary to a credit owes a duty to the applicant with regard to the documents 
which he presents’.454  
 
A point is sought to be made in the forgoing analysis. That point is that the 
beneficiary of a credit owes neither a duty of care to the applicant nor the paying bank 
with respect to the documents which he presents under the documentary credits 
contract for the purpose of getting payment under the credit. The ground for this 
contention was noted by Potter LJ when the Court of Appeal held that the beneficiary, 
in seeking to ensure that documents presented to the issuing bank comply with the 
terms of the letters of credit, is pursuing its own commercial interests. The beneficiary 
                                                 
452
 The necessity of this question arises because it can be persuasively argued that the starting point of 
ascertaining whether a person is reckless will be to consider whether he owes a duty to be careful. The 
ground for such persuasion is that most definition of recklessness has seen it from the point of 
aggravated or gross carelessness or negligence. As noted by Alan  White in ‘Carelessness, Indifference 
and Recklessness’  (1961) MLR 592,595 a person could not be accused of being reckless if he cannot 
be adjudged to be a person who did not care whether he caused damage or not. 
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 Montrod Ltd v Grundkotter Fleischvertriebs-GmbH & Ors [2001] CLC 466. 
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 Montrod Ltd v Grundkotter Fleischvertriebs-GmbH & Ors [2001] CLC 466 at 479-480. 
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seeks to present documents in order to be paid in a transaction in which the 
commercial interests of the issuing bank and other parties involved with the letter of 
credit are dealt with in the manner provided for under UCP 500.455  
 
In a more recent Singapore case of DBS Bank Ltd v Carrier Singapore,456 the question 
whether there exists a duty of care on the part of the beneficiary seeking payment 
regarding the documents it presents was answered in the negative. The court justified 
its conclusion that there exists no duty of care on the basis that it is consistent with the 
narrowness of the fraud exception as posited by Lord Diplock in United City 
Merchants v Royal Bank of Canada.457 Hence the decision in Carrier Singapore is 
that a duty of care would only exist if the beneficiary had assumed an express 
responsibility to the issuing bank/ the confirming bank or the buyer to ensure that the 
documents were accurate, failing which no duty of care would ordinarily be presumed 
to exist.  The above analysis reflects the position of case law with respect to whether 
there exists a duty of care owed by the beneficiary to the issuing bank / confirming 
bank or the applicant with regard to the document(s) which he presents under a 
documentary credits contract.  
 
Thus judging from the above position, (the difficulty of establishing a mere duty of 
care owed to the applicant or the paying bank by the beneficiary with respect to the 
document it presents) it would be difficult to see how the beneficiary’s recklessness, 
which could be compared to a duty of care owed in gross negligence458 can arise. The 
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 Note that the current edition is UCP 600 which came into effect on July 2007 
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 [2008] 3 SLR 261. 
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 [1983] 1 AC 168. 
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 As in some cases, recklessness is used in relation to the degree of carelessness required to find a 
person guilty of an offence. More so, of decisive importance is that an act or omission could not be 
treated as careless, reckless or negligent unless three things are established by the claimant. These are 
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reason for the above assertion is that where such a duty (duty of care) could not be 
established, it is difficult to find a legal basis to judge the beneficiary’s recklessness if 
he has presented the required document(s) (as a commercial party pursuing his own 
commercial interest) which entitles him to payment. Secondly, if the Montrod case 
rejected the third party (nullity) defence, it is curious how a document that is 
presented by the beneficiary which was forged by a third party could provide a 
convincing ground for displacing the beneficiary’s right to payment. 
 
5.3.2. Where the dishonesty of the beneficiary cannot be established, is 
there any justifiable basis for asserting his recklessness as a 
ground for non payment? 
 
The above legal question was given judicial attention in BDS Bank Ltd v Carrier 
Singapore, 459  where the court observed that if a bank may rely on negligent 
misrepresentation (which in this case includes reckless conduct) by a beneficiary as a 
ground to recover any money it has paid out to the beneficiary, then the law would 
have to accept that the banks, and by extension the applicant, are entitled to invoke 
negligent misrepresentation (which includes reckless conduct) by the beneficiary as a 
ground for not paying the beneficiary in the first place. 
 
The court further noted that the overall implication of the above would be to unravel 
the narrow fraud exception which the English House of Lords460 took pains to limit. It 
                                                                                                                                            
(a) that the defendant owes to the claimant a duty to take reasonable care not to act the way he did; (b) 
that the defendant breached the duty; and (c) and that the claimant suffered damage as a result of the 
breach.  See Sally ‘Cunningham Recklessness: Being Reckless and Acting Recklessly’ (2010) 21 KLJ 
445, 447. 
459
 [2008] 3 SLR 261. 
460
 United City Merchants Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada [1983] 1 AC 168. 
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means that banks and the applicant could insist on not paying the beneficiary once 
there was any inaccurate statement of material facts by simply alleging that the 
beneficiary was grossly negligent or reckless in his conduct. 461  This position has 
received the earlier judicial support of Lord Diplock in United City Merchant 
(Investment) Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada462 where it was made clear that nothing but 
the fraud of the beneficiary or his agent will relieve the issuing or confirming bank of 
its duty to pay upon the tender of facially conforming documents. 
 
5.3.3. Objections to Allowing Beneficiary’s Recklessness as a Ground for 
Denying payment  
    
The strongest argument (in this case probably well justified) against adopting 
beneficiary recklessness in presenting a third party fraudulent document as a ground 
for displacing the autonomy doctrine is that its application would lead to much 
uncertainty and unjustified erosion of  the principle of independence. This point was 
well made in DBS Bank Ltd v Carrier Singapore463 where the Singapore High Court 
per Andrew Ang. J, noted 464  that ‘one has to bear in mind that the underlying 
foundation of the system of documentary credits is to give sellers, as far as possible, 
an “assured right” to payment notwithstanding disputes in the underlying sale 
contract’.465 The court further noted that developing the law to allow for a negligent 
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 DBS Bank Ltd v Carrier Singapore [2008] 3 SLR 261 [99] [100]. 
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 [1983] 1 AC 168. 
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 [2008] 3 SLR 261 [100]. 
464
 The court in giving its dictum highlighted the point that was made by Lord Diplock in United City 
Merchant v Royal Bank of Canada [1983]1 AC 168,183; R D Harbottle (Mercantile) Ltd v National 
Westminster Bank Ltd [1978] QB 146, 155–156 regarding the point that trust in international trade will 
be greatly affected if such unjustified erosion of the principle of autonomy is allowed.  
465
 [2008] 3 SLR 261 [100]. 
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misrepresentation exception (reckless conduct) as a ground upon which autonomy 
doctrine could be displaced would be an unjustified erosion of this very premise.  
 
Another variant of the certainty argument that could be made regarding adopting 
beneficiary’s recklessness as a ground for non-payment of the beneficiary was evident 
in the judgment of HHJ Raymond Jack in Montrod v Grundkotter, 466  where he 
pointed out some of the inherent difficulties with respect to establishing when conduct 
is reckless or proving that a duty of care exists. For such legal analysis as to 
beneficiary’s recklessness to succeed, it needs to justify its existence by proving 
further issues like remoteness and foresight.467 These (remoteness and foresight) are 
not issues which are easily within the competence of the bank to ascertain before it 
determines whether to pay the beneficiary or not. Having noted the above objections 
to beneficiary’s recklessness, it may be apposite to consider whether any advantage 
exists in having beneficiary recklessness as a ground to displace the autonomy 
principle. 
 
 
5.3.4.  Arguments for Allowing Beneficiary’s Recklessness as a 
ground for denying Payment. 
 
The most striking argument that could be advanced for beneficiary’s recklessness in 
documentary credits is that its recognition as an exception to the principle of 
autonomy would lead to the beneficiary being more diligent with respect to the 
document which he tenders for payment. Diligence of the beneficiary with respect to 
                                                 
466
 [2001] CLC 466.  
467
 ibid 479. Note that this  point was made by the court with respect to proving the duty of care but 
such analysis could be extended to proving when a person’s conduct could be adjudged to be reckless 
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the documents he tenders would warrant the beneficiary carefully inspecting the 
documents stipulated in the credit which emanates from a third party so as to 
exonerate himself (beneficiary) from any charge of recklessness which could be 
brought 468  as a ground for non-payment of the beneficiary upon the tender of 
conforming documents. However, the diligence of the beneficiary with respect to the 
documents raises a further question as to what extent would the beneficiary be diligent 
with respect to the documents as not to be dubbed reckless? This question arises 
because the documents469 which the beneficiary relies on for payment may come from 
third parties whose commercial activities may have no direct relationship with the 
beneficiary. Consequently, another problem may arise as to the criteria for judging 
when and which beneficiary conduct is reckless. It will involve analysing the thorny 
issues with respect to foresight, remoteness and meeting the subjective test required to 
adjudge the beneficiary reckless with respect to the documents. These ingredients 
required to establish whether the beneficiary has been reckless, it is submitted 
compound paying banks’ duties in documentary credits. To this extent, whatever 
benefit that is achieved by making the beneficiary more diligent470 in handling third 
party documents is extinguished by the dilemma which the investigation of whether 
the beneficiary has been reckless would cause the bank for payment to be made.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
468
 Most often by the applicant for the credit  with respect to the presentation made by the beneficiary 
469
 Such documents like the bill of lading are issued most often by the ship master who may have no 
direct relationship with the beneficiary. 
470
 In any case an assessment of whether he is not diligent will be a subjective and troubling legal 
assessment to make and should not be encouraged for the sake of the independent banking commitment 
assumed by banks.  
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5. 4.  Conclusion 
 
The chapter has sought to answer the question whether the beneficiary is entitled to 
payment in a situation where his reckless conduct, albeit not amounting to fraud in 
itself, enabled a third party to present fraudulent documents under a credit.  In 
Singapore, this view which possibly could be perceived as an exception to the 
principle of autonomy found favour with Goh Phai Cheng JC in Lambias Co Ptd Ltd 
v. Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking Corpn.  This dictum of the court in Lambias case 
has been argued to have the support471 of the English Court of Appeal in Montrod.  
The dicta of the courts with respect to beneficiary’s recklessness seem to ignore some 
crucial aspects of Montrod’s decision.  HHJ Raymond Jack, with whom Potter LJ 
agreed, emphatically held in the Montrod case that the beneficiary owes no duty of 
care to the issuing [or nominated] bank or the applicant with respect to the documents 
it presents to get payment under the credit. The reason given for the above submission 
was captured by the Court of Appeal in Montrod when it stated that in the absence of 
any express assumption of responsibility the beneficiary in seeking to ensure that 
documents presented to the issuing bank comply with the terms of the letters of credit, 
is pursuing his own commercial interests. He (beneficiary) seeks to present compliant 
documents in order to be paid in the context of a transaction in which the commercial 
interests of the issuing bank and other parties involved in connection with the letters 
of credit are dealt with in the manner provided for under UCP 500,472 subject to the 
provisions of which they are aware that the transactions will be conducted and the 
commercial risk distributed. If based on the documentary credits contracts no such 
duty of care exists on the part of the beneficiary, it may be difficult to justify an 
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 See Peter Ellinger and Dora Neo The Law and Practice of Documentary Letters of Credit (Hart 
Publishing 2010) 170. 
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 See the recent version called UCP 600 which came into effect on July2007 
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attempt to rely on his reckless 473  conduct as ground for denying payment to the 
beneficiary under the credit. 
 
More so, relying on the beneficiary’s recklessness as a ground for withholding 
payment will, as the cases have highlighted, introduce an unnecessary level of 
uncertainty with respect to payment under the documentary credits contract. This 
could easily be gleaned from the issues that will ordinarily need to be considered 
before a beneficiary is adjudged to be reckless, issues like whether the beneficiary had 
foreseen the third party fraud, and if he has, to what extent the harm caused is not too 
remote from the beneficiary’s point. 
 
The enthusiasm generated by the comments of the courts with respect to beneficiary’s 
recklessness being an exception to the principle of autonomy runs contrary to 
established authority. While it can be argued to provide opportunity for greater 
diligence on the part of the beneficiary, it should be dismissed as wishful thinking and 
runs contrary to established principles primarily accepted in this area of law. The 
inquiry into the recklessness of the beneficiary in presenting the forged documents 
where he is not proven to be dishonest will introduce a high level of uncertainty474 in 
an area where precision is paramount. Its subjective nature will arise because the bank 
in deciding whether or not to pay the beneficiary upon the tender of apparently 
conforming document will have to decide on the degree of fault required to adjudge a 
beneficiary reckless in order to curtail the beneficiary right to payment. This 
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 In any case bank need a clear test to apply as to what amounts to being reckless as what amounts to 
recklessness, without much definition is too vague. 
474
 The uncertainty that will result by inquiring into whether the beneficiary’s action is reckless could 
be seen in the Montrod case itself. The issues decided bordered on reckless conduct - that is failure to 
take reasonable care - was not mutually agreed by the courts. If such issues could generate 
disagreements between lawyers and judges who are versed in law, it may not be an issue that ought to 
be considered by a bank before it decides whether it ought to pay the beneficiary or not. 
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undoubtedly is no little task as the bank will have to consider the extent of the 
beneficiary’s knowledge in presenting the forged document. The knowledge of the 
beneficiary will have to be judged by tests of foresight and proximity as to whether 
the fraud in question was foreseen by the beneficiary before being adjudged reckless 
or unscrupulous. 
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Chapter Six 
 
6.0.    Unconscionability 
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter considers whether unconscionability is a justifiable ground upon which 
the autonomy principle could be displaced. Unconscionability475 as an exception to 
the principle of autonomy envisages a situation where a beneficiary’s conduct though 
not fraudulent in the sense of being dishonest, could be so tainted with bad faith that a 
court would be amenable to restraining either the beneficiary from claiming or the 
bank from paying.476 The circumstances that could lead to the above have attracted a 
less than satisfactory development in different common law jurisdictions originating 
principally from the amorphous477 nature of the term. Unconscionability is a subject 
that has attracted many descriptions478 both from case law and commentators alike. 
The reason for the many unfavourable descriptions of the term may not be 
unconnected with the difficulty associated with articulating its concise definition and 
the circumstances under which it could apply as a defence. It has been criticized as 
                                                 
475N Enonchong, Duress, Undue Influence and Unconscionable Dealing (Sweet & Maxwell 2006). It 
has to be noted that unconscionability here, is treated from the standpoint of  its effect as an exception 
to the principle of autonomy in documentary credit law but the analysis borrows from the perception of 
the term in general law. 
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 See EP Ellinger and Dora Neo, The Law and Practice of Documentary Credit (Hart Publishing, 
Portland 2010) 169. 
477
 Criticism has arisen by the failure of the law to articulate in precise details what the term 
unconscionability actually means. 
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 Santow J in Woodson (Sales) Pty v Woodson (Australia) Pty Ltd, Unreported, Supreme Court of 
New South Wales, 12 July 1996 described it in the following terms. ‘Unconscionability and its variant 
‘Unconscionable conduct” have rapidly become prominent but largely incoherent features of the legal 
landscape. And they creep across all contexts in which private law is applied. The terms are sometimes 
used, I suspect, by both practitioners and judges in these days of smorgasbord pleadings to describe an 
all embracing claim when a more specific and legitimate ground fails to present itself. A commentator 
referring to the above described it as “the last refuge of the desperate’ or ‘the first refuge of the 
analytically lazy’ For the immediate preceding comments, see C Rickett  ‘Unconscionability and 
Commercial Law’ in John Lowry Commercial Law : Perspective and Practice (Lexis Nexis 2006) 175. 
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defying predictability or serving any purpose in terms of being a normative guide479 
for application by an exercise of judgment to the facts of the case.480 Generally, its 
proponents however, argue that unconscionability gives the courts some flexibility481 
and allows them to ‘police agreement directly’482 by denying contractual right/liability 
where it appears that the element of free choice is absent.483  
 
In the context of documentary credits law, the general law perception of 
unconscionability as an unruly horse 484  is visible in the manner in which its 
application as an exception to the principle of autonomy has been received in some 
jurisdiction. 485  However, there is a trend developing in some jurisdictions that 
unconscionability is a ground upon which the independent undertaking of 
documentary credits could be displaced. The main thrust of this chapter is to critically 
examine this emerging trend and to answer the question as to what extent, if any, 
unconscionability could be a valid defence to the impregnability of documentary 
credits and whether this development would be a credit or setback to the law of 
documentary credits. 
 
It will be contended that despite the inherent difficulty associated with articulating a 
comprehensive and exhaustive definition of unconscionability, it is not completely 
                                                 
479
  It needs to be noted that having a normative guide is a fundamental observation about the nature of 
law and the adjudicative process that a system of law offers. Hence the term "normative" is simply used 
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 C Rickett ‘Unconscionability and Commercial Law’ in John Lowry Commercial Law: Perspective 
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 Richard  Epstein ‘Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal’ (1975) 18 J LEcon. 293, 304. 
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 Robert  Hilman ‘Debunking some Myth About Unconscionability: A New Framework for UCC 
Section 2-302’ 67 Cornell L Rev 1, 15 (1981). 
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 Unruly horse in the sense that once you mount it, you never know where it is going to land you. It in 
effect, emphasizes the degree of unpredictability associated with the term. 
485
 In England, save for occasional receptive attitudes evident in some judicial dicta, the courts have 
been opposed to unconscionability as an exception to the autonomy principle. This is despite dicta in 
some English cases that tend to favour its recognition. 
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without its merits as an exception to the autonomy principle. Its most substantial 
critics argue that unconscionability is nothing but ‘an emotionally satisfying 
incantation acting as a refuge for the desperate and analytically lazy’,486 which in 
substance means nothing. However, as will be seen in the course of this chapter, the 
use of unconscionability as a ground upon which the independent undertaking evident 
in the autonomy principle could be disregarded has proved workable in some 
jurisdictions.487 This is a pointer to the fact that in some exceptional circumstances 
when unconscionability has been used as a ground for refusal of payment, minimal 
clarity is sometimes achievable without straying unnecessarily into the realm of 
unrestrained speculation.488 More so, as pointed out by Professor Mugasha,489 this is 
an area of law (exceptions to the autonomy principle) that is gradually changing and 
embracing wisdom that did not previously exist. To this effect, it is my submission 
that too much emphasis on the illusory and shadowy nature of unconscionability may 
mean that issues that are not beyond the range of discovery are left either 
uninvestigated or under-investigated.490 Lastly, it may be the case that the ritualistic 
incantation491 of promoting certainty492 in international trade is served by rejecting the 
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 See Rickett ‘Unconscionability and Commercial Law’ in John Lowry Commercial Law: Perspective 
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 Most notably in Singapore, Australia and Malaysia, unconscionability has been used as a ground in 
numerous cases to restrain payment in demand guarantees. However, as a result of this development, a 
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Chartered Bank v Pakistan National Shipping Corp (No.2) [2000] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 218, with the 
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(2004) JBL 515 at 538 
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 Unconscionability as a ground for restraint of the irrevocable undertaken assumed by banks has 
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derogation from the autonomy principle will lead to the commercial world shunning the instrument. 
However, this much chanted situation has not been witnessed so far in the jurisdiction which has 
adopted a broader approach to the exceptions.   
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 It is perceived as ritualistic incantation because, in most instances the arguments which are repulsive 
to unconscionability as an equitable doctrine, which is rooted fundamentally  in certainty and 
predictability at times is formalistic and the element of certainty if properly investigated might be 
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unconscionability doctrine. Nevertheless, while such overemphasis in promoting 
certainty might seem to be achieving its declared objectives, it may be undermining 
the inherent powers of the court (using the equitable doctrine of unconscionability) 
from discharging the reasoned and creative function which the dynamic nature of the 
current law of documentary credits should require of them. 
  
For the sake of structural clarity, the chapter is set out in seven main sections. Apart 
from the introduction which is discussed in Section 6.1, section 6.2 examines the 
nature of unconscionability. Here attempt will be made to discuss unconscionability 
by borrowing from the meaning associated with the term in general law with the aim 
of applying same to documentary credit. Section 6.3 undertakes a comparative 
examination of unconscionability in some jurisdictions with the aim of ascertaining 
how the term has influenced the law of documentary credit in these jurisdictions. In 
section 6.4, the limit of the unconscionability exception is explored. Section 6.5 
attempts an analysis of the relevance of this term as a justifiable ground upon which 
the impregnability of documentary credit could be displaced. In examining Section 
6.5, the factors that favour and/or work against the unconscionability exception would 
be explored. Finally, a conclusion would be drawn based on the above issues. 
  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
illusory. For more on this see the analysis of  AF Mason,  ‘Contract, Good Faith and Equitable 
Standard in Fair Dealing’ (2000) 116 LQR 66,70. 
492
 In commercial transactions, it could be persuasively argued that it is difficult to realize certainty in 
all the cases as well as dispense justice that meets the commercial expectations of the parties. 
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6.2.   Nature of Unconscionability 
 
Attempting the examination of the nature of unconscionability would inescapably lead 
to an encounter with its amorphous493 and slippery nature. However, Edmonds J494 in 
reference to the provision of S. 51AA495 of the Australian Trade Practices Act 1974 
defined unconscionability or unconscionable conduct as follows: It 
(Unconscionability) ‘includes conduct in respect of which a judge in equity would 
have been prepared to grant relief’. This attempt at proffering a definition of 
unconscionability was corroborated by the approach adopted by the Section 2-302 of 
the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) which in its official statement referred to 
unconscionability as a principle with the primary objective ‘of the prevention of 
oppression and unfair surprise and not of the disturbance of the allocation of risks 
because of superior bargaining power’.496 
 
Put differently, unconscionability has been analyzed from two standpoints: procedural 
unconscionability and substantive unconscionability. In this regard, Arthur A Leff497 
of Washington Law School, noted that unconscionability is different from the 
defences of fraud, duress, mistake, impossibility or illegality because unlike these 
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  See the Editors Note on ‘Unconscionability: an attempt at definition’ (1969-1970) 31 U Pitt L Rev 
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 Optus Networks Pty Limited v Telstra Corporation Limited [2009] WL 1998981 (FCA), [2009] FCA 
728. 
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RS Summers, Uniform Commercial Code 206 (4th edn, West Group 1995) 213. 
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  See generally, AA Leff ‘Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperors New Clause’ (1967) 115 U 
PA L Rev 485. 
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defences, which look at either the process of contracting or the resulting contract, but 
not both, unconscionability looks at both the process and the result. He described 
procedural unconscionability as ‘bargaining naughtiness’. 498  Hence, it represents 
some defects in the bargaining process that causes oppression and surprise to an 
unsuspecting party.499 The evils in the resulting contract are classified as substantive 
unconscionability and represent another variant of the unconscionability doctrine.500 
 
Generally, the rise of unconscionability as a judicial tool has been felt in many 
jurisdictions501. In the United States, section 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code 
UCC in no uncertain terms captured the relevance of unconscionability when it stated: 
‘If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to have 
been unconscionable at the time it was made, the court may refuse to enforce the 
contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable 
clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any 
unconscionable result’. This provision in no uncertain terms emphasizes the important 
role of unconscionability in the American commercial scene. One of its primary 
objectives is to mitigate the harshness and inflexibility that might arise as a result of 
the insistence on the age long doctrine that a party that signs a contract manifests 
intent to be bound by all of its terms. Hence, unconscionability as a judicial tool aims 
to fill the gap created by the difficulty of establishing common law fraud by assisting 
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  See Craig Horowitz, Comment ‘Reviving the Law of Substantive Unconscionability: Applying the 
implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing to Excessively Priced Consumer Credit Contracts’, 
(1986) 33 UNCLA L Rev 940. 
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492. 
501
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in rescinding contracts that are ‘not quite fraudulent’ 502  but produced ‘clearly 
oppressive and unfair results’.503 
 
Applying this general law concept of unconscionability to documentary credits, it has 
been observed in a recent Singapore Court of Appeal case, Dauphin Offshore 
Engineering & Trading Pte Ltd v The Private Office of HRH Sheikh Sultan bin 
Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan,504 that it is not possible to define 'unconscionability' 
other than to give some broad indications such as lack of good faith. In GHL Pte Ltd v 
Unitrack Building Construction Pte Ltd,505 the Court of Appeal attempted to clarify 
the position of unconscionability and referred to the High Court case of Raymond 
Construction Pte Ltd. v Low Yang Tong and AGF Insurance (Singapore) Pte Ltd 506  
Chiu J stated: ‘Unconscionability to me involves unfairness, as distinct from 
dishonesty or fraud, or conduct of a kind so reprehensible or lacking in good faith that 
a court of conscience would either restrain the party or refuse to assist the party. Mere 
breaches of contract by the party in question ... would not by themselves be 
unconscionable’. 
 
It is submitted that the nature of unconscionability is such that any detailed enquiry 
would raise the difficulty associated with its definition. However, such difficulty 
should be expected because of the nature of the term and should not detract from the 
basic function; unconscionability seeks to perform as a vitiating tool. The point needs 
to be made that unconscionability is an equitable creation and some of the primary 
                                                 
502
 See D Price ‘The conscience of Judge and Jury: Statutory Unconscionability as a Mixed Question of 
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 ibid 746. 
504
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considerations in its determination is what is commercially reasonable, devoid of mala 
fides and meets the commercial and contractual expectation of the parties.507 
 
 
6.3. Unconscionability in Selected Common Law Jurisdictions 
 
The Section seeks to analyse the legal position of unconscionability in four selected 
common law jurisdictions. The findings made in this section would be significant in 
the analysis made subsequently whether English law should welcome the recognition 
of unconscionability exception.  The examination starts off with the analysis of the 
position in England before delving into other jurisdictions. 
 
 
6.3.1. English Law 
 
In general law, as early as 1697, English law has formulated a rule against the 
enforcement of unconscionable contracts.508  In the case of Earl of Chesterfield v 
Janssen,509 a grandson borrowed 5000 pounds and agreed to pay 2000 pounds more as 
interest, upon the death of his grandmother, who was already 70 years old at the time 
the debt was incurred. The Chancellor, Lord Hardwicke, in setting aside the contract 
used the term “unconscientious” to explain the presence of presumptive fraud. In his 
words: 
                                                 
507
  See generally, the Editors, ‘Unconscionability: An attempt at Definition’ 31 U Pitt L Rev 333 
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It may be apparent from the intrinsic nature and subject of the bargain itself; 
such as no man in his senses and not under a delusion would make on the one 
hand, and as no honest man and fair man would accept on the other; which are 
unequitable and unconscientous bargains; and of such even the common law 
has taken notice…510 
 
It is contended that this source of unconscionability which is related to 
unconscionable bargains in circumstances where there was equity’s special protection 
of heirs 511  has been curtailed by statute. 512  However, the second source of 
unconscionable bargain, despite the statutory modification of the earlier source was 
not affected by the influence of the statute. 513  The second source relates to 
circumstances where there was an intervention of the doctrine of equity in a situations 
where a claimant was under some disadvantages which meant he could not be 
expected to fend for himself in dealing with others. 514  A lesson from this early 
development of unconscionability (for example in the Earl of Chesterfield’s case) is 
that a finding of unconscionability was made in the absence of actual fraud, duress or 
illegality. 
 
However, in documentary credits law, the concept of unconscionability has been 
muted in English law as a possible exception to the principle of autonomy. The 
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pronouncements of the courts, most often obiter, have not neglected the 
unconscionability development in other common law jurisdictions. The general 
position is that in English law, the recognized exception to the principle of autonomy 
is only fraud. However, the English court, in reference to both domestic and foreign 
case laws stated unequivocally in TTI Team Telecom International Limited v 
Hutchison 3G UK Limited 515  that lack of good faith that is comparable to the 
unconscionability doctrine in Singapore was a ground upon which the independent 
undertaking evident in a performance bond could be displaced.  Applying this 
principle to documentary credits, it has long been held that documentary credits and 
demand guarantees stand on the same footing with respect to applicable principle. The 
English High Court in holding that bad faith was a separate ground upon which the 
impregnability of a guarantee could be displaced referred to the English case of Elian 
and Rabbath v Matsas and Matsas,516 where the three justices of the Court of Appeal 
were in agreement that there are circumstances in which breach of faith could be a 
ground upon which the autonomy principle could be disregarded. The rationale for 
this decision, well justified in reported cases on unconscionability and which was 
echoed by the court is that there are situations based on the circumstances of the case 
where as a result of bad faith on the part of a party to a transaction (performance bond) 
an injunction could be granted in order to prevent an irretrievable injustice. The ratio 
for the above was captured by the statement of the Lord Denning, M.R517 when he 
said:  
 
Now I quite agree that a bank guarantee is very much like a letter of credit. 
The Courts will do their utmost to enforce it according to its terms. They will 
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not, in the ordinary course of things, interfere by way of injunction to prevent 
its due implementation. But that is not an absolute rule. Circumstances may 
arise such as to warrant interference by injunction…. Although the shippers 
were not parties to the bank guarantee, nevertheless they have a most 
important interest in it. If the bank pays under this guarantee, they will claim 
against the Lebanese bank who in turn will claim against the shippers. The 
shippers will certainly be debited with the account. On being so debited, they 
will have to sue the ship-owners for breach of their promise, express or 
implied, to release the goods. Are the shippers to be forced to take that course? 
Or can they short-circuit the dispute by suing the ship-owners at once for an 
injunction? 518 
 
Lord Denning MR concluded that this was the kind of case where it was imperative, 
to prevent an irretrievable injustice to grant an injunction based on its facts. 
 
The facts of this case are that shippers in Beirut shipped barley on a Greek ship which 
was chartered by Lebanese charterers. She was bound for Rijeka in Yugoslavia. The 
goods were consigned to buyers in Hungary. When the ship got to Rijeka there was 
delay in unloading, and the ship-owners claimed a lien on the goods for demurrage. 
This lien was good under the charter-party. The shippers were not liable to pay 
demurrage. But they wanted the goods released to their buyers, because otherwise 
their good commercial relations with the buyers would be prejudiced. In order to get 
the goods released, there were negotiations between the shippers in Beirut with the 
owners and their agents, J D McLaren & Co Ltd., in London. The shippers said: ‘We 
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will give a bank guarantee if you will release the lien and instruct the Captain not to 
exercise a lien on the cargo’. That offer was contained in telex messages. In the result 
a bank guarantee was given. The Lebanese shippers instructed their bankers in 
Lebanon, who in turn instructed the Midland Bank, Ltd., in London, who in turn gave 
a bank guarantee to the ship owners’ agents in London. The terms of the guarantee 
stated as follows; 
 
IN CONSIDERATION of the Ship-owners refraining from exercising a lien 
on the cargo, or raising it immediately if it has already been exercised, we, 
MIDLAND BANK LTD. . . . hereby undertake to pay on demand in external 
sterling in London to J. D. McLaren & Co., Ltd. . . . such amount as may be 
agreed between the Ship-owners and the Charterers, Pan Asiatic Shipping Co. 
of Beirut, to be due to the Ship-owners in respect of demurrage at Rijeka under 
the above named Charter Party and in default of agreement to pay such 
amount of demurrage together with interests and costs as may be found to be 
due by an arbitration award in accordance with Clause 28 of the Charter Party. 
Further, on behalf of the Charterers, we hereby waive the provisions of 
Clauses 8 and 27 of the Charter Party.519 
 
The guarantee was payable against presentation of  a debit note certifying that the 
amount claimed is properly due and given on the understanding as evident in the 
terms of the guarantee that  the lien would be lifted and no further lien imposed. The 
Master of the ship upon instruction by the ship-owners after the guarantee was issued, 
lifted the lien but immediately exercised another lien in respect of some other liability 
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of the cargo owners. This was arguably against the terms of the guarantee as captured 
by Lord Denning MR, who noted that ‘the guarantee was given on the understanding 
that the lien was raised and no further lien imposed: and that when the ship-owners, in 
breach of that understanding, imposed a further lien, they were disabled from acting 
on the guarantee’.520 This by implication meant that the actions of the ship-owners, 
though short of fraud, should be seen as lacking in good faith so as to demand a 
restraint by the way of injunction. This was the same basis of a concurring decision by 
Danckwerts LJ, with whom Winn LJ agreed and found it unnecessary to add further 
opinion on the issue. 
 
In similar vein, Eveleigh LJ in the Court of Appeal case of Potton Homes Ltd v 
Coleman Contractors (Oversea) Ltd521 added to this trend that has been utilized in the 
ratio of the decisions in TTI Telecom International Ltd522 and the case of Elian and 
Rabbat.523 In an obiter dictum, he categorically stated that: 
 
In principle I do not think it possible to say that in no circumstances 
whatsoever, apart from fraud will the court restrain the buyer. The facts of 
each case must be considered. If the contract is avoided or if there is a failure 
of consideration between the buyer and the seller for which the seller 
undertook to procure the issue of a performance bond, I do not see why, as 
between seller and buyer, the seller should not be unable to prevent a call on 
the bond by the mere assertion that the bond is to be treated as cash in hand. 
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Again, Eveleigh LJ’s statement touches on some of those cardinal issues that underpin 
the unconscionability doctrine. First, it considers the facts of each case to determine 
whether a restraint is necessary. Secondly, Eveleigh LJ notes that compelling 
circumstances absent fraud may displace the impregnability of documentary credit.   
 
One of the strongest criticisms of the approach in the above cases discussed is that it 
runs contrary to established authority which in the main recognizes only one 
established exception to the principle of autonomy in England which is fraud. 
Eveleigh L.J statement in Potton Homes Ltd v Coleman Contractors (Overseas) Ltd524 
cited above as to the possibility of other exceptions different from fraud has been 
dismissed by Professor Enonchong525 as being uncertain, made ex tempore, obiter and 
running contrary to established English authority. As it is, his comment captures the 
predominant thinking as reflected in English documentary credit cases.  
 
However, the development in other jurisdictions of other grounds different from fraud 
reinforces the dictum of Eveleigh LJ which refers to the possibility, based on the facts 
and circumstances of the case, of other grounds of restraining payment. Also the 
dictum of Thornton QC in TTI Team Telecom International Limited v Hutchison 3G 
UK Limited526 as to the presence of a bad faith exception, which is comparable to the 
unconscionability exception in Singapore, has been judicially noticed in several 
jurisdictions. Adding to the sympathy expressed by the court in TTI Team Telecom 
Case, it may be instructive to note that reliance on fraud and its associated difficulty 
in terms of proof as the only ground upon which the impregnability of documentary 
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credits could be displaced is reminiscent of the opening passage of Lord Roskill’s 
published report regarding fraud in criminal cases: 
 
The public no longer believes that the legal system in England and Wales is 
capable of bringing the perpetrators of serious fraud expeditiously and 
effectively to book. The overwhelming weight of the evidence laid before us 
suggest that the public is right. In relation to such fraud, and the skilful and 
determined criminals who commit them, the present legal system is archaic, 
cumbersome and unreliable. At every stage,… the present arrangements offer 
an invitation to blatant delay and abuse.527 
 
If the above view refers to the public mistrust of any investigation or trial based on 
fraud because of the miscarriage of justice associated with rigid application of fraud 
and its proof, it will not be out of place for English law to recognize in documentary 
credits a more flexible ground like unconscionability. Unconscionability in this case, 
seeks to maintain a more commercial balance based on fairness and legitimate 
expectation of parties devoid of unnecessary insistence of right where none exist in 
equity. The unconscionability exception ensures that there is no abuse in the call or 
manner in which documents are tendered in documentary credit. It prevents the 
beneficiary from taking advantage of the gaps left by the contractual provisions or 
inflexibility associated with the fraud rule. The flexibility of the exception means that 
the concept has no strict guidelines and can be tailored to suit each new case. An 
attempt will be made to ascertain the approach that has been adopted in other common 
law jurisdictions regarding an unconscionability exception to the principle of 
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autonomy. 
 
 
6.3.2. Singapore 
 
Courts in Singapore blazed the trail with respect to the application of 
unconscionability as an exception to the principle of autonomy in an abstract payment 
undertaking. After a period of sitting uncomfortably with the traditional English 
position that only fraud could displace the impregnability of documentary credit, the 
Singapore courts recognized that unconscionability, if successfully proved, does 
constitute a ground separate from fraud upon which a court will grant an injunction 
restraining the beneficiary from receiving payment or preventing the issuer from 
making payment. 
 
In 2003, in the case of Hiap Tian Soon Construction Pte Ltd  v Hola Development Pte 
Ltd528 Lai Siu Chiu J, relied on the leading Singapore unconscionability case of GHL 
Pte v Unitrack Construction Ltd 529  to hold the action of the defendant (Hola) 
unconscionable, where the defendant had called on the original amount in the 
performance bond in circumstances where the original price of the contract had been 
revised downward, which consequently affected the amount of the bond posted. In the 
course of the decision, the court upheld unconscionability as a ground for restraining a 
call of a performance bond notwithstanding its similarity to a documentary credit. 
Relying on the earlier case of Dauphin Offshore Engineering & Trading Pte Ltd v The 
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Private Office of HRH Sheikh Sultan bin Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan, 530  it 
emphasized that it was unnecessary to define with precision the meaning of 
unconscionability as ‘…what kind of situation would constitute unconscionability 
would have to depend on the facts of each case…There is no pre-determined 
categorization’.531  
 
However, Lai Kew Chai J, has perceptively suggested in Raymond Construction Pte 
Ltd v Low Yang Tong,532 that the concept of unconscionability ‘involves unfairness, as 
distinct from dishonesty or fraud, or conduct of a kind so reprehensive or lacking in 
good faith that a court of conscience would either restrain the party or refuse to assist 
the party. Mere breaches of contract by the party in question would not by themselves 
be unconscionable’. This definition was further clarified in McConnell Dowell 
Constructors (Aust) Pty Ltd v Sembcorp Engineers and Constructors Pte Ltd,533 when 
the court noted that all unconscionability cases must involve an element of unfairness.  
 
In conclusion, four points need be made regarding the position of unconscionability in 
Singapore. Firstly, unconscionability is a separate exception to fraud in Singapore. 
Secondly, despite the difficulty of defining unconscionability, it has not deterred the 
finding of unconscionability. Thirdly, the documentary credit law of Singapore (as far 
as the exception is concerned) cannot be said to be uncertain as the equitable doctrine 
of unconscionability has been applied within the terms of a recognized legal principle, 
at least in relation to performance bond. And finally, it has not been reported 
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anywhere, contrary to the contention of critics of unconscionability, that its subjective 
nature will adversely affect international trade.  
 
6.3.3.  Position in Malaysia 
 
In Malaysia, the issue of whether unconscionability is a ground for restraint of 
payment again resurfaced recently in the High Court case of Mitsubishi Corp & Ors v 
Sepangar Bay Power Corp Sdn Bhd534 The argument of the claimant’s counsel in 
asking for a restraint on payment was that a call on the bond was unconscionable, in 
bad faith and fraudulent. Kang Gee J, relying on the earlier case LEC Contractors Sdn 
Bhd v. Castle Inn Sdn Bhd 535  dismissed without hesitation the contention that 
unconscionable conduct was a ground upon which a restraint on payment could be 
sought. In the LEC Contractors case, Siddin JCA of the Malaysian Court of Appeal in 
reference to English authorities, opined that: ‘… authorities we have referred to 
clearly indicate that in order to justify any injunction to stop payment there must be 
clear evidence of fraud on the part of the first defendant which comes to the 
knowledge of the second defendant. Bad faith or unconscionable conduct by itself is 
not fraud’.536 Relying on the appellate court pronouncement on the current state of the 
law in Malaysia, the court held that only in cases of established fraud will a restraint 
order be granted. 
 
The above position seems to represent the position of the law in Malaysia. However, 
what is worrying about the Malaysian court decisions adopting the English orthodox 
position is that there are still cases where the unconscionability exception seems to 
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have been lauded as being of sound principle or completely adopted. In the recent 
case of Pasukhas Construction Sdn Bhd v MTM Millennium Holdings Sdn Bhd537 
Hishamudin J, though apparently bound by the principle expounded in LEC 
Contractors (that fraud is the only ground upon which a restraint on payment could be 
made) described the principle of unconscionability that was enunciated in the 
Singapore Court of Appeal case of Bocotra Construction538 as being sound.539 His 
Lordship however, expressed regret that that under the doctrine of binding precedent, 
he was bound to follow the Malaysian Court of Appeal decision in LEC Contractors.  
 
In the unreported Malaysian case of Nafas Abadi Holdings Sdn Bhd v Putrajaya 
Holdings Sdn Bhd & Anor540  the doctrine of unconscionability was recognized by the 
court. Suriyadi, J while recognizing that letters of credit stand on the same footing as 
performance bonds and that fraud constituted a ground upon which payment could be 
restrained noted as follows: ‘I do not think it is possible to say that in no 
circumstances whatsoever, apart from fraud, will the court restrain the buyer. The 
facts of each case must be considered. In our opinion,… fraud and unconscionability 
are considerations in application for injunction restraining payment or calls on 
bonds’.541  Similarly, in Perkasa Duta Sdn. Bhd. v Perbadanan Kemajuan Negeri 
Selangor542 it was also held that unconscionable conduct could also be regarded as an 
exceptional circumstances upon which the courts will interfere with the machinery of 
irrevocable obligations assumed by banks. 
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It is concluded that while the position of the Court of Appeal in Malaysia is that fraud 
is the recognized exception to the principle of autonomy, the numerous instances in 
which the lower courts have either expressed sympathy for, or adopted, the principle 
of unconscionability enunciated in Singapore leaves the rationale for the higher court 
pronouncement that fraud is the only established exception subject to doubt. It shows 
how opinion is divided in most Malaysian courts as to the current position of the law 
regarding what constitutes an exception to the impregnability of the independent 
undertaking. While the Court of Appeal in LEC Contractors has held that fraud is the 
only recognized exception, numerous High Court decisions in Malaysia543 both old 
and current 544  continue to show either support or outright adoption of the 
unconscionability exception enunciated in Singapore. However, until an appellate 
court decides otherwise,545 it remains the position that in Malaysia, the only exception 
to the impregnability of the independent undertaking is an established fraud.  
 
  
6.3.4.  Australia 
 
Unconscionability as a legal doctrine became prominent in Australia with the 
introduction of Part IVA of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (TPA). The Act, contains 
three sections that prohibit corporations from engaging in unconscionable conduct: SS 
51AA, 51AB and 51AC. Section 51AC was added to the TPA in 1998 following 
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concerns that existing statutory and common law causes of action did not adequately 
protect small businesses against unfair or exploitative conduct. To achieve this 
protection, s 51AC proscribes ‘conduct that is, in all the circumstances, 
unconscionable’546 in connection with dealings with small businesses. The doctrine of 
unconscionability as evidenced in Part IVA of the Trade Practices Act forms part of a 
modern trend in the law towards legal evaluation of the normative conduct of 
commercial dealings, and attempts to free such transactions from morally 
reprehensible conduct.547  In this respect, it may be recalled that at common law, 
bargains made in unfair circumstances were ameliorated to some degree by the 
development in equity of the doctrine of unconscionable bargains. Hence, statutory 
unconscionability in the TPA is a descendant of this equitable doctrine548 and its 
influence has been widely felt in Australian commercial life. 
 
In documentary credit law, it was held in the Victoria Supreme Court case of Olex 
Focas Pty Ltd v Skodaexport Co Ltd 549 that letter of credit stands on the same footing 
with demand guarantee.  If this is the accepted position, what then is the Australian 
position as to whether unconscionability is a separate exception to the principle of 
autonomy in documentary credit? In Olex Focas Pty Ltd case, an application by the 
first plaintiff for an injunction restraining the first defendant from calling on a 
performance bond as well as a call on a mobilization advance guarantee on the ground 
that such call was fraudulent and unconscionable both in Australian general law and 
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under the Trade Practices Act of 1974550 attracted an approach that is with respect 
subject to doubt.  Batt J,  relying principally on the authority of Wood Hall Ltd v 
Pipeline Authority551 held that unconscionability in general Australian law is not an 
exception552 to the principle of autonomy and cited a host of English authorities to the 
effect that the only recognized exception to the irrevocable undertakings assumed by 
banks is established fraud. Turning to the argument put forward by the first plaintiff 
that unconscionability was a ground for restraint on payment under the Trade 
Practices Act 1974 and the action of the plaintiff in calling on the performance bond 
was unconscionable, Batt J, considered the transaction in two parts, the performance 
bond in respect of the underlying contract, and the advance mobilization and 
procurement guarantee. In respect of the performance bond he reasoned that, 
considering its importance, the conduct of the first defendant was not unconscionable. 
The pronouncement of Batt J is captured succinctly as follows:553 
 
I consider separately the performance bonds and the mobilization/procurement 
guarantees. Despite the extension by the High Court in recent years of the use 
of the concept of unconscionable conduct as a criterion of liability, …I am not 
persuaded that the conduct of the first defendant in seeking to call up and 
procuring the call up of the performance bonds for their full amount is 
unconscionable or that there is a serious question to be tried about that… 
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However, in the case of the mobilisation and procurement guarantees I 
consider the position to be different. 
 
Batt J then held that under the advance/ mobilization guarantee, the conduct of the 
first defendant in calling on the guarantee was unconscionable, the reasoning being 
that a mobilization/ procurement guarantee served a purpose different from a 
performance bond and the call on it was affected by unconscionable conduct within 
the meaning of the Trade Practices Act. His Honour’s reason for issuing an injunction 
under the Trade Practices Act in respect of the advance/mobilization guarantee was 
that unconscionability was construed in a general Trade Practices Act sense to require 
parties to behave reasonably and in accordance with ordinary human standards. It 
includes a principle that a person should not, by an appeal to strict legal rights, cause 
hardship to others by violating their reasonable expectations. The court further stated 
that insistence on rights in circumstances which make that insistence harsh or 
oppressive will amount to unconscionable conduct. One can engage in unconscionable 
conduct even if one believes, wrongly, that one is acting within one's rights. 
 
It is submitted that in answering the question whether unconscionability is a ground 
for restraint of payment in Australian documentary credits’ law, an approach which 
separates unconscionability under the Act and that in general law, is with respect, 
likely to be misleading. The reason for the above submission firstly, is that the 
provision of the Trade Practices Act, though a statute, is still part of the general law 
of Australia and its provisions, which for restraint of payment on grounds of 
unconscionable conduct remain the law. The provision affirms that unconscionability 
is an exception to the principle of autonomy in Australia. Secondly, and more 
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specifically, the provision of S51 AA which states in its subsection (1) that ‘a 
corporation must not, in trade or commerce, engage in conduct that is unconscionable 
within the meaning of the unwritten law, from time to time, of the States and 
Territories’ has been considered by the court in Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission v Samton Holdings Pty Ltd & Ors.554 Gray J555 citing Lange v 
Australian Broadcasting Corporation556 noted that ‘it is beyond controversy that the 
unwritten law of the States and Territories is one body of law for the whole of 
Australia and that Section 51AA, in referring to the unwritten law from time to time 
of the States and Territories, refers to the common law of Australia’. 
 
Many Australian decisions have held that unconscionability under the Act is a ground 
for restraint of the irrevocable undertaking assumed by banks and one of the most 
recent in those line of authorities is Clough Engineering Limited v Oil and Natural 
Gas Corporation & Ors557 where it was held that unconscionability under the Trade 
Practices Act is a ground for restraint of payment in respect of demand guarantees. In 
Clough Engineering Limited v Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd,558  Gilmour J 
was concerned with an application for leave pursuant to an order made under the 
Federal Court Rules to serve an application out of the jurisdiction and for orders to 
restrain Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd ("ONGC") from taking further steps to 
demand or obtain payment or renewing or claiming to renew such demand in respect 
of certain performance guarantees granted by the three respondent banks to ONGC. 
The applicant, Clough Engineering Limited, sought a declaration that ONGC by 
demanding and threatening to make a demand on the performance guarantees granted 
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by the banks had engaged in, or proposed to engage in, unconscionable conduct in 
contravention of S. 51AA of the TPA. Gilmour J granted leave to serve and he made 
an order restraining ONGC from taking any further step to demand or obtain payment 
or renewing or claiming to renew a demand for payment from the banks under the 
performance guarantees. Gilmour J said that there was authority which clearly 
supported the proposition that an inappropriate threat to call or a call on performance 
guarantees can be unconscionable conduct within s 51AA of the Trade Practices Act. 
His Honour considered that it was appropriate to grant an injunction restraining 
ONGC from making a call on the performance guarantees and he appears to have 
relied on the fact that there was a serious question to be tried as to whether ONGC's 
conduct was unconscionable within S. 51AA of the TPA.  
 
Shortly after his Honour made these orders, the banks applied to have them set aside 
in the case of Clough Engineering Ltd v Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited 
(No 2) 559  Gilmour J refused to set aside the orders: His Honour said: ‘I remain 
satisfied that there is a serious question to be tried as to whether ONGC has acted 
unconscionably in contravention of S.51AA of the Act in calling on or threatening to 
call on the performance guarantees despite there being no legal right on its part to do 
so’. 560   To further drive home his conviction on the issue, Gilmour J cited the 
pronouncement of Austin J in Boral Formwork v Action Makers561 and noted that 
when referring to s 51AA of the Act: ‘the principle of autonomy applicable to a 
standby letter of credit, cannot override the statute’. His Honour finally concluded 
based on the decision in Boral Formwork he was satisfied that upon the same factual 
matrix, there is a serious issue to be tried. 
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Similarly, in respect of documentary credits, Besanko J, in Orrcon Operations Pty Ltd 
v Capital Steel & Pipe Pty Ltd562  accepted the contention that apart from fraud, 
unconscionability was a separate exception to the principle of autonomy in 
documentary credits.563 
 
 
6.4. Scope of the Unconscionability Exception 
 
In answering the question as to what the limit of the unconscionability exception that 
would warrant a departure from the independent principle is, effort should be made to 
borrow from the different jurisdictions that have adopted the exception. References 
should also be made to the legal development in the jurisdictions that have not 
adopted unconscionability exception but points to the law of the jurisdiction having 
not neglected unconscionable conduct, as serious issue upon which the law would 
consider granting relief.  Hence, in this section, an attempt will be made to consider 
the standard of proof required to establish unconscionability as well as some 
necessary ingredients that need to be present before a finding of unconscionability is 
made. 
 
6.4.1. Standard of Proof 
 
The issue of whether unconscionability is established as to act as a restraint on the 
irrevocable undertaken assumed by banks would undoubtedly warrant a discussion of 
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two phases on the issue of proof required. On one side, is an application for an 
injunction to restrain the beneficiary from presenting documents for payment on the 
grounds that it would be unconscionable to present the documents or the bank from 
making payment on the grounds that it would be unconscionable for the bank to pay a 
beneficiary whose conduct is deemed unconscionable. Related to the above is the 
further question as to the standard of proof required to avoid an application for 
summary judgment on the grounds that the beneficiary by tendering document for 
payment if not restrained would be acting in an unconscionable manner. And finally 
the question as to the standard of proof required for unconscionability cases at full 
trial. The above issues raised would be addressed by comparatively looking at the 
positions in some common law jurisdictions. 
 
6.4.1.1.  Singapore 
 
Considering an aspect of the first question, that is, the required standard of proof in an 
application for interim or interlocutory injunction, the authorities with respect are not 
very clear on the issue. In the Singapore case of Samwoh Asphalt Premix v Sum 
Cheong Piling Pte Ltd 564  the Court, was of the view that depending on the 
circumstances of the case, the Court would grant an injunction if the applicant could 
make out a case of unconscionability. Unfortunately, this pronouncement of the court 
does not assist greatly in understanding the standard of proof required. The basic 
difficulty with this is that it is not clear whether a high or low standard is required. 
However, in the earlier case of Bocotra, 565  Karthigesu J.A opined that ‘a higher 
degree of strictness applies’. It was his contention that to establish unconscionability, 
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 [2002] SLR 459 (CA). 
565
 [1995] 2 SLR 733, 744. 
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the principal must ‘establish a clear case in interlocutory proceedings. It is clear that 
mere allegation is not enough’. This pronouncement seems to have been influenced by 
the pronouncement of English cases as to the standard of proof required to establish 
the fraud in an irrevocable undertaking.566 In similar vein, the High Court in Raymond 
Construction Pte Ltd v Low Yang Tong567  made it clear that mere allegations of 
unconscionability would not suffice for the grant of an injunction on the grounds of 
unconscionability but that a contractor seeking to restrain the employer from calling 
on the performance bond must establish a strong prima facie case of unconscionability. 
 
 However, this trend that seems to have been set by earlier cases of setting a high 
standard for the proof of unconscionability appeared to have stalled in the 1999 case 
of GHL v Unitrack.568 Here the Court of Appeal of Singapore held that ‘where there is 
a prima facie evidence of fraud or unconscionability, the court should step in to 
intervene at the interlocutory stage until the whole of the circumstances of the case 
has been investigated’.569 This approach represents a lower standard of proof to the 
ones adopted by earlier cases.   
 
6.4.1.2. Australia 
 
In Australia, where the Trade Practices Act 1974 has recognized unconscionability as 
a ground upon which the irrevocable undertaking assumed by banks could be 
disregarded; a different standard of proof (a threshold that is lower than that required 
by a majority of Singapore cases) is required for the grant of interim or interlocutory 
                                                 
566
 It must be noted that in the case, Karthigesu JA made reference to fraud or unconscionability. 
567
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injunction. In Western Australia v Vetter Trittler570 French J, in reference to a prima 
facie standard of proof, expressed an opinion in the case that ‘that a prima facie case 
is made out, if, on the material before the Court, inferences are open which if 
translated into findings of fact would support the relief claimed’. In reliance on the 
same principle, Gilmour J in Clough Engineering Ltd v Oil and Natural Gas 
Corporation Limited 571  held in an application for an interlocutory injunction to 
restrain the defendant oil company from making a call on the a demand guarantee 
opened by the plaintiff in its favour that the plaintiff (Clough) had established a prima 
facie case for the relief variously claimed in that the defendant’s threatened call or call 
on the performance bonds were unconscionable within the meaning of the Trade 
Practices Act. 
 
This pronouncement is in line with the approach of the Australian courts that have 
held in a long line of cases that the standard of proof for granting an interlocutory 
injunction is the claimant’s legal duty to establish that there is a prima facie case for 
the grant of the injunction sought. The court in Australian Broadcasting Corporation 
Ltd v O’Neill572 citing the decision of Beecham Group Ltd v Bristol Laboratories Pty 
Ltd573 explained the meaning of prima facie as follows: 
By using the phrase ‘prima facie case’, their Honours574 did not mean that the 
plaintiff must show that it is more probable than not that at trial the plaintiff 
will succeed; it is sufficient that the plaintiff show a sufficient likelihood of 
success to justify in the circumstances the preservation of the status quo 
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pending the trial. This was the sense in which the Court was referring to the 
notion of a prima facie case.575 
 
It needs to be pointed out that in some Australian decisions,576 a different wording has 
been used in describing the standard of proof required in interlocutory injunctions. 
Most courts prefer to state that the plaintiff needs to prove that there is a serious issue 
to be tried. However, the court in Australian Broadcasting Corporation Ltd v 
O’Neill577 noted that there is no objection to the use of the word “serious question” to 
be tried if it is understood as conveying the notion that the seriousness of the question, 
like the strength of the probability, still falls under the consideration as enunciated in 
Beecham Group Ltd v Bristol Laboratories Pty Ltd578 that is the requirement that the 
claimant must establish a prima facie case579 
 
Another aspect of the standard of proof is the threshold required to establish 
unconscionability during trial. Put differently, assuming the required standard of proof 
is established for the grant of an interlocutory injunction and the status quo is 
maintained pending trial, what would be the standard required for the finding of 
unconscionability at the main trial? The answer to this question is not different from 
the answer to the appropriate standard of proof required for an allegation of fraud in 
civil proceedings to be established. Unconscionability exception being a concept in 
civil law, the standard is not different from that required in all civil proceedings. In 
this regard, authorities in the different jurisdictions are in harmony that the standard 
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577
 [2006] 80 ALJR 1672. 
578
  [1968] 118 CLR 618. 
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required is proof on a balance of probabilities.580 The authoritative judgment of the 
House of Lords in Re B581 has cleared the confusion associated with some cases582  
that in certain civil cases a heightened standard of proof that is higher than the 
required proof on a balance of probabilities is required. 
 
Closely related to the issue of the standard of proof in Australian jurisdictions is the 
enquiry as to where the balance of convenience583 lies. This inquiry is undertaken 
after a consideration of whether the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case. The 
inquiry as to where the balance of convenience lies as well as proving 
unconscionability to the requisite standard must be resolved in the plaintiff’s favour 
before an interlocutory injunction is granted.584 
 
 
6.4.2.  Proving Unconscionability- Legal Ingredients  
 
Having set out the standard of proof required for the finding of unconscionability, it is 
important to note that establishing unconscionability to the required level of proof 
depends fundamentally on proper appreciation of the crucial elements that 
characterizes the unconscionability doctrine in documentary credit. Having said that, 
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it would be very significant to consider some of these important elements upon which 
the finding of unconscionability rest in documentary credits law. 
 
6.4.2.1. Reprehensible Conduct of such a manner that a court of 
conscience will deprive the party involved or refuse to assist him 
 
What amounts to reprehensible conduct in documentary credit based upon which a 
court of conscience would intervene at times is a factual situation which varies 
depending on the circumstances of each particular case. In most of the cases, the 
answer to what amounts to unconscionable conduct could be deduced from the terms 
of the transaction. In this regard, Mason J,585 in reference to unconscionability and 
reprehensible conduct noted that such conduct would include several distinct vitiating 
factors like undue influence, misrepresentation whether actual or constructive.586 In 
this case, reprehensible conduct represents a kind of descriptive label for the kind of 
conducts with several distinct vitiating elements where the mala fides of a party is not 
in doubt. It is suggested that in the proof of what amount to reprehensible conduct as 
to prove unconscionability, establishing variants of other distinct vitiating elements to 
a standard required in a civil proceeding suffices. In achieving this, the opinion of the 
court in Baynes Clarke v Corless587 is instructive. The court noted that ‘Questions of 
unconscionability were matters for the court to be decided on an objective basis 
having regard to the terms agreed or the representations made and the effect that they 
had’.588  Applying this to documentary credit, it is submitted that the question of 
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whether unconscionability exist is matter to be achieved with a consideration of the 
whole circumstances of the contract and the reasonable expectation of the parties. 
 
6.4.2.2.  Insistence on the strict application of legal rights in circumstances 
where to do so is regarded, on the facts of the particular case, to be harsh or 
oppressive. 
 
Let’s take for example this hypothetical situation, AB Ltd is in a supply agreement 
with CD Ltd for the supply of 15 containers of aluminium profile. The agreement 
specifies that the aluminium profile must be of certain quality strength. Based on this, 
a documentary letter of credit was opened by AB Ltd in favour of CD Ltd. Out of the 
15 containers contracted for, CD Ltd delivered only 5. Upon taking delivery, AB Ltd 
discovered that the aluminium profile was below the quality strength and wrote to CD 
Ltd about it.  CD Ltd conceded to the quality level of the aluminium and advised AB 
Ltd to take necessary action to upgrade the aluminium product to the required strength 
and deduct their expenses from the contract price. Subsequently, after this CD Ltd 
went into administration and receivers appointed on behalf of CD Ltd decided to call 
on the letter of credit supporting the underlying transaction for the full amount despite 
the agreement earlier had with AB Ltd.  
 
From the above hypothetical case, the receivers’ action in calling on the full amount 
of the letter of credit by insisting on the separate legal right which arose from the 
credit would be unconscionable having regard to the circumstances of the case. 
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Judging for this hypothetical case, a call on the documentary credit by insisting on the 
right inherent in it as a separate transaction would amount to insisting on strict 
application of right in circumstances where to do so should be regarded, on the facts 
of the particular case, to be harsh or oppressive. This is so because such insistence by 
the beneficiary of the credit on the right inherent in the credit is done in total disregard 
of all the circumstances and such insistence makes the beneficiary oppressive in his 
demands. Where it could be established on a balance of probabilities that a demand 
for payment only amounts to insistence on rights in an oppressive and harsh manner, 
it could suffice to prove unconscionability. 
 
6.5. Should English Law Recognize Unconscionability? 
 
This section analyses the arguments for and against unconscionability exception with 
the view to assessing the possibility of its recognition in English law. 
 
6.5.1. Arguments in Support of Unconscionability 
 
Unconscionability as a ground for displacing the autonomy doctrine in documentary 
credit law apparently derives its support from the following grounds. 
 
 
6.5.1.1. Long entrenched in English legal History 
 
The doctrine of unconscionability as a ground for vitiating an otherwise valid contract 
is not novel in English law. As early as 1697, Lord Hardwicke has made reference to 
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the concept of unconscionability in Earl of Chesterfield v Janssen589 by describing 
circumstances ‘where no man in his right senses and not under a delusion nor an 
honest and fair man would accept on the other hand that which is inequitable and 
unconscientious…’590 The only criticism levelled against the Earl of Chesterfield case 
and other authorities in its class is that it is related to a particular group of cases 
dealing with improvident bargains with particular vulnerable group of people.  
 
However, a wider application of the doctrine of unconscionability in a sense that 
depicts that it could be used in any type of transaction was evident in two English 
decisions of Multiservice Bookbinding v Marden591 and Alec Lobb v Total Oil.592 It 
was contended by Anthony Siopis593 that these two cases suggest that English law 
recognizes ‘a general principle entitling a court to intervene on the grounds of 
unconscionability’. The principles in these cases are regarded as having a general 
application in any type of transaction because contrary to the approach adopted in the 
Earl of Chesterfield case, they are not confined to specific type of bargain with 
particular group of vulnerable class. Hence, if these cases 594  recognize a general 
application of unconscionability in English law,595 there then is a strong force to the 
argument that its application in documentary credit as a ground for displacing the 
autonomy principle should, as a matter of its long entrenchment in English general 
law not be without support. 
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In documentary credit law, case law is replete with judicial dicta that have not 
completely overlooked the idea of unconscionability as a ground for displacing the 
autonomy rule. 596  In Elian and Rabbath v Matsas,597  the Court, was prepared to 
intervene to prevent an irretrievable injustice in circumstance that fell short of fraud. 
The facts of the case hinged on a guarantee that was issued to secure the release of 
cargo. The claimant applied for an injunction when another lien was imposed in 
contravention of the agreement to release the goods on the posting of a guarantee for 
the first lien. Lord Denning MR granted the injunction on the grounds of irretrievable 
injustice.   In TTI Team International v Hutchinson 3G UK Ltd 598 Judge Anthony 
Thornton QC referring to Samwoh599 and MC Connell600noted that lack of good faith 
that is comparable to the unconscionability doctrine was a ground upon which the 
autonomy doctrine could be displaced. Hence judicial dicta as evident in the above 
cases are direct pointer to the fact that the concept of unconscionability is long 
engrained in English law and its presence offers credibility to the call for 
unconscionability exception in documentary credit. 
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6.5.1.2. Complements the Fraud Rule 
 
In documentary credit, the recognition of an unconscionability exception would assist 
to fill the protection gap left by the other exceptions like fraud which by virtue of its 
common law origin is applied strictly and very difficult to prove. In order to prove the 
existence of fraud, the courts require that the alleged fraud of the beneficiary of the 
credit must be clearly and strictly established to the knowledge of the bank to justify a 
refusal by the issuing bank to honour a draft under the credit. Adding to the difficulty 
in the use of only fraud as a protection mechanism, is that the ingredients of common 
law fraud like knowledge, intention, dishonesty etc are notoriously difficult to prove. 
In Discount Records Ltd v Barclays Bank Ltd,601 the restrictive approach of the fraud 
rule was dramatically exemplified. In this case, Megarry J, despite a substantial 
number of goods ordered for not being compliant with the order by either being below 
standard or were outright rejects, held that it was not a case of clearly established fraud 
and the court would ‘be slow to interfere with bankers’ irrevocable credits unless a 
sufficiently grave cause is shown. It is in this kind of protection gap, where it becomes 
manifest that the failure of the law to aid the claimant does not lie in his failure to 
prove the wrong doing or mala fides of the defendant in demanding payment on the 
credit but in his difficulty in proving fraud and its technicalities to the satisfaction of 
the court that unconscionability fills.  Where this is so, the unconscionability exception 
becomes a ‘blanket’ ground coming to the aid of the claimant as its proof is less 
onerous that the fraud rule and lies primarily on establishing the lack of good faith of 
the beneficiary. 
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Professor Nelson Enonchong602 has argued that in the absence of the unconscionability 
exception, the courts sometimes strain to fit facts which would lead to intervention on 
some other grounds within the concept of fraud. 603  This attempt to stretch the 
boundaries of fraud beyond its normal boundaries sometimes becomes difficult to 
justify the finding of fraud based on legal principle.604 However, recognition of an 
unconscionability exception would readily make it possible to justify displacing the 
autonomy principle on the ground that the call on a credit is unconscionable in the 
absence of the proof of actual fraud. 
 
 
6.5.1.3. Flexible nature of Unconscionability 
 
Equity’s jurisdiction of unconscionability exception ensures to a large extent that there 
is no unfair and/or abusive drawing in documentary credit by the beneficiary who may 
take advantage of the inherent difficulties associated with proving fraud and its 
ingredients. 605 The flexibility of the exception means that the concept has no strict 
guidelines and can be tailor-made to suit each new facts and circumstances. It thus, 
provide a safety net for preventing abusive drawing in documentary credits by 
capturing situations which fall short of actual fraud but warrants making a call on a 
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credit in circumstances that is abusive, oppressive and unfair.606 There are situations 
where actual fraud could not be established but unconscionability could be used as an 
effective weapon against abusive demand in documentary credit. It could also be used 
to stop abusive demand on the credit in circumstances where a presentation is made for 
an already earlier amount in disregard of agreement that has reduced the amount that is 
otherwise due under the credit. 
 
6.5.1.4. Has Support from Common Law 
 
Though unconscionability, as an element in the enforcement of contracts, is equitable 
in origin, there is evidence to sustain the conclusion that the common-law courts as 
well were moved by the doctrine to invalidate contracts under certain 
circumstances. 607  In the American case of Industra-lease Automated & Scientific 
Equip. Corp v RME Enters Inc.608 it was held that the disclaimers of express and 
implied warranties in the lease of industrial equipment were unconscionable under the 
circumstances where the equipment never operated. In reaching this conclusion, 
Hopkins JP of New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division re-inforced the 
submission609 that unconscionability, though being of equitable origin, were in certain 
circumstances applied by the common law courts to invalidate a contract. This 
statement of the court goes to show that the common law courts in certain 
circumstances recognized the use of unconscionability as a ground for vitiating a 
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contract610 and in appropriate circumstances its use as a ground for displacing the 
autonomy principle in documentary credit may borrow from the support shown to the 
doctrine by common law. 
 
 
6.5.1.5. Progress of the Unconscionability Exception in other Jurisdictions 
 
Courts in other jurisdictions 611  have advanced the cause of the unconscionability 
exception as a ground for displacing the impregnability of documentary credits.612 In 
Singapore, unconscionability is an established exception to the principle of 
independence, at least in relation to performance bonds. In Australia, the Trade 
Practices Act 613  has in no uncertain terms made unconscionability a ground for 
restraint on payment as the provision of the Act applies to the common law of 
Australia which includes transactions relating to international sale of goods.614 
 
 
6.5.2.  Arguments Against 
 
Having considered the arguments in favour of unconscionability exception, what are 
the objections against judicial intervention based on this ground? It is the contention of 
this section that some of the objections are well founded. However, some of the 
                                                 
610
  Compare with the contrary view by Sam Rickett that the use and recognition of the 
unconscionability belies in his view a complete lack of appreciation of the entire endeavour of the 
common law.  See further, C Rickett ‘Unconscionability and Commercial Law’ in John Lowry 
Commercial Law: Perspective and Practice (Lexis Nexis 2006) 179 para. 9.28.  
611
 See for example Canada, Australia, Singapore and New Zealand where progress have made using 
the unconscionability.  
612
 This assumes, as reported in many cases cited above that the applicable law is the same for both  
demand guarantee and letter of credit. 
613
 See mostly S. 51AA. 
614
 Orrcon Operations Pty Ltd v Capital Steel & Pipe Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 1319 [70]. 
203 
 
reasons advanced for the rejection of the exception are based on some assumptions that 
in the main account for the unsatisfactory nature of the law in this branch of law. Some 
of these arguments would be considered forthwith. 
 
6.5.2.1. Too Vague and Uncertain 
 
The strongest argument against the unconscionability exception lies in the difficulty in 
articulating with precision what unconscionability entails. Consequently, it has led to 
numerous suggestions that it will lead to much uncertainty. The underlying logic 
behind this contention is that in each case where unconscionability is raised, the court 
will have to determine to what extent it limits the unqualified615 right of the beneficiary 
to make presentation for payment under the credit. This will involve making a 
determination as to the meaning of unconscionability and the standard of proof. As 
pointed out by Alexia Ganotaki,616 the Singapore cases617 are illustrative of the fact that 
there will be ‘an unacceptable level of uncertainty’618 both as to the meaning of the 
words and the standard of proof required.  
 
However, it is submitted that the argument of uncertainty though in some instances, 
well founded, should not be elevated to a point where it becomes counter-productive. 
The uncertainty arising from unconscionability’s vague nature should not be over-
emphasized so as to becloud its relevance. Cases are littered with legal terms that tend 
towards imprecision but have not affected the understanding of their meaning and the 
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courts’ willingness to adjudicate on those issues. The fraud exception is also very 
problematic and the ingredient of dishonesty- an actual fraud requirement- tends 
towards imprecision and uncertainty but has not affected its acceptance as a ground 
upon which impregnability of documentary credit can be displaced. Similarly, the 
doctrine of unconscionability should not be rejected outright because of uncertainty.  
 
Uncertainty is part of the realities of commercial activities and judicial process and 
should not be perceived in all circumstances to be counter-productive. Since 
unconscionability issues in most instances involve a consideration of the different 
factual situations, it should be a less telling point that seemingly uncertain decisions 
could be reached. This point could be gleaned from the insightful and well known 
comment of B Cardozo619 on the nature of the judicial process when he opined that:  
I sought for certainty. I was oppressed and disheartened when I found 
that the quest for it was futile.... As the years have gone by, and as I 
have reflected more and more on the nature of judicial process, I have 
become reconciled to uncertainty, because I have grown to see it as 
inevitable. I have grown to see the process in its highest reaches, is not 
discovery but creation: and that the doubts and misgiving, the hopes and 
fears, are part of the mind, the pangs of death and the pangs of birth, in 
which principle that have served their day expire, and new principles are 
born.620 
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Applying this to unconscionability in documentary credit, the point sought to be made 
is that uncertainty is part and parcel of commercial life. The argument of uncertainty 
should not distract from the remedies which unconscionability seeks to achieve. 
 
Apart from the above observation, that uncertainty is inherently or at best a part of 
commercial life and judicial process is evident in the actions and decisions of the 
protagonist of certainty in documentary credits law. Consequently, the argument of 
certainty should not be used as a ground to completely discountenance the gain sought 
to be achieved by the recognition of unconscionability exception in documentary credit. 
In documentary credit, the law is littered with cases and legal dicta that remotely 
support this conclusion. In most documentary credit cases, judges have resorted to the 
use of unhelpful phrases like ‘this is an unusual case with extra-ordinary facts’, ‘to 
avoid irretrievable injustice’ etc as a ground for deviating from a patterned and certain 
line of thought which the call for certainty should have entrusted upon them. The 
hidden lesson from these phrases that has been adopted where it becomes difficult to 
follow the certain pattern of rules without handing out unjust decisions, is that human 
actions or the activities of commercial men are not certain and any attempt to 
systematize and subject it to a certain pattern is likely to achieve undesirable result. 
 
Another point that considerably reduces the significance of the ‘certainty argument’ is 
evident in the dictum of Toohey J,621 in reference to unconscionability when he stated 
that ‘although the concept of unconscionability has been expressed in fairly wide terms, 
the courts are exercising an equitable jurisdiction according to recognized principles. 
They are not armed with a general power to set aside contractual bargains simply 
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because in the eyes of the judges, they appear to be unfair, harsh or unconscionable’.622 
Applying this to documentary credits, it means that in the application of the doctrine of 
unconscionability, the courts are not in reality, acting in a wholly discretionary fashion 
where unconscionability is invoked but exercising equitable jurisdiction according to 
recognized principle.623 
 
6.5.2.2. Unconscionability would lead to easy grant of injunctions, thereby 
destroying the purpose of the autonomy principle 
 
It has been contended that the recognition of an unconscionability exception would 
lead to easy availability of injunctions restraining a demand on a credit. Part of the 
reason that supports this argument is that it is easier to prove unconscionability than 
fraud.624 While this is a fair point, it has to be submitted that the contention seems to 
underestimate the inherent difficulty associated with satisfying the required standard of 
proof which is that unconscionability ‘must be significant and clearly established’.625 
More so, that unconscionability is easier to prove than fraud should be of less telling 
point as what is important is whether the unconscionability in question has been 
established to the required standard of proof. 
 
Another vital point which, the contention that the recognition of an unconscionability 
exception in documentary credit would lead to easy grant of injunction misses is the 
point made by Rix J, in Czarnikow-Rionda Sugar Trading Inc v Standard Bank London 
                                                 
622
 ibid at 654. 
623
 The principle in the case of documentary credit being one that is based on the reasonable 
expectation of the parties or based on commercial reasonableness 
624
 NE Enonchong ‘The Problem of Abusive Calls on Demand Guarantees’ [2007] LMCLQ 97, 104. 
625
 TTI Team Telecom International V Hutchinson 3G [2003] 1 All ER 914 [37].  
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Ltd626regarding the criteria for the grant of injunctions. The case is an authority to the 
effect that for an injunction to be granted in documentary credit, the claimant need to 
establish that not only does he have a cause of action but also that the balance of 
convenience is in his favour. The satisfaction of these criteria before an injunction 
could be granted in documentary credit, in no small measure curtails the availability of 
injunctions. 
 
6.5.2.3. Involvement with Dispute in the Underlying Contract 
 
An objection to recognizing the unconscionability exception is that it would lead banks 
and courts getting involved with disputes in relation to the underlying contract. The 
difficulty with this argument is that if it is true in respect of the unconscionability 
exception, the same would also apply to the fraud exception. The point sought to be 
made here is that if fraud is recognized as an exception to the principle of autonomy if 
it would lead to investigation of the underlying dispute, it becomes less convincing to 
use it against the unconscionability exception. More-over, the issue of when a call on a 
credit is unconscionable should be easier for the bank to determine without much 
involvement in the underlying dispute than when fraud is involved.627 
 
6.6. Conclusion 
 
The chapter has sought to establish that the concept of unconscionability is not novel in 
English law. However, its recognition in English documentary credits law has attracted 
an approach that is uncertain. While the cases are littered with judicial dicta that are 
                                                 
626
 [1999] 2 Lloyd's Rep 187 
627
 This is possible with information from the applicant as to the circumstances which make the 
beneficiary insistence on strict legal right as amounting to an abuse of right and hence abusive demand. 
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receptive to the unconscionability exception, it remains the accepted position that in 
English law, that it is only in cases of established fraud that, the impregnability of 
documentary credits can be displaced. In other common law jurisdictions, like 
Singapore and Australia, an attempt to disregard the autonomy doctrine where a 
beneficiary’s demand628 is established to be unconscionable has proved successful and 
remains a separate exception from fraud based upon which the independent 
undertaking implicit in the autonomy principle could be displaced. 
 
Whether English law, should recognize the unconscionability exception is particularly 
not an easy question to answer. While the court struggles and commentators indulge in 
a seemingly endless wrangle on what the right position is, this chapter has endeavoured 
to demonstrate that unconscionability as a ground upon which the principle of 
autonomy could be displaced remains an attractive proposition. The strongest objection 
to this submission is that admitting the unconscionability exception as a ground for 
displacing the autonomy doctrine in documentary credits would necessitate an 
undesirable degree of uncertainty. This argument, it has to be acknowledged, is not 
devoid of substance. However, what is evident, as most cases and judicial dicta reveal 
is a degree of uncertainty in the law because of the pursuit of certainty in documentary 
credits law629 by the English courts.630 Regrettably, this uncertainty has been hidden by 
adopting phrases which apparently seem to distract from the main problem. As early as 
1966, Lord Denning, relied on the phrase ‘this was a special case…. to prevent what 
might be irretrievable injustice’631 to hold, contrary to accepted principle,632 that an 
                                                 
628
 This is on the assumption that a demand guarantees and letters of credit are on the same footing. 
629
 Especially, on the issue of what should be the recognized exception and/or exceptions to the 
principle of autonomy in documentary credit 
630
 The many dicta in English law that is contrary to the established position are pointer to this 
uncertainty. 
631
 Elian and Rabbath v Matsas [1966] 2 Lloyds Rep 495, 497. 
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injunction should be granted. In the recent case of TTI Team Telecom International Ltd 
v Hutchison 3G UK Ltd,633 Anthony Thornton QC, citing Singapore authorities which 
he said were in accord with the decision in Elian and Rabbath and that of Morrisson J 
in the Cargill International case,634 as to a demand ‘utterly lacking in bona fides’635 
said that ‘If a similarly clear-cut case came before an English court, it would, in the 
light of these cases, grant restraining relief’. It is submitted that these cases show that 
unconscionability is not altogether without support in English law and the pursuit of 
certainty, by insisting that it is only in cases of established fraud that impregnability of 
documentary credits can be displaced, has yielded nothing but uncertainty. If there are 
special cases with extra-ordinary facts that appear to defy the systematized and certain 
order of things and situations when the need to avoid irretrievable injustice is such that 
following the certain order of things will occasion injustice, the lesson partly derivable 
is: it may be the right time to jettison dogma636 by allowing some degree of flexibility 
though the recognition of limited unconscionability exception so that the insulated 
method of payment is shielded from abuse. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
632
 There was no actual or clear fraud proved 
633
 [2003] 1 All ER 914. 
634
 See Cargill International SA v Bangladesh Sugar & Foods Corp [1996] 4All ER 563. 
635
  As a ground that is different from the established actual fraud based upon which the impregnability 
of documentary credit could be disregarded. 
636
 Dogma in the sense that the belief that every legal facts  would conform to set or established pattern 
remain an illusion 
210 
 
Chapter Seven 
 
7.0.    Illegality 
 
7.1. Introduction 
 
Recent English cases have adopted the view that there exists an illegality exception to 
the principle of autonomy in documentary credit. This is evident from obiter dicta in 
some recent English documentary credit cases. This Chapter explores the illegality 
exception to the principle of autonomy in documentary credits. The primary object of 
the chapter is to determine the circumstances under which illegality may constitute a 
separate ground from fraud based upon which the independent undertaking of the 
issuing bank to make payment to the beneficiary upon the tender of apparently 
conforming documents could be displaced. With the above objective in mind, the 
chapter’s focus is not a consideration of the question whether the exception should be 
recognized in English Law637 but to explore the vexing issue of the manner (scope) in 
which illegality operates and should be applied in practice.  
 
To achieve this purpose, the chapter is divided into six main sections. Apart from the 
introduction, sections 7.2 and 7.3 deal with the nature and rationale of the illegality 
defence. Sections 7.4 and 7.5 examine the current state of the authorities in some 
jurisdictions regarding illegality in documentary credits and the issue of proof. 
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 As long ago as 1995 in the Group Josi case [1996] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 345, Staughton L.J though obiter, 
emphatically stated that ‘illegality is a separate ground for non-payment under a letter of credit.’ This 
has been followed with a similar judicial pronouncement and detailed academic commentary. For this, 
see generally The Mahonia (1) & (2) [2003] 2 Lloyd's Rep 911, [2004] EWHC 1938 (Comm), N 
Enonchong, ‘The Autonomy Principle of Letters of Credit: an Illegality Exception?’ (2006) LMCLQ 
404 
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Section 7.6 explores the ambit of the illegality defence by examining some of the 
criteria that would assist in limiting the exception. 
 
It finally submits that, in appropriate circumstance, recognition of a limited illegality 
exception to the principle of autonomy in documentary credits, rather than harm the 
instrument will ensure trust in the use of the instrument by setting a standard in which 
parties realize that the impregnability of documentary credits may in certain limited 
situations be ignored where an obvious illegality in the underlying transaction is 
established.  
 
 
7.2.  Illegality Defence in General 
 
Generally, illegality arises in two broad situations.638 Illegality which arises by virtue 
of unlawfulness arising from a breach of a legal statute otherwise known as statutory 
illegality and illegality which arises in relation to common law.639 However, there are 
rare situations where the court may have to consider both questions. For example, 
where the contract involves the commission of a statutory illegality, the first question 
the court must consider is whether the legislature has provided that a claim by the 
relevant party to enforce the contract must be denied. If it has not, there remains a 
separate question of whether the claim under the contract is unenforceable at common 
law.640 Another way of understanding illegality in general law is that a transaction is 
                                                 
638Commission Consultation Paper No 189, 2009.available at 
http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/docs/cp189.pdf.  at para. 3.2 
639
 For the a detailed discussion on this, See generally, N Enonchong  Illegal Transactions (LLP 1998) 
640
 The above distinction is clearly explained in R A Buckley, Illegality and Public Policy (Sweet and 
Maxwell 2002) p 10; See also the second edition, RA Buckley, Illegality and Public Policy (Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2009) p.11. M P Furmston, ‘The Analysis of Illegal Contracts’ (1966) 16 University of 
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illegal, or at least affected by illegality, if the transaction or some aspect of it is 
prohibited (expressly or impliedly) by the law. This is usually the case, where the 
transaction involves the commission of a legal wrong or involves conduct which is 
contrary to public policy even though it is not otherwise prohibited by law.641 
 
More so, the defence of illegality may also partly relate to the circumstances under 
which the law applies the doctrine of illegality as a ground for limiting or avoiding a 
contractual liability based on the alleged illegality. Opinions are divided as to the 
consequence of illegality in general law.642 However, one common feature of the 
consequence of illegality in contract is that an agreement proved to be illegal or 
tainted with illegality is unenforceable as a result of the illegality either at law or in 
equity.643 A contract which is unenforceable is presumed to be one in respect of which 
a court will not compel compliance by its order or judgment.644 So far, the analysis 
relates to illegality and its effects in general law. 
 
7.3. Illegality in Documentary Credit 
  
Illegality in documentary credits relates to the emerging trend of documentary credits 
law in borrowing from the wider aspect of the general law on illegality (a vitiating 
                                                                                                                                            
Toronto Law Journal 267 and the Law Commission Consultation Paper No 189, 2009.available at 
http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/docs/cp189.pdf. at para. 3.2. 
641
 See NE Enonchong, Illegal Transaction (Lloyds of London Press1998) 2. 
642
 There is some kind of controversy as to whether the effect of illegality is make an agreement void or  
merely unenforceable. See  Mackender v Feldia Ag [1967] 2QB 590.  
643
 This is a settled proposition of English Law.  Cleaver v Mutual Reserve Fund [1892] I QB 147, at 
151, see also NE Enonchong Illegal Transaction  (Lloyds of London Press 1998) 31. However, this 
proposition seems to have ignored later development where some illegal conduct has not led to denial 
of enforcement especially where the claimant is not relying on the illegality. 
644
 However, a court can make an order to prevent the performance of the illegal agreement.  E.g. the 
court can grant an injunction preventing the enforcement of letters of credit if the letters of credit is 
issued as part of illegal transaction. On this point, see Group Josi Re v Walbrook Insurance Co. Ltd 
[1996] 1WLR 1152 where the court, however, held that there was no illegality as to warrant an 
injunction. 
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factor to a contractual liability) as a ground for displacing the autonomy principle. In 
displacing the autonomy principle, the contractual right and/or liability that is inherent 
in the separate documentary credit contract is sought to be avoided as a result of the 
alleged illegality. In this regard, the illegality exception would be pleaded by a litigant 
as a ground for rescinding an otherwise binding obligation created by the separate 
letter of credit contract save for the illegality. Hence the illegality exception serves to 
protect the letter of credit from the legal flaw that would have arisen if a credit that is 
illegal or tainted with illegality is allowed to be enforced.  Therefore the illegality 
exception in documentary credits, if definitively recognized in documentary credit 
defies the logic held in some quarters645 that the unique nature of the instrument 
(documentary credits) extricates it completely from the rules governing general 
laws. 646  Hence some of the crucial questions pertinent to the understanding of 
illegality in documentary credit are: (1) whether the illegality defence is a separate 
exception to the principle of autonomy in documentary credit. (2) In what 
circumstances can a bank rely on illegality affecting the letter of credit as an excuse to 
avoid payment? (3) Whether and in what circumstances is an applicant for a credit 
entitled to an injunction restraining payment on grounds of illegality in documentary 
credits?  
 
Before, delving into the above questions, it is appropriate to understand the nature of 
illegality in documentary credits. To ascertain the nature of the illegality defence in 
documentary credits with a view to addressing the implications of illegality, three key 
                                                 
645
 In most cases, there is always a debate in favour of protecting the integrity of documentary credit by 
allowing no derogation on the one hand and the contention that public policy reasons inherent in the 
fraud rule and illegality doctrine should defeat the otherwise impregnability of documentary credit. 
646
 It has been noted in many cases and by commentators that letter of credit is a specialty contract that 
is different and not amenable to rules governing general contact law. For general understanding of the 
law regarding illegality and its effects on contract, see generally N Enonchong Illegal Transaction 
(Lloyds of London Press 1998) particularly at chapter 2. p. 29 
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questions call for consideration. One is where payment under a documentary credit is 
being enjoined on the ground that the letter of credit is illegal in itself. Secondly, is 
where a letter of credit is enjoined on the grounds that the illegality arises both from 
the credit and from the underlying transaction. Lastly, and a more fundamental 
question, is the consideration of the question whether a letter of credit is affected by 
the illegality in the underlying transaction in respect of which the credit is issued. 
 
 
7.3.1.  Where the Letter of Credit is in itself Illegal 
 
The illegality of the letter of credit itself in this case arises mostly through an express 
or implied statutory prohibition.647 In this case, a provision in the law may for some 
reasons make the use of a credit illegal, for instance, where there is a government 
prohibition on the use of letters of credit,648 it becomes immaterial that the parties did 
not intend to break the law and generally even an innocent party may not enforce such 
a credit. 649  The illegality of the credit itself also could arise where there is a 
supervening prohibition on the use of letters of credit after it has been advised by a 
beneficiary as a means of payment for goods or services arising from a contract for 
the sale of goods. The situation contemplated in this case is where a letter of credit has 
been lawfully issued but before payment or reimbursement obligation falls due under 
the credit, its use is prohibited by reason of a governmental or judicial order.650 Also, 
                                                 
647
 It has to be noted that in some situations, the distinction between express or implied prohibition may 
be blurred. So when such a situation arises, the statute by virtues of its apparent inconclusive nature 
should be probably classified as implied prohibition. For this analysis, see M Furmston, The Law of 
Contract (3rd edn, Lexis Nexis 2007) 1005 [5.20]. 
648
 International Dairy Queen Inc v Bank of Wadley (1976) 407 F Supp 1270 (MD Ala). 
649
 See St John Shipping Corp v Joseph Bank Ltd [1957] 1QB 267, 283. However, where there is a 
legal prohibition by a statute, it may not be enough to lead to a denial of right if the intention evident in 
the statute is to the contrary. 
650
 See Chudian  v Philippine National Bank (1992) 734 F Supp 415. 
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another example is a situation where an issuing bank issues a letter of credit but 
before its payment or reimbursement obligation arises, its ability to carry out banking 
business is proscribed by reason of illegal trading like being involved in money 
laundering. Also there are situations where it may be discovered that a bank is set up 
in violation of some required statutory licences as to make illegal its carrying of 
business as a trading entity. Circumstances such as the above make the issuance and 
payment of a letter of credit in itself illegal.   
 
Where the letters of credit is illegal as a result of the situation described above, its 
illegality does not arise as a result of a breach of the autonomy principle but because 
the credit is illegal in itself. Therefore, the issue of the circumstances under which 
illegality will constitute an exception to the principle of autonomy does not arise. 
 
 
7.3.2.  Illegality Affecting the Credit and Underlying Transaction 
 
It may happen that in some instances, the letter of credit is affected by illegality 
arising from the credit as well as the underlying transaction that gave rise to the letters 
of credit. If this is the position, a question may arise as to whether the principle of 
autonomy is engaged. For example, in an underlying contract for the export of 
publishing equipment on CIF terms to Nigeria which is supported by a letter of credit 
in favour of the UK exporter (seller of goods), the contract provides for the seller to 
procure the export licence on behalf of the Nigerian buyer and for the Nigerian buyer 
to procure a letter of credit in favour of the UK seller redeemable upon the 
presentation of an invoice, insurance and document evidencing shipment. It is 
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provided that the seller furnishes an export licence for payment under the credit. It 
happened that the UK seller inadvertently failed to procure the export licence despite 
having shipped the goods but prior to the arrival of the goods, a subsequent 
government of Nigeria legislation unconnected with the underlying transaction 
prohibits the importation of publishing equipment without an export and import 
licence and the licence has not been obtained prior to the government action. In this 
case, there is a provision in the underlying transaction requiring an export licence 
which but for the Nigerian legislation would not have invalidated the credit.  
 
Assuming the seller having shipped the goods, presented the required documents 
under the credit which did not include a licence as directed in the credit, the bank 
refuses to pay on the grounds that it has valid information from the applicant for the 
credit (buyer) that the export licence was not obtained. It is apparent from this 
scenario that the failure to obtain an export licence would not have invalidated the 
credit save for the express statutory prohibition by the Nigerian government 
legislation. In this kind of situation where the illegality arises from a combination of 
an underlying contract provision and a national legislation that make it impossible to 
fulfill the credit requirement, is the principle of autonomy not engaged?  Professor 
Enonchong651 has argued that where illegality affects the letters of credit and the 
underlying transaction, the principle of autonomy is not engaged because the letter of 
credit is illegal in itself rather than through the underlying transaction.652 The rational 
explanation for the submission may be that once the letter of credit is illegal, the 
consideration of the illegality of the underlying transaction become of lesser 
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 NE Enonchong, ‘The Autonomy Principle of Letters of Credit: an Illegality Exception?’ (2006) 
LMCLQ 404.  
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 NE Enonchong, ‘The Autonomy Principle of Letters of Credit: an Illegality Exception’ (2006) 
LMCLQ 404, 407. 
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importance. However, in the present hypothetical case, the letters of credit though 
illegal cannot be said to be so without an analysis of the underlying contract to 
uncover its illegality with the result that the documents presented by the beneficiary 
though apparently complying is rendered illegal by failure to obtain the licence. The 
point sought to be made in this case is that there are situations where the 
circumstances that make the letter of credit illegal are a combination of the issues 
from the underlying transaction as well as an express prohibition unrelated to the 
underlying transaction. In this kind of situation where the underlying contract facts 
and the express provision external to the underlying contract become inextricably 
linked so as to make the credit illegal, is the principle of autonomy not engaged? It is 
submitted, that in this kind of situation, where an aspect of the underlying contract 
contributes to make the letter of credit illegal, the autonomy principle is engaged 
despite the credit being apparently seen to be illegal by an express prohibition 
unrelated to the underlying contract. 
 
In United City Merchants Ltd v. Royal Bank of Canada,653 the situation where the 
credit itself and the underlying transaction were illegal was exemplified. It was held 
that under Art. VIII (2)(b) of the Bretton Wood Agreements654 as implemented in the 
United Kingdom, the whole transaction, that is, the credit itself and the underlying 
transaction was in breach of the exchange control regulation of Peru and was therefore 
unenforceable in England. It is contended by Professor Enonchong, that where the 
letters of credit is illegal in itself, whether as a result of illegality in the issuance of the 
credit or through a combination of illegality in the credit and that of the underlying 
transaction, that the principle of autonomy is not engaged because the credit is illegal 
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 [1983] 1 AC 168. 
654
 See Bretton Woods Agreement Act 1945 and the Bretton Woods Agreements Order in Council 1946 
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in itself rather than through the underlying transaction and therefore no difficulty 
arises as a result of that principle.655 This proposition, it is submitted, is correct where 
there is no difficulty in separating the illegality in the credit as well as in the 
underlying transaction. But at times difficulty may arise with respect to understanding 
of the multiplicity of ways in which illegality can be raised.656 
 
7.3.3.  Illegality in the Underlying transaction 
 
In letters of credit transactions, the underlying transaction represents a different 
contract that is distinct from the letter of credit itself. However, under what 
circumstance will an illegality in the underlying transaction affect the letters of credit 
in order to restrain payment? In Group Josi Re v Walbrook Insurance Co. Ltd. and 
Others,657  Group Josi contended that payment should be restrained on the grounds 
that the reinsurance contract which formed the underlying contract was illegal. It was 
the submission of the defendant that considering the irrevocability of letters of credit 
and its distinct nature from the underlying agreement which brings it into being, the 
credit is not illegal, void or unenforceable even if it is assumed that the contracts of 
reinsurance are.658 On the other hand, the claimant (Group Josi) submits that it has an 
arguable case that the letter of credit is illegal, void and unenforceable on several 
grounds. The claimant submits that they are themselves void, either directly because 
they were entered into for the purposes of carrying out illegal reinsurance contracts, or 
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 See NE Enonchong  ‘The Autonomy Principle of Letter of Credit: an Illegality Exception’ (2006) 
LMCQ 404, 406. See also G.T McLaughlin ‘Letters of Credit and Illegal Contracts: The Limits of the 
Independence Principle’ (1988-1989) 49 Ohio St LJ 1197, 1217. 
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 See generally MP Furmston ‘The Analysis of Illegal Contracts’ (1965) 16 U Toronto LJ 267. 
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 [1996] 1 Lloyd's Rep 345. 
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indirectly because they are tainted with the illegality of the underlying contracts.659 To 
support its case, it further submits that the issuing and confirming of the letters of 
credit in the instant case were acts of performance of prohibited business, as payment 
under them would be. The payment of a claim is equally illegal whether it is done by 
placing cash in the hands of the defendants or by placing cash in the hands of an 
intermediary such as a bank who pays the defendant or by any other mechanism set up 
by the plaintiffs including a letter of credit. Hence the letters of credit are in any event 
tainted with illegality and are therefore unenforceable. In all of the above, the difficult 
question is ascertaining when the credit is or is tainted with illegality in the underlying 
transaction as to be capable of breaching the absolute impregnability of documentary 
credits. 
 
Regarding illegality in the underlying transaction, Staughton LJ660 noted that illegality 
in the underlying transaction could constitute a separate ground upon which the 
autonomy principle in letters of credit could be breached. The Lord Justice 
demonstrated his conviction by giving instances where illegality could affect a letter 
of credit as to constitute a ground for restraining payment by a bank. These include a 
contract for the sale of arms to Iraq, at a time when such a sale is illegal. The contract 
providing for the opening of a letter of credit, to operate on presentation of a bill of 
lading for 1000 Kalashnikov rifles to be carried to the port of Basra. He maintained 
that in his view, a Court would not give judgment for the beneficiary against the bank 
in such a case. The above example given by Staughton LJ is strong indication that the 
underlying contract illegality can in some circumstances affect the letter of credit as to 
make it illegal whether directly or by way of taint.  
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7.4. The Rationale for the exception 
 
This section addresses the policy rationale behind the illegality exception. It answers 
the question as to what the rationale for the illegality defence is and whether the 
illegality defence is based only on the ‘ex turpi causa’ rule. If based on the rationale of 
‘ex turpi causa’, what is its meaning and effect in law and if not, what are the other 
policy rationales that underpin the illegality defence in documentary credits? 
 
In primary terms, a rationale for the illegality defence in documentary credit would be 
to complement the crucial role played by fraud in breaching the autonomy doctrine in 
some special circumstances.661 It need not be over-emphasized that the autonomy 
doctrine states that the letter of credit is separate from and independent of the 
underlying contract in respect of which it is issued and remains a cardinal principle in 
the law of letters of credit. However, some policy considerations662 demand that the 
absolute impregnability of the autonomy doctrine may be set aside in cases of fraud. It 
is in this context that illegality exception in documentary credits is perceived to play a 
complementary role to the fraud rule. 
 
More so, as expressed in a long line of cases,663 the rationale for the illegality defence 
has been captured in well-known phrases and maxims which ultimately are intended 
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  See United City Merchants v Royal Bank of Canada [1983] 1 AC 168.  
662
 Such as the need to combat fraud and avoid the abuse of the letter of credit instrument 
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 See for example, Beresford v Royal Insurance Company Ltd [1938] AC 586, 599, See also Euro-
Diam Ltd v Bathurst [1990] QB 1. where Kerr L.J stated the basis of the “ex turpi causa” defence as 
rooted on the general principle that ‘… rests on a principle of public policy that the courts will not 
assist a plaintiff who has been guilty of illegal (or immoral) conduct of which the courts should take 
notice. It applies if in all the circumstances it would be an affront to public conscience to grant the 
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to portray the public policy dimension of the illegality defence. Hence maxims 
deployed to capture the rationale of the illegality such as ‘no person may benefit from 
his own wrong’, or ‘no cause of action may be founded on an illegal act’ (ex turpi 
causa non oritur actio; and in pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis) remain 
established principles. As Professor Enonchong664 observed with regard to the general 
illegality defence, it ‘… seeks to protect the integrity of the judicial system from the 
disrepute which would attach to it if the courts were seen to be encouraging conduct 
which they ought to denounce’.665 This position is not only legally persuasive but 
sensible if regard is had to most of the cases where illegality has been invoked. 
 
However, the approach of explaining the rationale of illegality defence from the point 
of this established maxim have been criticized  as being inherently vague and even 
question begging with the overall effect therefore likely to be one of confusion rather 
than illumination.666 The difficulty of rationalizing the illegality defence primarily 
from the point of the ex turpi rule did not escape the insightful adverse criticism of 
Balcombe LJ in Pitt v Hunt667 when he said ‘I find the ritual incantation of the maxim 
ex turpi causa non oritur actio more likely to confuse than to illuminate’. So therefore, 
in the midst of these competing judicial and academic opinions as to the inadequacy 
of explaining the rationale for the illegality defence on grounds of ex turpi causa, 
what then is the rationale upon which the illegality defence is based? 
 
                                                                                                                                            
plaintiff the relief which he seeks because the court would thereby appear to assist or encourage the 
plaintiff in his illegal conduct or to encourage others in similar acts’. 
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 See N Enonchong  Illegal Transaction (Lloyd’s of  London Press,1998) 16. 
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 See N Enonchong  Illegal Transaction ( Lloyd’s of London Press,1998) 16. 
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 R A Buckley Illegality and Public Policy. (2nd edn London, Sweet & Maxwell 2009) 1. 
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 [1991] 1 QB 24,49. 
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The rationale for the illegality defence has been explained from the standpoint of 
different policy arguments.  One of the rationales which underpins the illegality 
defence according the Law Commission668 is said to be that disallowing the claim 
may further the purpose of the rule which the claimant has infringed. If, for example, 
the law makes the sale of hand guns illegal, it furthers the purpose of gun control to 
prevent a seller from suing for the contract price. This is a rationale which is 
frequently considered in contract cases where the claimant has breached a statutory 
provision either in making or performing a contract. An early example is given in 
Cope v Rowlands669 where the court held that an otherwise valid brokerage contract 
made by a person who had failed to comply with a statutory requirement to obtain a 
licence from the City of London was unenforceable. Closely related to this rationale is 
the requirement that the law should be internally consistent. If a law for whatever 
reason makes the selling of a gun illegal, it will amount to an ‘absurdity’ in law for it 
to be seen to be encouraging its sale by protecting the interest of the seller. Applied to 
a letter of credit, if the law makes the trafficking of heroin illegal, would the 
enforcement of a letter of credit furnished in respect of such transaction not be 
furthering the purpose of the rule which the beneficiary has infringed?  
 
                                                 
668
 See The Illegality Defence (LC CP No189) [2.6] 
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 (1836) 2 M & W 149, 150 ER 707 per Parke B at 710-711 ‘The question for us now to determine is, 
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taken … to imply a prohibition of all unadmitted persons to act as brokers, and consequently to prohibit, 
by necessary inference, all contracts which such persons make for compensation to themselves for so 
acting’. 
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Another contested670 rationale for the illegality defence is that by upholding it, it seeks 
to deter the commission of crime and illegal conduct. In Taylor v Bhail 671  an 
agreement to defraud an insurer of an amount of money which formed part of the 
overall cost for the repair of a building was held to be illegal, not severable and thus 
not recoverable. The contention of the respondent’s counsel that the agreement which 
contained an estimate slightly above what was the actual building cost could be 
severed as to enable the respondent recover what was his actual cost of repairing the 
building was rejected by the Court of Appeal.  The court held that an illegal contract 
to defraud a third party insurer was not capable of severance and hence unenforceable. 
However, this was against the finding of the trial judge that the contract was 
nevertheless fully enforceable, having regard to the quality of the illegality. The trial 
court reasoned that the ‘quality of the illegality in all the circumstances was not such 
that the plaintiff should not be permitted to succeed on his claim against the defendant 
to be paid for the work which in fact he did. If it were otherwise the defendant would 
have all these works done free and, what is more, keep the money from the insurers. 
That seems to me to be the right and just attitude to take’.672 The Court of Appeal 
thought otherwise and held that the contract being illegal was not severable and 
therefore not unenforceable. It seems that the rationale for the decision of the Court of 
Appeal in not allowing recovery for the actual cost of the building work was because 
the illegality arising from the conspiracy to defraud the insurer was to deter insurance 
fraud by sending ‘a clear message’ to builders that they will not be entitled to enforce 
                                                 
670
  It needs to be pointed out that some judges have doubted how effectively the illegality defence can 
uphold any deterrent effect. This is largely for two reasons. First, many of those entering into 
transactions involving illegality are unaware of the law. Secondly, even if they are, it could be argued 
that a rule which acts as a deterrent for one party to a transaction may act as an inducement to the other, 
should he or she be aware that the illegality defence may result in an unmerited windfall. See Tribe v 
Tribe [1996] Ch 107, 133-134 per Millett LJ and Tinsley v Milligan 
[1992] Ch 310, 334 per Ralph Gibson LJ, See also Lord Lowry in Tinsley v Milligan [1994] 1 Ch 340, 
368 
671
 [1996] CLC 377. 
672
 [1996] CLC 377, 384. 
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payment if they provide false estimates of work. As can be inferred from the trial 
Judge’s rationale for the decision, it will be difficult (if the sole rationale 
underpinning the illegality defence is to protect the integrity of the legal system and/or 
to prevent a party from benefitting from his/her illegal conduct) to justify the Court of 
Appeal’s decision. In allowing a party who took part in an illegal act of defrauding an 
insurer by initiating and actively participating in the illegal conduct to retain the 
insurance money and further assisted by the court in evading the payment of the 
actual cost of renovation work carried out by a builder, the Court of Appeal has not 
justified the rationale of preventing a party from benefitting from his illegal conduct. 
Such an approach, it can be argued does not protect the integrity of any rational legal 
system. Also, it flies in the face of the assertion that the rationale for the illegality 
defence is to stop a party benefitting from his illegal conduct. 
 
Judging from the above analysis, the rationale for the illegality rather than being only 
to stop a party benefitting from his illegal conduct, could be said to be varied and 
depends on the circumstance of each case.673 It need not be overstated that illegality is 
a very serious consideration in law and once implicated in a contract or transaction, its 
effect is usually to make the contract unenforceable.  In documentary credit, the 
rationale for the adoption of an illegality defence, should not only be to complement 
the role played by fraud but to protect the integrity of the letter of credit by making 
illegal credit or credit tainted with illegality to be unenforceable. 
 
 
 
                                                 
673
 It has to be noted that in some instances, though a statute makes a contract illegal, what determines 
whether the enforceability or otherwise of such contract is only ascertainable from the intention of the 
statute 
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7.5. The Current State of Authorities on Illegality Exception 
 
This section undertakes a comparative analysis of the position of the illegality defence 
in documentary credits in the US, Singapore and the United Kingdom. The aim is to 
explore how the illegality defence has been applied in these jurisdictions and how the 
application in those jurisdictions may benefit the position adopted in English law with 
respect to illegality defence in documentary credit law. 
  
 
7.5.1. United States of America 
 
The authorities in the United States seem to adopt a position that fraud is the only 
recognized exception to the independent principle in letters of credit. This position is 
explicitly supported by Art. 5-109 of the Uniform Commercial code (UCC) which 
expressly recognizes fraud as the only ground upon which payment may be withheld 
upon a complying presentation. Art. 5-109  states that  ‘If a presentation is made that 
appears on its face strictly to comply with the terms and condition of the letter of 
credit, but a required document is forged or materially fraudulent, or honour of the 
presentation would facilitate  a material  fraud by the beneficiary on the issuer or 
applicant…, the issuer, acting in good faith, may honour or dishonour the 
presentation…or a court of competent jurisdiction may temporarily or permanently 
enjoin the issuer from honouring a presentation that is fraudulent’ 
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It is the traditional view674 that the illegality exception is not part of the US letter of 
credit law as it is not expressly provided for by Art.5-109 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code (UCC). This view is supported by some authorities 675  which denounce the 
existence of illegality as an exception upon which the independent undertaking in 
documentary credits could be breached. Does it then mean that, if a credit is illegal or 
tainted with illegality in the United States, its courts will fail to assist the aggrieved 
party seeking to be relieved of the contract by virtue of the illegality? The foregoing 
analysis will be undertaken taking into consideration the provision of Art. 5- 103 of 
the Uniform commercial Code (UCC) dealing with the scope of the letter of credit 
provision. Art. 5-103 (b) in which it is stated that ‘the statement of a rule in this article 
does not by itself require, imply, or negate application of the same or a different rule 
to a situation not provided for, or to a person not specified, in this article’ does not 
exclude the illegality exception. Subsection (c) continues to the effect that with the 
exception of certain provision of Art. 5, the effect of the article may be varied by 
agreement or by a provision stated or incorporated by reference to an undertaking. 
Bearing this provision in mind, it is arguable whether a credit either illegal or tainted 
with illegality in a domestic sphere676 is enforceable in the United States. Can the 
position be different if the illegality in a letter credit arises from a conflict of law 
situation.677 This analysis is undertaken having regard to the facts that UCC expressly 
provides for only fraud and forgery as being the only ground upon which the 
autonomy principle may be breached. 
 
                                                 
674
 See J Zeevi & Sons Ltd v Grindlays Bank (Uganda) Ltd (NY Ct of App 1975) 333 NE2d 168. 
675
 ibid, see also Art. 5-109 of the UCC which expressly provide for the fraud exception as the ground 
for withholding payment. 
676
 As separate from illegality in documentary credit arising from a conflict of law situation. 
677
 For example where the governing law is that of a foreign law which makes  a letter of credit 
payment in America illegal. 
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In the domestic context, as early as 1960, a New York court noted that ‘It is the settled 
law of this State (and probably of every other State) that a party to an illegal contract 
cannot ask a court of law to help him carry out his illegal object, nor can such a 
person plead or prove in any court a case in which he, as a basis for his claim, must 
show forth his illegal purpose’. 678   The court, referring to the illegality defence, 
further stated that no court should be required to serve as paymaster of the wages of 
crime. It makes no difference that the defendant has no title to the money since the 
court's concern ‘is not with the position of the defendant’ but with the question of 
whether ‘a recovery by the plaintiff should be denied for the sake of public interests', 
a question which is one ‘of public policy in the administration of the law. The court in 
reference to public policy noted that ‘No one shall be permitted to profit by his own 
fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong, or to found any claim upon his own 
iniquity, or to acquire property by his own crime. These maxims are dictated by 
public policy, have their foundation in universal law administered in all civilized 
countries, and have nowhere been superseded by statutes.’679 Judging from this, it is 
still arguable whether the courts in the US would still enforce a letter of credit that 
originates from an illegal transaction just because the provision of Art.5-109 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) provides only for fraud and forgery as ground for 
displacing the autonomy principle. 
 
In conflict of law situations, the Court of Appeals of New York in J Zeevi & Sons Ltd. 
v Grindlays Bank (Uganda) Ltd,680 held that the issuer's obligation under the letter of 
credit was not excused based on illegality abroad. The facts of this case are that 
                                                 
678
 Stone v Freeman, 298 NY 268, 271, 82 N.E.2d 571, 572, 8 A.L.R.2d 304. 
679
 Riggs v Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 511-512,22 NE 188, 190,5 L.R.A. 340: See also, Carr v Hoy 2 
N.Y.2d 185, 187, 158 NYS2d 572, 574-575). 
680
 (NY Ct of App 1975) 333 NE2d 168. 
228 
 
Grindlays Bank of Uganda issued a letter of credit to an Israeli beneficiary.  Grindlays 
Bank authorized Citibank in New York to debit Grindlays Bank's account if the 
beneficiary's drafts complied with the terms of the credit.  The Ugandan government, 
however, subsequently ordered the cancellation of all foreign exchange transactions 
with Israeli companies and nationals.  Grindlays Bank then cancelled its letter of 
credit. Citibank, in its turn, refused to honour J Zeevi & Son's drafts presented to it 
through Chemical Bank. J Zeevi & Sons proceeded to sue Grindlays Bank in New 
York State court. The New York Court of Appeals ruled that New York law, not 
Ugandan law, should be applied in the case because New York had ‘an overriding and 
paramount interest’ in the lawsuit. The New York Court of Appeal found that despite 
the illegality arising from the cancellation of all foreign exchange controls with Israeli 
nationals by the then General Amin; the mere fact that payment was to be made in 
New York gave New York the greatest interest in the litigation and thus the law of 
New York, not Uganda, applied.  
 
Hence, despite the illegality of operating the letter of credit under the Ugandan law, 
the credit could not be enjoined. A proper reading of this case reveals that some 
policy issues681 were instrumental in the New York Court of Appeal not respecting the 
illegality resulting from the executive order of the Ugandan Government. They were 
policy concerns relevant to the resolution of a problem682 as opposed to whether 
illegality was actually a ground upon which to enjoin payment such as (1) New York 
                                                 
681
 That is ‘enforcement of irrevocable letters of credit is vital to international commerce’ than 
respecting the order of Ugandan government made in the circumstance in which it was made and  that 
the Ugandan order represented a policy which was offensive to the citizens of New York as an 
international financial centre interested in the smooth operation of letters of credit. 
682
 J A Reinhart,  ‘Reallocating Letter of Credit risks: Chuidian v Philippine National Bank’ (1993)18 
NCJ Intl. L & Comm Reg 725, See also J Zeevi and Sons Ltd v Grindlays Bank (Uganda) Ltd 333 NE 
2d 168 (NY1975). 
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was the designated place of payment in the letter of credit;683 (2) New York, as a 
financial center, had a significant interest in the smooth and consistent enforcement of 
letters of credit obligations;684 and (3) the Ugandan order represented a policy which 
was offensive to the citizens of New York.685 
 
It must be noted that despite the UCC not making an express provision recognizing 
the illegality defence, nothing in article 5 of the UCC dealing with letters of credit 
expressly excludes the exception. In the United States, if payment on the letter of 
credit is illegal, certainly the issuer's dishonour will be excused.686 This is provided by 
the American Restatement of Laws published by the American Law Institute. 
American Restatement is essentially a codification of case law, common law judge-
made doctrines that develop gradually over time because of the principle of stare 
decisis. Although Restatements are not binding authority in and of themselves, they 
are highly persuasive because they are formulated over several years with extensive 
input from law professors, practising attorneys, and judges.687 Hence Section 202 of 
the American Restatement of Laws states that the effect of illegality upon a contract is 
determined by the law selected by application of the rules of [sections] 187-188, 
which deals with law of the state chosen by the parties and the law governing in 
absence of effective choice by the parties respectively. To ascertain the law governing 
a transaction, in the absence of effective choice by the parties, demands a 
consideration of a quite good number of issues 
 
                                                 
683
 ibid at 171. 
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 ibid at 172. 
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 ibid at 173. 
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 Restatement (Second) Of Conflict Of Laws § 202(2) (1971). 
687
 See the explanation offered by Wikipedia assessed on 25 July 
2009.http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Restatements_of_the_Law 
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Also inherent in the potential application of foreign law under a conflict of laws 
analysis is the notion of comity. Comity is defined as ‘the recognition which one 
nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of 
another nation . . . [as an] expression of understanding which demonstrates due regard 
both to international duty and convenience and to the rights of its own citizens or of 
other persons who are under the protection of its laws’.688 Recognition of a foreign 
law thus involves a policy decision grounded in a host of concerns which a court must 
balance and in most of the circumstances pay due regard to consideration of illegality. 
 
Hence, in Chuidian v Philippine National Bank,689 the US Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeal had the opportunity to address the effect of illegality in a letter of credit 
transaction which demanded the application of the law of a foreign nation so as to 
excuse liability in a letter of credit transaction on grounds of illegality. To understand 
this case and its implications, a discussion of its facts is necessary. In 1980, Asian 
Reliability Company, Inc. (ARCI), a Philippine corporation, received a loan guarantee 
of $25 million from the Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee Corporation 
(PG).690 Vincent Chuidian, a Philippine citizen living in the United States, was a 98% 
shareholder in ARCI. After ARCI defaulted on the loan, and caused PG to become 
liable through the guarantee, PG brought suit in Santa Clara County Superior Court 
alleging that Chuidian had misappropriated the funds for his own use and for 
investment in concerns outside of the scope of the loan guarantee.691 The parties 
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 Somportex Ltd v Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 
U.S. 1017 (1972).  
689
 734 F. Supp. 415. 
690
 Chuidian v Philippine National Bank, 734 F. Supp. 415.  
691
 The proceeds of the loan were supposed to be used for investment in industrial projects in the 
Philippines. PG alleged that the funds were instead used for Chuidian's personal benefit and to invest in 
two Silicon Valley corporations, Dynetics, Inc. and Interlek Semiconductor, Inc., in violation of the 
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entered into a settlement carried out through a stipulated judgment under which (1) 
Chuidian surrendered to PG shares of stock in ARCI, Dynetics, Inc., and Interlek 
Semiconductors, Inc., and (2) PG agreed to pay Chuidian $5.3 million ‘to be paid by 
means of an irrevocable letter of credit from a United States Bank’. The letter of 
credit, although issued by the bank in Manila, was payable at the counters of the 
bank's Los Angeles branch 
 
After the government of President Ferdinand Marcos fell in 1986, the new 
government in the Philippines established a Presidential Commission on Good 
Governance charged with the task of recovering any ‘ill-gotten wealth’ of President 
Marcos.  As part of this effort, the commission ordered the bank not to pay the letter 
of credit that had been issued in favour of Chuidian.  The commission suspected that 
the settlement of Guarantee Corp.'s lawsuit against Chuidian might have been 
fraudulent in that its purpose was to pay off Chuidian for his remaining silent about 
President Marcos's participation in Chuidian's businesses.  Stopping payment of the 
letter of credit would obviously give the Commission time to analyze the legitimacy 
of the settlement. 
 
Chuidian proceeded to sue the bank in a California state court in Los Angeles for 
refusing to pay its letter of credit.  The bank remanded the case to the U.S. federal 
district court.  After a trial, the Federal court excused the bank from paying its letter 
of credit on the ground that since the place of performance of the letter of credit was 
Manila, the order of the commission had rendered payment of the credit illegal.692  
The district court considered two defences that would excuse PNB from liability 
                                                                                                                                            
terms of the loan. Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guar. Corp. v Chuidian, 267 Cal Rptr 457, 460 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1990). 
692
 734 F. Supp. 415 (C D Cal. 1990). 
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under the letter of credit. The first was fraud and duress in the underlying settlement 
agreement. The court rejected this defence. A different line of defence, however, was 
recognized by the court, which offered alternative holdings that PNB's performance 
was excused because (1) it was illegal or (2) the doctrines of comity and act of state 
meant that the Philippine executive order should be observed by a U.S. court.693 The 
district court therefore held that the settlement agreement between PG and Chuidian 
was valid, but that performance of the letter of credit arising under that settlement 
agreement was excused because it was illegal or, in the alternative, because the 
doctrines of comity and act of state gave the Philippine executive order validity in the 
United States.694 Chuidian's trustee in bankruptcy appealed this decision to the Ninth 
Circuit.  The Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision but focused solely on the illegality of 
performance in the Philippines as the ground for excusing the Philippine National 
Bank from dishonour. 
 
A proper analysis of this case reveals that illegality affecting the credit arose from the 
acts in the underlying transaction thus making the credit illegal as well as the 
underlying transaction. The case evidences the application of the rules of comity and 
conflict of laws. It largely justifies the contention that, despite the express provision of 
Art.5 making fraud and forgery the only ground for dishonour of a letter of credit in 
the United States, a letter of credit that is illegal, by the application of the rules of 
comity arising from the illegality, has been held to be unenforceable.   
 
It is finally submitted that despite the UCC not making an express provision 
recognizing the illegality defence, nothing in article 5 of the UCC dealing with letters 
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of credit expressly excludes the exception. This could be deduced by a combined 
effect of Article 5-103 dealing with the scope of the provision as well as other United 
States laws whose combined effects seem not to exclude the illegality defence in 
documentary credit. 
 
7.5.2.  Position in Singapore 
 
Case law and judges in Singapore have maintained a robust disposition regarding the 
exceptions to the principle of autonomy in documentary credit. This has been 
expressly felt in the recognition of a separate exception on the ground of nullity of the 
tendered documents in a documentary credits transaction that is distinct from the 
fraud rule.695 It has also maintained that there is a separate exception known as the 
unconscionability exception.696 However, on the issue of illegality as an exception to 
the principle of autonomy, there is currently no express judicial authority on the point. 
However, considering the trend of the decisions so far in Singapore on the exceptions 
to the principle of autonomy, it may not be totally wrong to conclude that considering 
the policy issues 697  that underpin the recognition of the illegality defence, its 
recognition as an exception in Singapore is only a matter of time. But till that time, 
the current position in Singapore is that there is no illegality exception. 
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 This issue would be giving a detailed consideration in subsequent chapters under the heading the 
nullity exception. 
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 See generally, GHL Pte v Unitrack Construction Ltd and Another [1999]4 SLR 604, See also the 
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7.5.3.  English law 
 
The first major legal pronouncement on the issue of illegality as it affects 
documentary credit was in the American Accord.698  Lord Diplock commented on 
illegality and its implications when it affects a documentary credit transaction. 
However, despite United City Merchants (Investments) Ltd and Glass Fibres and 
Equipments Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada,699touching on illegality, the first English 
decision to have expressly raised the issue as to whether illegality in the underlying 
transaction should form a separate exception that is distinct from fraud is Group Josi 
Re v Walbrook Insurance Co Ltd and Others. 700 Here, the Court of Appeal had the 
opportunity to consider the issue as to whether illegality in the underlying transaction 
could form the basis of a separate exception that is different from fraud. Staughton LJ 
in resolving one of the arguments of the appellant as to why the defendant was not 
entitled to the encashment of the letters of credit noted as follows, 
 
… in my judgment illegality is a separate ground for non-payment under a 
letter of credit. That may seem a bold assertion, when Lord Diplock in the 
United City Merchants case said that there was ‘one established exception’. 
But in that very case the House of Lords declined to enforce a letter of credit 
contract in part for another reason, that is to say the exchange control 
regulations of Peru as applied by the Bretton Woods Agreements Order in 
Council 1946. I agree that the Bretton Woods point may well have been of a 
kind of its own, and not an indication that illegality generally is a defence 
                                                 
698
 [1983] 1 AC 168. 
699
 [1983] 1 AC 168. 
700
 [1996] 1 Lloyd's Rep 345.  
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under a letter of credit. But it does perhaps show that established fraud is not 
necessarily the only exception.701 
 
The confidence in the opinion of Staughton LJ as to the existence of a separate 
exception from fraud led to the citing of many instances in which he was convinced 
that illegality in the underlying transaction could constitute a separate exception from 
fraud. He cited a convincing hypothetical example where illegality could operate as a 
bar to payment on a letter of credit ‘a contract for the sale of arms to Iraq, at a time 
when such a sale is illegal. The contract provides for the opening of a letter of credit, 
to operate on presentation of a bill of lading for 1000 Kalashnikov rifles to be carried 
to the port of Basra. I do not suppose that a Court would give judgment for the 
beneficiary against the bank in such a case’. 
 
In Mahonia Ltd v JP Morgan Chase Bank and West LB,702 the issue of illegality in the 
underlying transaction constituting a separate exception to the principle of autonomy 
once again received judicial attention. In this case, a claim was brought by the 
claimant, Mahonia for payment of US $165 million under a letter of credit issued by 
the defendant bank, West LB. The backdrop to this action was the collapse of the US 
energy giant, Enron. Mahonia was a special purpose vehicle utilized to enter into a 
series of swap transactions with Enron and JP Morgan Chase, as a result of which the 
letter of credit issued by West LB at Enron’s request acted as a security required in 
relation to one of the swaps. Upon presentation to it of conforming documents, West 
LB refused to make payment under the credit, contending that it had a valid defence 
for refusing payment, as the letter of credit was unenforceable for illegality either 
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directly or by way of taint from the underlying transaction.703 It need not be forgotten 
that at the time of refusal to make payment, Enron had already filed for Chapter 11 
bankruptcy proceeding in the US and West LB would have been unable to recover the 
value of the credit from Enron. West LB in justifying the illegality argued that the 
swaps transaction has been entered into as a means of Enron obtaining a ‘disguised” 
loan that need not be reflected on its published accounts. The purpose it further argued 
was contrary to US accounting standards and in breach of US securities law. 
 
Mahonia applied for summary judgment on the basis that West LB had no defence to 
the action. However, its application was refused by Colman J, on the ground that there 
was an arguable defence of illegality sufficient to go to trial. In considering the issues, 
Colman J allied his position with the pronouncement made obiter by Staughton LJ in 
Group Josi Re v Walbrook Insurance Co Ltd 704  when he said ‘I find it almost 
incredible that a party to an unlawful arms transaction would be permitted to enforce a 
letter of credit which was an integral part of that transaction even if the relevant 
legislation did not on its proper construction render ancillary contracts illegal. To take 
an even more extreme example, I cannot believe that any Court would enforce a letter 
of credit to secure payment for the sale and purchase of heroin between foreign 
locations in which such underlying contracts were illegal’.705  
 
At the full trial of the action,706 Cooke J found that there was no illegality in the 
underlying transaction as there was no breach of the US accounting standard and 
hence no breach of US securities law. In the words of the Cooke J,  ‘It follows from 
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my finding that Enron's accounting for the prepays was not in breach of US 
accounting rules, that its accounting for these transactions did not constitute a breach 
of US Securities law. It inevitably follows that West cannot show that there was any 
conspiracy between Enron, Mahonia and Chase to devise, arrange and implement 
transactions in order to enable Enron to account wrongfully. It equally follows that 
there was no unlawful purpose behind the Three Swaps or the letter of credit’.707 As a 
result of this finding, the question of the effect of illegality in a letter of credit law was 
not subject of an authoritative legal pronouncement in Cooke J’s judgment. However, 
the hypothetical case based on the argument canvassed by West LB was considered. It 
in effect tried to resolve the hypothetical question as to what will be the effect of West 
LB establishing that there was an unlawful underlying purpose for the swap 
transactions in respect of which the letter of credit was issued. Cooke J primarily 
allied his view with that of Colman J at the summary application stage as to the 
operation of law of illegality. His conclusion was that the impregnability of the letters 
of credit by virtue of the autonomy principle does not prevent it from being tainted 
with illegality in the underlying transaction.708  
 
It must be noted that Cooke J’s opinion, which is in accord with earlier judicial 
views709 on the issue (availability of illegality defence in documentary credit law), 
reflects the direction that the English law is going. However, as already pointed out by 
Professor Nelson Enonchong,710 the views expressed so far in the cases are merely 
obiter as there is yet no English case where a complying presentation has been 
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dishonoured on the grounds of illegality of the underlying transaction. Hence, it may 
be appropriate to consider some of the legal issues that are necessary for the 
application of the illegality exception. 
 
 
7. 6. Legal Considerations for the Application of Illegality Defence 
 
Having considered the present state of English law on the availability of the illegality 
defence as an exception to the principle of autonomy in documentary credits; this 
section examines some legal issues which the existence of an illegality defence will 
undoubtedly bring to the fore. It attempts to define the boundaries of the exception by 
examining the scope of the illegality defence that will warrant a departure from the 
principle of autonomy. In doing the above, certain legal issues are considered and 
analysed. They include the evidentiary requirement for the application of the illegality 
defence, the intent of the beneficiary and the extent to which it remains a primary 
consideration to the application of the illegality defence, an analysis of whether there 
should be a connection between the letter of credit and the alleged illegality for it to 
warrant a departure from the principle of autonomy. Finally, a consideration whether 
the distinction between serious and trivial illegality is actually necessary in the 
application of the exception in documentary credits’ law will be undertaken. 
 
7.6.1. Evidentiary Requirement of Illegality Defence 
 
The evidence required for the proof of illegality is still subject to conflicting 
interpretation by the courts in England. This is evident not only from decided cases 
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but also from the opinion of experts. The uncertainties surrounding the application of 
the law in the area prompted Staughton LJ 711  to share the view expressed by 
Balcombe LJ in Themehelp Ltd. v West and Others712 that ‘the law on this topic is not 
wholly satisfactory’.713 However to understand the nature of the evidence required in 
illegality cases, two main issues call for consideration, the standard of proof and the 
time at which the bank should have the evidence upon which to establish illegality. 
 
Staughton LJ in the Group Josi’s dealt with the issue of what level of evidence is 
required to establish illegality in documentary credit. In this regard, Staughton LJ 
questioned whether illegality, like fraud, has to be clearly established and known to 
the bank before it could operate as a defence for restraining payment by the bank. In 
his answer he noted the difficulty associated with this question but was of the view 
that it would. He continued that if illegality is merely doubtful, it may be that the bank 
will not be restrained. Hence, Staughton, LJ reinforced the high standard of proof 
already well known in documentary credits in the case of fraud. The statement of 
Staughton LJ raises further questions. What amounts to a situation where an illegality 
has been clearly established? To analyze this question, one will ignore in this part of 
the discourse, a question that seems to be neglected714 but poses a primary difficulty 
in understanding of when illegality is clearly established. The question touches on the 
complexity surrounding the understanding of when a given contract can be said to be 
illegal715 or when a transaction is illegal. It has to be pointed out that the extremely 
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fluid nature of the notion of ‘illegality’ and the absence of any simple agreed 
definition of what constitutes an ‘illegal transaction’716 poses a tremendous difficulty 
in ascertaining when an illegality is clearly established. 
 
If the standard of proof required in illegality cases is that the illegality must be clear, 
then another consideration that may arise in this circumstance is the question whether 
illegality would be ‘clear as to what’? Or put differently, is it supposed to be clear 
with respect to all the components that make up the proof of illegality? This question 
is raised because the overall approach of the courts as to the issues of proof of 
illegality have not been consistent and tend most often to be ultimately pragmatic and 
very much dependent on the facts of the particular case in question.717 It may also be 
noted that the standard of proof of clear illegality which is also used in cases of fraud 
has been perceived to be a high standard that has so limited the exception as to have 
prompted Ackner LJ to warn of the inherent dangers of too high a standard of proof. 
 
7.6.2.  Timing 
 
The question of when knowledge of illegality, just like fraud, must be apparent arises 
in two major situations: first, if the bank has not paid and is resisting proceedings by 
the beneficiary for payment under the letter of credit; and secondly if the bank has 
already paid on the credit and the applicant is resisting reimbursement. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
was held that the transaction which involved the three swap transactions was not illegal but merely a 
“price risk management activities” 
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Contracts (30th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2006) para 16-001, See generally ‘Illegal Transactions: The 
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241 
 
In the first instance, if the bank decides not to pay it has a responsibility to establish 
the illegality at the trial if it is sued by the beneficiary. However, for the bank to have 
the right of refusal, actual illegality must be demonstrated, as it is not sufficient for the 
bank merely to prove that there is material which would lead a reasonable banker to 
infer the illegality by the beneficiary.718 Hence if illegality is apparent at the time 
payment is due, then the bank must not make payment and has a defence to a claim by 
the beneficiary. An issue that arises in this context is: suppose that the bank rejects 
documents based on an alleged illegality but that decision is subsequently conceded to 
be wrong based on the material available at the time payment was due. Can the bank 
defend proceedings relying on new evidence of illegality which came to light after the 
date of payment but before trial?  
 
Drawing from the approach adopted in the fraud rule in Balfour Beatty Civil 
Engineering v Technical and General Guarantee Co Ltd,719 Waller LJ, recognized the 
submission that if at the hearing stage the bank can produce clear evidence of fraud, it 
would be unreasonable to think that the bank can have judgment entered against it 
because evidence of the fraud was not available to the bank at the time when payment 
was due. However, the above submission did not deter the court from taking the view 
held in the Edward Owen Case720 to the effect that the bank is only entitled to refuse 
payment ‘where it has clear evidence of fraud’. In other words, the liability of the 
bank cannot alter depending on what stage the litigation has reached and it would be 
unreasonable to require the court to give judgment because it concluded that, although 
fraud was now sufficiently established, it had not been established and known to the 
bank at the time when the demand was made.  
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719
 (1999) 68 Con LR 180. 
720
 Edward Owen (Engineering) Ltd v Barclays Bank International Ltd [1978] QB 159,169. 
242 
 
 
In Solo Industries UK Ltd v Canara Bank721  Mance LJ identified a way of removing 
the ‘contradiction’ that would result from insisting that the bank must have clear 
evidence at the time of payment. After considering Waller LJ’s analysis in the Balfour 
Beatty case, Mance LJ held that:  
 
Another way of reaching the same conclusion… may be by applying Lord 
Diplock’s underlying principle that the court should not lend its process to 
assist fraud and that “fraud unravels all”. Not question arises in this context of 
the grant of injunctive relief or any requirement for that purpose to have a 
course of action. It would affront good sense ... if courts were obliged to give 
judgment in favour of a beneficiary now shown to be acting fraudulently 
 
Also in Mahonia Ltd v JP Morgan Chase Bank,722 Colman J expressed a view that 
supports Mance LJ’s approach. It is also the submission of Professor Enonchong723 
that Mance LJ’s approach is preferable as it has the merit of allowing the bank to use 
clear evidence of fraud in all cases where such evidence is available rather than in 
cases where it has a counterclaim. This approach, it is submitted, is not only legally 
persuasive but sensible if regard is had at the policy reasons behind the recognition of 
the fraud rule. 
 
The second situation relates to where the bank has paid in accordance with the terms 
and condition of the credit and is seeking reimbursement from the applicant. In Credit 
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Agricole Indosuez v General Bank724 it was held that a bank that has paid according to 
its mandate is entitled to reimbursement unless there is clear evidence of fraud at the 
time of payment, as it is not open to the applicant objecting to the bank’s decision to 
rely on evidence not made available to the bank at the time of payment. The above 
position confirmed the earlier position in United Trading Corpn SA v Allied Arab 
Bank Ltd725 where the court held that the relevant date for establishing fraud in cases 
where the bank has made payment based on the representation of the beneficiary must 
be such fraud that was clear prior to the actual payment. Accordingly, ‘if all that the 
plaintiff (account party) can establish is such knowledge after payment, then it has 
failed to establish his cause of action. The bank would not have been in breach of any 
duty in making payment without the requisite knowledge’726 
 
7.6.3.  The Reliance Doctrine and Proof of Illegality 
 
As explained above, the proof of illegality is fraught with some difficulties. One 
difficulty is whether the plaintiff’s reliance on the illegality needs to be established so 
as to prove the illegality and ultimately defeat his claim. This question is raised 
bearing in mind that the operation of the reliance principle exists mainly in cases of 
trust and determination of proprietary rights.727 The case of Tinsley v Milligan728made 
the reliance principle in illegality popular. The facts are that the parties were 
cohabitees who had both contributed to the purchase price of a house. The house had, 
however, been solely registered in Miss Tinsley’s name in order to enable Miss 
Milligan to make false claims to the Department of Social Security. The proceeds of 
                                                 
724
 [1999] 2 All ER (Comm.) 1009, 1015. 
725
 [1985] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 554. 
726
 ibid at 560. 
727
  See generally Tinsley v Milligan [1994] 1 AC 340. 
728
 [1962] AC 304. 
244 
 
the fraud were used by both parties, but they did not amount to a substantial part of 
their joint income. The parties subsequently quarrelled and Miss Tinsley moved out. 
She brought a claim against Miss Milligan for possession of the house, asserting her 
legal title to it. Miss Milligan counterclaimed for an order for sale and a declaration 
that the house was held by Miss Tinsley in trust for them both in equal shares. Miss 
Tinsley contended that because of the illegal scheme, Miss Milligan could not 
establish any equitable interest in the house under a trust. It was held by a bare 
majority of the House of Lords, who upheld a majority decision of the Court of 
Appeal which had confirmed the finding of the trial judge, that Miss Milligan was 
entitled to her equitable share in the property provided that she did not need to lead 
evidence of the illegality in order to prove her equitable interest in the property. 
 
The use of this doctrine in illegality cases as earlier pointed out has not been 
consistent. In Chai Sau Yin v Liew Kwee Sam,729  the defendant bought a quantity of 
rubber from the plaintiff in breach of a Malayan statutory provision which required a 
purchaser of rubber to be licensed. After accepting delivery of the rubber, the 
defendant refused to pay the price. The Privy Council held that the sale contract 
entered into in breach of the licensing condition was impliedly prohibited by the 
statute and the defendant was able to rely on his own unlawful actions to defeat a 
claim by the plaintiff for the sale price. It has to be noted that the plaintiff in this case 
had not been in breach of any statutory prohibition and the proof of his reliance on the 
said illegality as to defeat the plaintiff’s action for the price was not established. 
However, despite the failure to establish that the plaintiff, in claiming for the purchase 
price of goods sold was not relying on any illegality, his action for the price failed.  
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The question may then arise as to whether the application of the illegality exception in 
documentary credit would require a proof of the beneficiary reliance on her illegality 
as to deny payment? It is submitted that the insistence on the proof of the 
beneficiary’s reliance on the illegality would lead to an unsatisfactory result. To this 
effect, some academic commentators have criticized the reliance principle as being 
arbitrary and not based on any convincing policy reasoning.730 It is submitted that in 
documentary credit, insisting on the proof of the beneficiary’s reliance on his 
illegality as a ground for knowing when payment would be denied would prove 
problematic. This is because, in most of the cases, the beneficiary would be insisting 
on the separation between the documentary credit contract and whatever illegality 
arises in relation to the underlying contract. 
 
  
In conclusion, the reliance principle, viewed from the many angles upon which 
illegality can affect a contract or trust has generated an approach that is unsatisfactory, 
arbitrary, uncertain and is not based on any convincing policy rationale. 731  In 
documentary credits, if the proof of reliance is insisted on for illegality to be a ground 
for withholding payment, the consequence may be that the exception of illegality may 
never be applied, at least with regard to the beneficiary asking for payment in 
documentary credits. Take for example, in situations where the beneficiary has 
applied for summary judgment for payment in cases of the bank’s refusal to pay, 
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chances are that most often than not, the beneficiary’s claim would succeed, as the 
beneficiary does not need to rely on the illegality in the underlying transaction in 
order to make out his claim for payment under the letters of credit transaction. 
 
Having noted the difficulty associated with the reliance doctrine and the standard of 
proof of illegality, questions may arise as to whether there are other ways of setting 
clear parameters upon which illegality could be founded. This in itself is an 
uncertain732 question but considering the recommendation of the Law Commission 
that this is an area of law that requires the courts to use certain discretion in its 
consideration as to when illegality is proved and should constitute ground for the 
denial of a claim, attempt will be made to consider some of the limiting factors that 
the court should take into consideration in coming to a conclusion as to when 
illegality is established. 
 
7.7. Illegality: Defining its Boundaries 
 
This section analyzes the ambit of an illegality exception that would warrant a 
departure from the autonomy rule in documentary credits. The task is undertaken 
bearing in mind that the complex matrix733 of judicial interpretation surrounding the 
understanding of illegality poses a great difficulty. It needs to be emphasized that 
despite the difficulty of articulating all the issues that will govern the application of 
illegality defence in documentary credits, there are strong cases by academics734 and 
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judges735  that in certain situation, illegality could be a defence to the principle of 
autonomy. This section analyses some of the criteria and ingredients that need to be 
present for illegality to be a ground upon which the independent undertaking of 
documentary credits could be set aside.  Such ingredients include questions as to (a) 
how serious the illegality is, (b) the knowledge and intention of the of the party 
involved in illegal conduct, (c) whether denying relief would act as a deterrent, the 
requirement of a close connection between the illegality and the letter of credit and 
finally (d) whether denying relief would further the purpose of the rule which renders 
the claimant’s conduct illegal.736 
 
7.7.1.  Seriousness of Illegality 
 
The seriousness of the illegality that will justify a departure from the principle of 
autonomy is a good parameter for limiting the illegality exception as well as a strong 
factor to be taking into account in the proof of illegality arising from the underlying 
transaction. In Standard Chartered Bank v Pakistan National Shipping Corporation 
and others (No 2)737 Cresswell J738 hinted at this requirement of the seriousness of the 
illegal conduct by noting that it is likely that even a claim which is linked to an illegal 
act will not fail unless the illegality is of a serious nature. Cresswell J, also noted that 
‘whatever theory founds a defence of ex turpi, the defendant must establish (a) that 
the plaintiff’s conduct is so clearly reprehensible so as to justify its condemnation by 
the Court and (b) that the conduct is so much part of the claim against the 
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defendant...as to justify refusing any remedy to the plaintiff’.739  Also the case of Lane 
v Holloway740 provides example of where the claimant’s illegality was held to be 
trivial as to not defeat his claim. 
 
One question that arises in deciding the seriousness of illegality is where to draw the 
line between an illegality which is sufficiently serious and that which is not.741 Some 
instances of illegality that are serious were captured in Group Josi Re v Walbrook 
Insurance Co. Ltd742 when Staughton LJ gave as an example, an underlying contract 
for the sale of arms to Iraq at a time when such sale is illegal. In the same vein, 
Colman J743 referred to an underlying contract for the sale and purchase of heroin. The 
difficulty with the above approach is that it does not establish any verifiable criteria 
for knowing when illegality is sufficiently serious apart from the mentioning of 
extreme examples of illegal conduct which are rare in real commercial life.  
 
However, Cooke J in Mahonia Limited v JP Morgan Chase Bank, West LB AG (No 
2)744 devised criteria for categorizing illegality that is serious enough to displace the 
autonomy principle. Based on these criteria, illegality was analyzed in two main 
categories. Illegality that involved intentional wrong doing (in which case the 
illegality defence applies) and illegality that arises through mere inadvertence (in 
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which case it does not) were differentiated. 745  This criterion for assessing the 
seriousness of illegality, though commendable, appears not to provide a complete 
answer as to when an illegality should be seen as being serious. Case law is replete 
with instances where a plaintiff’s claim has been defeated by illegality even though 
there was no intentional breach of law.746 However, despite the inherent difficulty 
associated with ascertaining when an illegality is sufficiently serious, it does not affect 
the limiting role played by this test as an effective mechanism for drawing out the 
scope of the underlying contract illegality that will affect the letter of credit. 
 
7.7.2.  The Knowledge and Intention of the Claimant/ Beneficiary 
 
This is a very crucial criterion for narrowing the scope of the illegality defence. The 
claimant in this context refers to the person who is seeking to rely on what would, 
save for the illegality, be his or her normal legal rights and remedies.747 Though this 
criterion for limiting the illegality defence has not received unanimous support,748 
there is strong force to the submission that the principle that a claimant/beneficiary 
should not be allowed to profit from his own wrongdoing should not be applied where 
the claimant does not know that the act is unlawful or is not in any way morally 
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culpable.749 Under general law, barring some exceptions,750 where an agreement is 
illegal as a result of being entered into for an illegal purpose, a claimant who has no 
knowledge of the illegal purpose is not barred by the defence of illegality.751  In the 
Canadian case of Bosse v Mastercraft,752  It was held that in so far as a lender did not 
have knowledge of a borrower’s illegal purpose, an action for the borrowed money 
under the loan agreement is not defeated by the illegality arising from the borrower 
using the fund for illegal transactions. Following from the above, if applied in the 
context of documentary credits, it follows that illegality in the underlying transaction 
will not defeat the beneficiary’s claim if the beneficiary was not aware of that 
illegality. 753  Take for example, an international transaction that is financed by 
documentary credits between an English seller and an overseas buyer, and the 
overseas buyer intended to commit or in fact did commit an illegal conduct by 
importing the goods to his country in breach of some local ports regulations without 
the knowledge of the seller. Will such illegality defeat the English seller’s 
presentation of document for payment under the documentary credit? It is submitted 
that to protect the integrity of documentary credits, such illegality without the 
knowledge of the beneficiary should not defeat his claim for payment. 
 
This criterion was impliedly adopted in part by Cooke J in Mahonia (2)754 in deciding 
whether the actions of Enron in accounting for the prepay transactions in the way it 
did was contrary to US accounting principles and hence illegal. In determining 
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whether the action of Enron in accounting for the swap transactions in the manner it 
did, was illegal, such factors as the knowledge of Enron as to the accounting 
procedures based on the advice it took from its auditor were considered. It was 
established, based on the advice of its auditors (Arthur Anderson), that Enron was 
right to account for the swap transactions as a ‘price risk’ management obligation and 
not as a loan and by so doing was not in breach of US securities law. 
 
7.7.3.   A Close Connection 
 
Another important factor that will limit the ambit of the illegality exception is the 
requirement of establishing a close link between the documentary credits and the 
underlying illegal transaction. In Fidelity & Deposit Co of Maryland v Grand Nat. 
Bank755 the difficulty of identifying the criteria with which a court would determine 
whether, in a particular situation, there is a sufficiently close connection between a 
claim and an alleged illegal conduct was recognized. The court noted that ‘the 
question of how close illegality must be woven into a transaction in order to taint it is 
often difficult to determine’.756 It went on to state that ‘the principle to be applied is 
one of general public policy, and the inquiry is not alone as to the effect of a particular 
transaction, but whether its tendency is in the direction of public detriment’.757 It 
simply follows that the test advocated here is that to determine whether an illegal 
conduct is related to a claim as to taint it, consideration should not be restricted to 
only the relationship between the illegal conduct and claim but extended to whether 
barring or allowing the claim will have a public detrimental effect. Adopting this 
approach, it is submitted, would lead to uncertain result as in most cases the public 
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detriment rule will lead to every claim having a close connection with the illegality as 
issues unconnected with a direct relationship between the illegality and a particular 
transaction will be put in perspective in determining whether there is a close 
connection.  
 
In the context of documentary credits, ascertaining when illegality in the underlying 
transaction will have a close connection with the credit so as to taint it is also not an 
easy question.758 Many tests have been formulated and some adapted from general 
law on illegality in an attempt to resolve this vexed issue. The test ranges from the one 
developed by the Court of Appeal in Bowmakers Ltd v Barnet Instruments Ltd759 and 
confirmed by the English House of Lords in Tinsley v Millingan otherwise known as 
the ‘reliance doctrine’, to the test formulated in Mahonia’s case.760 The central theme 
of the reliance doctrine was prominently illustrated in Tinsley v Millingan.  
 
In Tinsley’s Case, the House of Lords761 majority upheld a majority decision of the 
Court of Appeal762 which had confirmed the finding of the trial judge in favour of 
Miss Milligan. Lord Browne-Wilkinson, in the lead speech noted that a plaintiff can at 
law enforce property rights so acquired provided that he does not need to rely on the 
illegal contract for any purpose other than providing the basis of his claim to a 
property right. The inference to be drawn from the above is that despite illegality 
affecting the underlying contract, illegality could not bar a recovery provided the 
claimant does not rely on the illegality to establish his claim. 
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In Mahonia Limited v JP Morgan Chase Bank, West LB AG (No 2)763 Cooke J, did not 
lay down any convincing approach for ascertaining the “closeness test” between the 
illegality in the underlying transaction and the documentary credits which is issued in 
respect of it. As to the contention of West LB in the above case that the letters of 
credit were an integral part of the three Swaps, 764  and suffered from the same 
unlawful underlying purpose, or alternatively that it was so connected with those 
transactions that it was tainted by the illegality which affected them, Cooke J accepted 
that if the illegality in the underlying transaction were to be established, he would not 
have hesitated to accept the contention that the documentary credit ‘was directly tied 
to the illegal purpose since it was an important part of the scheme which was to give 
rise to the unlawful accounting albeit that it was not directly connected to the 
accounting itself, in the manner of the Three Swaps’.765 On which criteria was the 
conclusion reached that the underlying illegality was connected to the letter of credit? 
It is, with respect, subject to doubt how this conclusion was arrived at. The only 
rational explanation for the approach of Cooke J could be gleaned from the judgment 
of Kerr and Bingham LJJ in Saunders v Edwards766 where the Lord Justices adopted a 
discretionary and pragmatic approach in establishing a close link and stated as follows: 
 
Where issues of illegality are raised, the courts have...to steer a middle course 
between two unacceptable positions. On the one hand it is unacceptable that 
any court of law should aid or lend its authority to a party seeking to pursue or 
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enforce an object or agreement which the law prohibits. On the other hand, it 
is unacceptable that the court should, on the first indication of unlawfulness 
affecting any aspect of a transaction, draw up its skirts and refuse all 
assistance to the plaintiff, no matter how serious his loss nor how 
disproportionate his loss to the unlawfulness of his conduct... . [O]n the whole 
the courts have tended to adopt a pragmatic approach to these problems, 
seeking where possible to see that genuine wrongs are righted so long as the 
court does not thereby promote or countenance a nefarious object or bargain 
which it is bound to condemn. Where the plaintiff’s action in truth arises 
directly ex turpi causa, he is likely to fail... [w]here the plaintiff has suffered a 
genuine wrong, to which the allegedly unlawful conduct is incidental, he is 
likely to succeed....767 
 
 
Commentators have not shied way from proffering a criterion for identifying the 
closeness between the letters of credit and the underlying illegal transaction. For 
example, Professor Enonchong suggested that the ‘sole criteria that should be used to 
determine whether the letter of credit is sufficiently connected to the illegality in the 
underlying transaction should be the beneficiary’s complicity in it’.768 It is strongly 
contended that once the beneficiary is aware of the illegal purpose in the underlying 
transaction, it should be enough to establish a close connection between the illegality 
in the underlying transaction and the letter of credit in respect of which it is issued.769 
This approach, it is submitted is in legal terms persuasive and should be commended.  
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7.7.4.  Whether Denying Relief will further the Purpose of the Rule which 
Renders the Contract Illegal 
 
This should be a very strong limiting factor to the illegality that would cause a 
departure from the autonomy principle. The limiting role of this criterion was 
recognized by McHugh J770 when he said that ‘the courts should not refuse to enforce 
legal or equitable rights simply because they arose out of or were associated with an 
unlawful purpose’ unless, inter alia, ‘the imposition of the sanction is necessary, 
having regard to the terms of the statute, to protect its objects or policies’771 Sir 
Gứnter Treitel has added his voice in this direction by suggesting that the question, 
whether success or failure of the civil claim would be more likely to promote the 
purpose of the invalidating rule, should be the decisive issue in all cases.772  
 
In the context of documentary credits, the efficiency of this criterion as a test for 
limiting the applicability or effects of illegality was captured in the case of Group Josi 
Re v Walbrook Insurance Co Ltd and Others773 where the Court of Appeal was called 
upon to decide whether the prohibition by a statute on overseas insurance companies 
from carrying out the business of insurance in England amounted to illegality that 
affected payment under a letter of credit. In order to resolve the problem whether 
there was illegality of the reinsurance contracts in the above case, Staughton LJ, 
though conceding that in certain cases illegality in the underlying contract would be a 
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valid ground for withholding payment in a documentary credit, resorted to an 
understanding of the purpose of the rule which was argued to make the carrying on of 
reinsurance business illegal. By a combined reading of Section 132 of the Financial 
Services Act 1986 in relation to the Section 2 Insurance Companies Act, 1982, it was 
held that performance of the reinsurance contracts by the reinsurers was not illegal.774 
The reason for so holding was that the purpose of a combined reading of the sections 
was to prevent insurers or reinsurers from refusing to pay claims merely because they 
were carrying on unauthorized insurance business.775 
 
 
7.7.5.  Deterrent Effect of Illegality 
 
The ambit of the illegality defence could be further limited by addressing the question 
whether the application of the defence would have any deterrent effect. As noted 
earlier, apart from the public policy reasons, deterrence is one rationale that lies 
behind the illegality rules. Hence restricting the scope of the illegality defence by 
considering in some circumstances whether denial of relief or claim will have a major 
deterrent effect will further curtail the availability of the illegality defence. The 
general principle is that refusing to award a claimant relief will deter others from 
entering into or performing under similar illegal contracts. However, some 
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commentators776 have noted that refusing relief will not act as an appropriate deterrent 
in all circumstances.777 
 
In the documentary credits, using the deterrent criterion as a limiting factor will serve 
a very useful purpose especially where the illegality involved is sufficiently serious. 
Take for instance the example giving by Staughton LJ778 as to situations where the 
court regards illegality in the underlying transaction to be capable of displacing the 
autonomy principle, like a contract for the sale of arms to Iraq that is financed by 
letters of credit, at a time when such a sale is illegal.779 A bank or court of law could 
refuse the beneficiary payment under the documentary credits supporting such 
transaction on the ground that refusing payment would deter others from using 
documentary credits to finance such illegal transaction. 
 
 
7.8.  Conclusion 
 
As in general law, illegality remains a central issue in documentary credit’s law. As 
early as 1995, Staughton LJ in the Group Josi780 case recognized the importance of 
illegality in relation to the principle of autonomy and stated that ‘in my judgment 
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illegality is a separate ground for non-payment under a letter of credit’781 Following 
from the pronouncement of Staughton LJ and the more recent authorities, 782  the 
vexing issue for parties involved in credit operations is not whether the exception is or 
should be recognized, but the manner in which it operates and should be applied in 
practice. Following from the above, it has to be submitted that the subject of illegality 
is one that presents tremendous difficulty both in terms of analysis and effectively 
carving out the ambit within which it operates. The complexity of analysis however 
should not deter from the importance of having the illegality defence because of the 
public policy role its recognition plays in documentary credit law by making sure that 
illegal underlying transaction in certain limited circumstances penetrates the otherwise 
impregnability of documentary credits. 
 
However, carving out the ambit of the illegality defence based on the analysis of case 
law presents considerable difficulty. Part of the problem stems from the fact that the 
rationale for the illegality defence based upon the analysis of cases on illegality 
cannot be articulated from the standpoint of public policy alone. Hence, drawing the 
boundaries of the illegality defence invites the use of discretion and a pragmatic 
approach by the court by considering a multiplicity of issues like the seriousness of 
the illegality, the knowledge of the claimant, how close the illegality is connected to 
the claim under the letters of credit etc.  
 
The question that inevitably arises is whether these considerations (the use of 
discretion) in the determination of when illegality exists, if viewed from the perceived 
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mercantile function of documentary credits, (to provide an assurance of payment) will 
not introduce uncertainty in an area of law where certainty is paramount. The answer 
to this question depends on how literally the concept of the autonomy of documentary 
credits is to be taken. For the advocates of total autonomy and irrevocability of 
documentary credits, illegality in the underlying contract of sale, and the attempt to 
reconcile conflicting public policies associated with illegality, may well give rise to 
uncertain consequences. However, some judges would take the view that it would be 
wrong in principle to invest letters of credit with a rigid inflexibility in the face of a 
strong countervailing public policy issue like illegality. The reason for this may not be 
far-fetched. If a beneficiary should as a matter of public policy be precluded from 
utilizing a letter of credit to benefit from his own fraud, it is hard to see, considering 
the seriousness of illegality in law why he should be permitted to use the court to 
enforce part of an underlying transaction which would have been unenforceable on 
grounds of its illegality if no letter of credit had been involved, however serious the 
material illegality involved. To prevent him doing so in an appropriately serious cases 
could hardly be seen as a threat to the lifeblood of international commerce. 
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Chapter Eight 
 
8.0.  Contractual Restrictions on a Beneficiary's Right to Draw on a Credit 
 
8.1. Introduction 
 
As the analysis in Chapters Three reveals, in English law, a fraud by the beneficiary 
or his agent displaces the right of the beneficiary to draw down on the letters of credit 
even though he presented apparently conforming documents. The above exception 
operates regardless of the assurance of payment promised the seller/beneficiary upon 
the tender of conforming documents that forms the essence of the autonomy doctrine. 
However, there are circumstances where the beneficiary, aware of such right which he 
has under the autonomy doctrine,783 decides (either as a result of the strong bargaining 
power of the applicant for the credit or to assure the applicant of his reliability in 
fulfilling the underlying contract) to restrict such assurance of payment by agreeing 
that certain conditions should be present before he draws on the credit. Such 
conditions which mostly manifest in the form of contractual restrictions on a 
beneficiary’s right under the credit raise at least two legal issues.  
 
One is whether such restriction could be implied in the contract. 784  The other is 
whether the position could be different if there is an express contractual (as opposed 
to implied) restriction on the beneficiary’s right to draw on the credit either in the 
underlying contract or a separate contract which affects the beneficiary’s right to draw 
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on the credit. Some dicta785 seem to be against implying a contractual restriction that 
seeks to restrict the beneficiary’s right to draw on the credit. With respect to express 
contractual restriction, case law in different jurisdictions786 and academic opinion are 
in its support. The positive response of the court and academic opinion787 towards 
express contractual restriction either in the underlying contract or a separate 
agreement raises the question whether such express contractual restriction is an 
established exception 788  capable of displacing the autonomy principle if the 
beneficiary wishes to draw in breach of such express agreement. Recent decisions789 
and academic commentary790 have demonstrated the possibility (as opposed to being 
established like the fraud rule) of a separate exception in the nature of this express 
contractual restriction on the beneficiary’s right to draw on the credit.  
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This restriction on the beneficiary’s right to draw on the credit is sometimes referred 
to as the underlying contract exception 791  to the principle of autonomy in 
documentary credit. By restricting the beneficiary’s right to draw on the credit,  it is 
not intended to contradict the age long principle, reflected in the principle of 
autonomy that states that letters of credit is separate from the underlying transaction in 
respect of which it is issued. However, it (contractual restriction on a beneficiary right 
to draw down the credit) seeks to answer the question whether there is a separate 
exception other than fraud in circumstances where a demand by a beneficiary is made 
in breach of an express stipulation in the underlying transaction or a separate contract, 
of such a nature as not to be categorized as fraudulent representation. Put differently, 
where a beneficiary aware of the nature of a credit which separates the credit from any 
underlying contract, agrees expressly with an applicant to restrict his right to draw 
down on the credit, by stipulating some conditions which need to be present before his 
entitlement to draw down on the credit arises; can the beneficiary be allowed to rely 
on the autonomy principle as a ground for reneging on his express contractual 
undertaking? The above forms the basis of the analysis in this chapter. 
  
For structural clarity, the chapter is divided into five sections. Section 8.1 examines 
the nature of the exception. Section 8.2, undertakes an evaluation of the rationale for 
the exception. Section 8.3 analyses the current state of the authorities in three 
common law jurisdiction- viz Australia, Malaysia, and England, Section 8.4 examines 
to what extent, the exception survives the autonomy principle. In the section, 
arguments that support and/or contradict the exception will be examined. Section 8.5 
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defines and assesses the working boundaries of this emerging exception in 
documentary credit law. Section 8.6 draws a conclusion based on the issues analyzed.  
 
8.2. Nature of the Exception 
 
In opening a letter of credit, it is assumed that the special nature of the contract relies 
primarily on the principle of autonomy. The autonomy principle draws a sharp 
distinction between the credit and the underlying contract with respect to which it is 
issued, and provides a beneficiary an assured right to payment792once conforming 
documents have been presented. The applicant for the letter of credit, perhaps anxious 
about the nature of his undertaking (giving an assured right to the beneficiary once 
conforming document has been presented) may seek to have better control over the 
beneficiary’s draw-down on the credit, or restrict such unconditional right of the 
beneficiary. Also, the beneficiary may wish to instil confidence in the applicant as to 
his ability to perform the underlying contract by suggesting or agreeing that his right 
to draw down the credit be restricted. This happens in a variety of ways but 
fundamentally, the applicant for the credit, may stipulate that the beneficiary’s right to 
draw down on the credit should be effective only when certain conditions related to 
the underlying contract or a separate agreement have been fulfilled. Take, for example, 
where the beneficiary agrees with the applicant for the credit that a draw down should 
not take effect except with a written consent of the applicant. 
 
The above position was highlighted by the English case of Sirius International 
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Insurance Co v FAI General Insurance Ltd and others793 and provides the factual 
background and detail that exemplify the nature of the exception under consideration. 
The facts of Sirius International Insurance may be summarized as follows. Agnew, a 
member of a Lloyd’s syndicate wished to reinsure its liabilities and FAI General 
insurance (FAI) was proposed as the reinsurer. Agnew was not happy with the choice 
of FAI as the reinsurer as there were issues as to the solvency of FAI. This led Agnew 
to demand a stronger and more solid reinsurer. Sirius became that reinsurer. Under the 
arrangement, Sirius agreed to reinsure the liabilities of Agnew and then retrocede such 
liabilities to FAI.  Under the agreement, in the event of any claim under the 
reinsurances, Sirius would be liable to the syndicate and FAI would be 
correspondingly liable to Sirius. It was a term of the agreement that FAI provide the 
Sirius with a letter of credit for US$5m.  
 
The letter of credit provided on the basis of the underlying agreement between Sirius 
and FAI was subject to an express restriction or negative covenant that Sirius, being 
the reinsurer, would neither pay a claim by the syndicate nor draw down without 
FAI’s consent in writing.  It is this contractual restriction on the beneficiary’s right to 
draw on the credit that forms the crux of the analysis in this chapter and highlights the 
nature of the problem under consideration. Hence, it raises the question whether 
Sirius’s right to draw on the credit could be defeated by the express restriction 
contained in a separate contract related to the underlying agreement between the 
beneficiary and the applicant for the credit. The Court of Appeal that decided on 
whether the right to draw on the credit could be defeated by an express restriction on 
the credit held as follows: ‘There is no authority extending this autonomy for the 
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benefit of the beneficiary of a letter of credit so as to entitle him as against the 
applicant to draw the letter of credit when he is expressly not entitled to do so’.794 
Hence, the Court of Appeal decided that an express restriction on a beneficiary’s right 
to draw on a credit was capable of enjoining the beneficiary’s right to draw on the 
credit. 
 
If the above position of the Court of Appeal is correct, there must be a rationale for 
the Court of Appeal so holding. This leads us to a consideration of whether there 
is/are a justifiable reason(s) for the Court of Appeal’s decision. 
 
8.3. Rationale for the Exception 
 
When the English Court of Appeal in Sirius International Insurance Ltd v FAI 
General Insurance,795 rejected the claimant’s (beneficiary) contention that the letter of 
credit being an autonomous obligation, it was entitled to draw down on the credit once 
conforming documents has been tendered. It put its decision on the ground that 
express conditions in the letter of credit detailing the circumstances under which 
draw-down could be made has not been met. Despite the rationale for the decision not 
being apparent on the face of the decision, this section explores the likely rationale for 
the court’s conclusion.  
 
 An insight into the reason for the court’s decision could be gleaned from the House 
of Lords decision in Doherty v Allman 796 which was cited by the Court of Appeal in 
Sirius International. In Sirius International, the Court of Appeal treated a contractual 
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restriction on a beneficiary’s right to draw on a credit as equivalent to an express 
negative covenant. This being the case, the court applied the law as if the 
beneficiary’s restriction was an express negative covenant with an implication that is 
well known in law. The Court’s justification for the reasoning with respect to an 
express negative covenant was evident in the House of Lords decision in Doherty v 
Allman.797 Lord Cairns, with respect to a negative covenant and the basis of which it 
could be used to grant an injunction, justified its rationale by stating thus:798 
 
if there had been a negative covenant, I apprehend, according to well-settled 
practice, a Court would have had no discretion to exercise. If parties, for 
valuable consideration, with their eyes open, contract that a particular thing 
shall not be done, all that a Court has to do is to say, by way of injunction, that 
which the parties have already said by way of covenant, that the thing shall not 
be done; and in such case the injunction does nothing more than give the 
sanction of the process of the Court to that which already is the contract 
between the parties. It is not then a question of the balance of convenience or 
inconvenience, or of the amount of damage or of injury— it is the specific 
performance, by the Court, of that negative bargain which the parties have 
made, with their eyes open, between themselves. 
 
With respect to documentary credit, it is evident from the pronouncement of May LJ 
that the court looked to the above passage when it held that ‘there is no authority 
extending this autonomy of documentary credit for the benefit of the beneficiary of a 
letter of credit so as to entitle him as against the applicant to draw the letter of credit 
when he is expressly not entitled to do so’.799 The justifying principle in these kinds of 
cases is that the beneficiary, despite being armed with the autonomy principle, is 
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assumed to have subjugated such right by an express agreement that restricts his right 
to draw on the credit. Provided such agreement was mutually entered into by the 
parties under no controlling influence, there are justifying and strong reasons why its 
terms should be given effect by the court. 
 
The underlying policy reason which justifies the above pronouncement, though not 
apparent in the Court of Appeal judgment in Sirius Insurance International, can be 
gleaned from the forceful pronouncement of Jessel MR with regard to a public policy 
need to enforce contractual obligations freely entered into by the parties. His Lordship, 
in reference to public policy inherent in the keeping of contractual promise openly and 
mutually agreed, said that:  
 
It must not be forgotten that …if there is one thing which more than another 
public policy requires it is that men of full age and competent understanding 
shall have the utmost liberty of contracting, and that their contracts when 
entered into freely and voluntarily shall be held sacred and shall be enforced 
by Courts of justice. Therefore, you have this paramount public policy to 
consider— that you are not lightly to interfere with this freedom of contract.800  
 
Put differently, this policy rationale emphasizes the supremacy of contractual 
undertakings fully and openly entered into among parties. Where such undertaking is 
threatened, it is the position that a court of competent jurisdiction is entitled and 
indeed obliged to grant a restraining order in line with contractual expectations of the 
parties.801 
 
                                                 
800
 Per Jessel M.R, in Printing and Numerical Registering Company v Sampson [1873] 177, (1874-75) 
L R 19 Eq. 462, re-affirmed by the House of Lords in Fender v St. John-Mildmay [1938] AC 1.  
801
 It is the same kind of policy reason that inspired the recognition of the fraud exception. 
268 
 
Professor Enonchong802  has justified the recognition of this exception albeit in a 
different context,803 on the policy ground that it is a useful tool in curtailing abusive 
and unjustified draw-down by the beneficiary of the credit in apparent violation of his 
contractual undertaking regarding the condition under which presentation and 
drawdown could be made. This argument seeks to emphasize the need to hold the 
beneficiary accountable to his/her contractual undertaking by insisting that the 
contract with the applicant be respected. It disentitles the beneficiary from using the 
assured promise of payment reflected in the autonomy principle as a ground for 
breaking a promise mutually and openly made with respect to conditions for a draw 
down. But the question as to what the real rationale behind this kind of contractual 
undertaking is cannot be perceived in detail without evaluating the ways that 
contractual stipulation stating the conditions of draw on a credit have been applied in 
the different jurisdictions.  The analysis of the jurisdictional approaches would 
provide us with more details as to whether the factual matrix leading to such 
contractual stipulations operates as an exception to the principle of autonomy in 
documentary credit. 
 
8.4.  Current State of Authorities 
 
Having fundamentally relied on general law position and the position of the law in the 
English case of Sirius Insurance International to establish the rationale for the 
application of this exception in documentary credits, this section explores the different 
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jurisdictionals’ approach with respect to contractual restriction on the beneficiary’s 
right to draw on the credit.  
 
8.4.1. Jurisdictional approaches 
 
Here an attempt to explore the approaches adopted in the different jurisdictions will 
be undertaken. 
 
8.4.1.1. Australia 
 
In addressing the question whether a contractual restriction on a beneficiary’s right to 
draw on the credit constitutes an exception to the principle of autonomy, some cases, 
mostly relating to bank guarantees in Australia, have sought to deal definitively with 
this legal issue. Prominent in this direction is Pearson Bridge (NSW) Pty Ltd v State 
Railway Authority of New South Wales.804 In Pearson Bridge (NSW) Pty Ltd v State 
Railway Authority of New South Wales,805 Yeldham J., in continuing the order of an 
injunction granted by Ash J., which was already in force pending the hearing of the 
action, held that a clause in a contract which restricted a call in demand guarantees 
was a negative stipulation the breach of which entitled the claimant to an 
injunction.806 In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on a host of Australian legal 
authorities807 and in the main relied on a stipulation in the underlying contract which 
restricted the circumstances under which the performance guarantee could be called. 
A certain clause in the underlying contract on its proper construction required a 
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beneficiary of a demand guarantee to ask for payment under the guarantee if and only 
if the beneficiary became entitled to exercise all or any of his rights under the contract 
in respect of the security. Yeldham J., in holding that this particular clause amounted 
to a contractual restriction which governed and restricted the circumstances in which, 
as a matter of contract between the beneficiary and the applicant, the latter could call 
on the guarantee, distinguished it from the Australian High Court case of Wood Hall 
Ltd v The Pipeline Authority.808 In the Wood Hall Limited case, the court noted that 
such a restriction never existed because there was no restriction on the performance 
bond which amounted to an equivalent of cash in hand liable to be called upon by the 
principal. 
 
The court in Pearson Bridge, in arriving at the above conclusion, noted that some 
Australian cases are in support of this conclusion. Notable in this respect are the cases 
of Ampol Petroleum Limited v Mutton 809  and Williamson Limited v Lukey and 
Mulholland.810 The facts and decisions support the principle that a negative stipulation 
as evident in the case of Pearson Bridge was such as to entitle a claimant to an 
injunction. Relying on the principle enunciated in these cases, the court accepted that 
a contractual restriction on the beneficiary’s right, which in most cases is a negative 
stipulation, was such that displaced the autonomy principle and continued the 
injunction already granted by Ash J. 
 
In a similar vein, the Supreme Court of New South Wales, adopted the position 
espoused in Pearson Bridge in Selvas Pty Limited v Hansen Yuncken (SA) Pty Ltd, 
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State Bank of South Australia811 and distinguished the case from the legal position 
adopted in Hortico (Australia) Pty Ltd v Energy Equipment Company (Pty) Ltd812 and 
Wood hall Limited v The Pipeline Authority.813  The court argued that to the extent 
that the facts of the case (Hortico Australia) was authority for the same proposition 
enunciated in Woodhall case, the court had no other choice but to depart from it as 
they court deemed it inapplicable. The facts that gave rise to the application for an 
injunction were that around August 1984, the claimant entered into a subcontract with 
the first defendant to whom the plaintiff agreed to supply and installs certain dry wall 
partitions in a building to be constructed by the first defendant as the main contractor. 
A provision in the sub-contract required that the claimant as the sub-contractor 
provide security for due and proper performance of its obligation under the sub-
contract. In accordance with this requirement, the claimant caused its bank - the 
second defendant - to issue two bank guarantees to the first defendant. Also, a certain 
provision in the sub-contract restricted the circumstances under which the first 
defendant, as the main contractor, could call on the bankers’ guarantee. The issue 
before the court, when the claimant applied for an injunction attempting to restrain the 
first defendant from seeking payment from the second defendant that issued the 
bankers guarantees, was whether the conditions restricting the circumstances under 
which the demand could be made on the guarantee had been complied with. 
 
The court in dealing with this issue of whether a contractual provision in a demand 
guarantee was such as to enable the court to depart from the autonomy principle had 
this say  
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In my view, neither the Wood Hall case nor the Hortico Case applies to this 
matter. Because, like Yeldham J in Pearson Bridge case, I am of the view that 
such a line of authority is to be distinguished on the basis that the sub-contract 
in this case contains a provision which can be interpreted as defining the 
circumstances under which the first defendant was to have recourse to the 
banker’s guarantees814 
 
The court relying on the above passage felt justified in granting the injunction sought 
on the ground that there was a real issue to be tried. This approach of the court where 
the autonomy principle is being displaced because of a contractual stipulation has also 
been adopted in a more recent decision by Rolfe J in the Australian case of Barclays 
Mowlem Construction Limited v Simon Engineering (Australia) Pty Ltd.815 
 
Despite the fact that this line of authorities holding that a contractual restriction on the 
beneficiary’s right to draw on the credit is an exception to the principle of autonomy, 
these decisions have not been endorsed by the decisions in the higher courts in 
Australia. However, the cases so far demonstrate in no uncertain terms that Australian 
courts are ready to intervene and displace the autonomy principle where there is a 
contractual stipulations the terms of which stipulate the condition of recourse to an 
independent undertaking. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
814
 Selvas Pty Limited v Hansen Yuncken (SA) Pty Ltd, State bank of South Australia (1987) 6 Aust. 
Construction LR 36 at p.40. 
815
 (1991) 23 NSWLR 451. 
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8.4.1.2. Malaysia 
 
The approach of the Malaysian courts with respect to contractual restrictions affecting 
the beneficiary’s right to draw on the credit in commercial letters of credit is not 
settled. However, a reported case on bank guarantees seems to be similar to the 
position adopted in Australia. The similarity of the approach of the two jurisdictions is 
evident in the case of Daewoo Engineering & Construction Co Ltd v The Titular 
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Kuala Lumpur.816 In this case, a guarantee was opened 
by the claimant in favour of the defendant as a condition for the defendant consenting 
to the installation of ground anchors on the defendant’s land. Part of the agreement for 
opening the bank guarantee contained an express condition which stipulated the 
circumstance under which the defendant could have recourse to the guarantee and it 
was expressly stated among other things that before the defendant could demand 
payment under the guarantee, it ‘must inform Daewoo Corporation by written notice 
of your intention to claim against the guarantee not later than 14 (fourteen) days 
before the date of the aforesaid demand’. At the expiration of the initial guarantee, the 
defendant wanted to vary the terms of the guarantee to exclude the express agreement 
but the plaintiff objected to it. Because the plaintiff failed to renew the guarantee due 
to the plaintiff insisting that the express term of the agreement be removed or varied, 
the defendant called on the guarantee arguing that a letter of guarantee was an 
unconditional guarantee payable without any requirement on the side of the 
defendant.817  
 
                                                 
816
 [2004] 7 MLJ 136. 
817
 See Daewoo Engineering & Construction Co Ltd v The Titular Roman Catholic Archbishop of 
Kuala Lumpur [2004] 7 MLJ 136 [18].  
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 In an action by the plaintiff for declaratory relief on the ground that the call or 
threatened call on the bank guarantee was wrongful and in breach of the written 
agreement, the Court granted an injunction to the plaintiff on the ground that there 
were serious triable issues which were neither frivolous or vexatious and which 
needed to be properly dealt with at trial.818 In other words, the condition(s) stipulated 
in the credit detailing the condition of draw-down had not been met. 
 
It could be submitted that the legal implication of this case (Daewoo Engineering) in 
Malaysia is that where there is an express contractual agreement, whether in a 
separate contract or in the underlying contract, which forms the basis of the issue of 
an independent undertaking, the court in dealing with the question whether the 
beneficiary has a right to claim under the credit or guarantee, will not ignore the 
contractual agreement openly entered into by the parties. 
 
 
8.4.1.3. England 
 
In England, the question whether there is a contractual restriction capable of 
displacing the autonomy principle has been answered in the case of Sirius 
International Insurance. The legal implication of the decision in Sirius International 
Insurance Corp v FAI General Insurance Co Ltd819 is that English court is minded to 
displace the autonomy principle and grant an injunction to a claimant where the 
beneficiary for the purposes of drawing on the credit breaches an express contractual 
restriction affecting the credit. Justifying the above position, the Court of Appeal in 
                                                 
818
 ibid at para. [25]. 
819
 [2003] EWCA Civ 470 [2003] 1 WLR 2214 
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Sirius International Insurance case820 held that the principle of autonomy does not go 
so far as to entitle the beneficiary of a letter of credit, as against the account party, to 
draw on the letter of credit when the beneficiary contractually has an express 
agreement which does not entitle him to draw down in a separate agreement. 
 
Jacob J at first instance decided the same issue of whether an express contractual 
restriction on the beneficiary’s right to draw on the credit was in breach of the 
autonomy principle. He held that whilst the principle of autonomy which applied to 
letters of credit was of vital importance, it could neither be undermined nor was there 
any justifiable reason why the law should not give effect to an express agreement that 
a party would not draw down a letter of credit unless certain (express) conditions were 
met.821 The basis of the court’s decision was the defendant’s submission that the full 
implication of the express agreement not to draw on the credit was that it constituted 
an express negative covenant, and that ‘the court always enforces a negative covenant 
on the well known principle that it is only making a man refrain from doing that 
which he has agreed not to do’822 
 
The Court of Appeal agreed in its judgment with the trial court that an express 
contractual restriction was such as to displace the autonomy principle. At the level of 
the House of Lords, the issue of whether the autonomy principle in letter of credit was 
such as to allow the beneficiary to draw on the credit in breach of an express 
contractual stipulation relating to the condition of draw down was not considered. The 
House of Lords instead focused on the correct contextual interpretation of documents 
                                                 
820
 Ibid at 476 
821
  See Sirius International Insurance Co (Publ) v FAI General Insurance Ltd and others [2002] 
EWHC 1611 (Ch), [2003] 1 WLR 87 [20] 
822
 ibid at [10] 
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relating to the conditions of draw down on the letter of credit. The omission by the 
House of Lords to make any definitive pronouncement on the issue (autonomy 
principle and the effect of an express contractual restriction on a beneficiary right to 
draw down on the credit) is a missed opportunity. It is a missed opportunity because a 
decision by the House of Lords would have authoritatively confirmed the position 
taken by the Court of Appeal. It follows that the English Court of Appeal’s 
pronouncement which affirmed the court of first instance’s decision on the issue 
remains the position of English law with respect to express contractual restrictions on 
a beneficiary right to draw down on the credit. The inescapable question that arises 
from the trail blazing judgment of the English Court of Appeal that an express 
contractual restriction displaces the autonomy doctrine is whether the decision 
remains a good law. This inevitably leads us to consider the arguments for or against 
the exception.  
 
8.5. Arguments 
 
The novelty of this decision that an express restriction on a beneficiary right to draw 
on the credit was capable of displacing the autonomy principle has led to some 
objections.823 In this section the arguments in support of or against the exception will 
be placed in perspective. The objective is to assess to what extent the decision of the 
court in Sirius Insurance international is well founded.  The argument in support of 
the exception will be considered first before going into the argument against it. 
 
                                                 
823
 Part of the objection could be gleaned from the argument of the claimant counsel at the court of first 
instance where he strenuously argued that such limitation was contrary to the independence principle.  
See Sirius International Insurance Co (Publ) v FAI General Insurance Ltd and others [2002] EWHC 
1611 (Ch) [2003] 1 WLR 87 [13, 14, 15,19] and 20, see also Hare C, ‘Not so black and white: the 
limits of the autonomy principle’ (2004) CLJ 63(2) 288-291. 
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8.5.1.  Argument in support of the Exception 
 
Having considered some of the arguments against the exception, the arguments that 
support the exception would be considered below. 
 
8.5.1.1.  Novelty and Variant of the more Typical Case 
 
The idea of novelty which provides one of the strongest supports for the exception 
comes from the nature of the letter of credit under consideration. In this respect, the 
court captured the novelty of these kind of cases in the Australian case of Bachmann 
Pty Ltd v B.H.P Power New Zealand Ltd824 regarding express restriction on a standby 
letter of credit when it stated that  
 
...so far as I am aware, of the cases which have come before the courts in this 
country the present may be said to be novel in one respect and unusual in 
another. It is novel in the sense that the present case raises for the first time the 
effect of an express, albeit qualified, contractual prohibition (in the underlying 
contract) on the conversion of a security into cash. The novelty resides in the 
circumstance that the present contract contains an express, but qualified, 
prohibition on conversion of a security into cash -- express in the sense that it 
is in form a negative stipulation (‘a party shall not convert . . . until the party 
becomes entitled’). 
 
The above statement of the Australian court demonstrates that these cases are novel 
and represent a special class of case. The willingness of the court to enforce this kind 
of express provision is based on its novelty and special nature. Its special nature does 
                                                 
824
 (1999) 1 VR 420. 
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not affect what is generally accepted as an independent and abstract undertaking.825 
Being an abstract undertaking, the obligation of the bank to pay on the credit once 
conforming documents are tendered is not based on the rights existing between the 
beneficiary and applicant in the underlying contract. Stephen J realised the force of 
this submission in the Pearson Bridge case when he cited the case of Wood Hall 
Limited v The Pipeline Authority & Another as authority for the proposition that a 
letter of credit is an equivalent of cash in hand. However, Stephen J noted that the 
equivalent of cash principle would as well be defeated if the underlying contract 
contained some qualification on the beneficiary’s power to make a demand under the 
performance guarantee. Rolfe J in Barclay Mowlem Construction Ltd v Simon 
Engineering (Australia) Pty Ltd restated the novelty of this type of case when 
he stated: ‘In my opinion neither Wood Hall nor Hortico, nor the various 
cases to which I was referred stating that there was an obligation on the party 
giving an unconditional performance bond to pay that bond on demand 
are determinative of the present case. Indeed in Wood Hall, Stephen J 
expressly leaves open, so it seems to me, this question for determination’.826  
 
To clarify this point, Rolfe J, directed his analysis to the statement of Stephen J 
in Wood hall case. He noted that in that case the court pointed out in the 
following words: ‘... Had the construction contract itself contained some 
qualification upon the Authority's power to make a demand under a 
performance guarantee, the position might well have been different. 
                                                 
825
 As the beneficiary is deemed to be aware of the right which he has in the abstract payment before 
agreeing to expressly restrict such right. 
826
 Barclay Mowlem Construction Ltd v Simon Engineering (Australia) Pty Ltd (1991) 23 
NSWLR 451,457. 
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In fact the contract is silent on the matter’.827 
 
In similar vein, in Sirius Insurance International v FAI General Insurance, Jacob J, 
realised the novelty and special nature of the cases dealing with express 
contractual restrictions on a beneficiary’s right to draw on the credit when he 
stated that ‘Whilst I accept the submission that the principle of autonomy is of vital 
importance, I cannot see that it is undermined in the very special case where a party 
expressly agrees not to draw down unless certain conditions are met. Suppose instead 
of a letter of credit an account had been opened in the name of Sirius with Westpac 
and credited with the US$5m. Suppose Sirius had agreed with FAI not to touch the 
account unless the conditions were satisfied. I can see no reason why a contract to that 
effect should not be enforced. Cash, like a letter of credit, is autonomous, perhaps 
even more so, but people can agree not to touch identified pots of it, if that is what 
they want to do. If such an agreement is made, there is no reason why the law should 
not enforce it’.828 The message derived from the cases is that where the beneficiary 
unreservedly consents to an express restriction stipulating the condition for draw 
down on the credit, it creates a novel and special case, where the ‘cash principle’ 
becomes conditional on the fulfilment of the express restrictions. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
827
 Wood Hall Ltd v Pipeline Authority (1979) 141 CLR 443,459 restated in Barclay Mowlem 
Construction Ltd v Simon Engineering (Australia) Pty Ltd (1991) 23 NSWLR 451,457. 
828
 See Sirius International Insurance Co v FAI General Insurance Ltd and others [2002] EWHC 1611 
(Ch) [2003] 1 WLR 87, 92-93. The same position was also restated in the in the same case at the 
Appellate Court. 
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8.5.1.2. Legitimate Expectations of the Parties to the Underlying Contract 
 
The primary concern of the court, at least in contract, is to enforce legitimate 
expectation of the parties. In England and other common law jurisdictions, the court 
has consistently made it clear that in determining a dispute arising from a contract, the 
solution depends largely on what the parties themselves have agreed. That solution is 
to be gathered from the terms and conditions of the contract in the light of the 
surrounding circumstances. Thus, where a credit gives a right to draw on a credit upon 
presentation of specified documents, in determining whether the bank should pay 
and/or the beneficiary is entitled to payment, the court will look at the credit in view 
of the material surrounding circumstances. One such circumstance is a contract under 
which a beneficiary has agreed to demand or obtain payment upon the fulfilment of 
certain conditions. In England, the leading case in this regard is Sirius Insurance 
International, where May LJ impliedly gave effect to the legitimate expectation of the 
parties, when he rejected the contention of the appellant in the Sirius Insurance 
International case that the autonomous nature of letter of credit entitled him to draw 
on the credit in breach of a negative covenant stipulating the conditions of a draw-
down on the credit. 
 
8.5.1.3. Contractual Restriction as an Express Negative Covenant 
 
A Restriction in a beneficiary’s right stipulating the condition under which a draw-
down could be made most often comes in the form express negative covenant.829 As 
pointed out by the House of Lords in Doherty v Allman, the courts have little or no 
                                                 
829
 The term was used in the court of first instance as well as the Court of Appeal in the Sirius 
International case. 
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discretion in giving effect to an express negative covenant openly and mutually 
entered into by the parties. The underlying reason justifying it being that the court is 
merely using its instruments to give effect to that which the parties have expressly and 
contractually agreed should not happen. 
 
 
8.5.1.4. Lack of Authority Specifically against the Exception 
 
This argument was accepted by both the High Court and Court of Appeal in Sirius 
Insurance International v FAI General insurance. Against the contention830 that it is 
only in the situation of established fraud that the autonomy of letter of credit can 
displaced, the court accepted the reasoning of the claimant that there is no authority 
specifically against this exception. The court stressed that none of the cases which the 
court had been referred to is specifically against the exception. It continued that in the 
circumstances of this particular case, there is an ‘express provision in the underlying 
contract saying that the beneficiary will not draw down unless conditions have been 
fulfilled. In those circumstances, you do not have the normal case of ‘pay now argue 
later’, which is the main point of providing letters of credit in normal 
circumstances’.831 In order words, the court was minded to recognise that an express 
contractual restriction in a credit is capable of displacing the autonomy principle on 
the ground that there was no direct authority specifically against the exception. 
 
 
                                                 
830
 The contrary contention was supported with the case of the United City Merchants that it is only in 
cases of established fraud can the impregnability of documentary credit be displaced. 
831
 Sirius International Insurance Co v FAI General Insurance Ltd and others [2002] EWHC 1611 (Ch) 
[2003] 1 WLR 87,92 [18] 
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8.5.2.   Arguments against the Exception 
 
Having looked at the arguments in favour of the exception, this sub-section analyses 
the arguments against the exception. 
 
8.5.2.1. Contrary to the Independence Principle 
 
One of the leading arguments against the exception is that the recognition of the 
express contractual restriction on the credit is contrary to the independence principle. 
This argument was strenuously pursued by the claimant (Sirius) at the court of first 
instance where it832 contended that the letter of credit was an autonomous contract not 
affected by the conditions as to its draw-down agreed between themselves, Sirius and 
FAI. They were entitled to draw the letter of credit according to its terms. Even if 
Sirius resorted to it in breach of those conditions, the remedy would be a claim for 
damages and an injunction would not be granted. The answer to the above contention 
was empathically delivered by Jacob J in the Sirius case. His Lordship reasoned that 
while he accepted that the principle of autonomy is of vital importance, he could not 
see that it is undermined where a party expressly agrees not to draw down unless 
certain conditions are met.833  
 
 
 
                                                 
832
 Sirius International Insurance Co v FAI General Insurance Ltd and others [2002] EWHC 1611 (Ch) 
[2003] 1 WLR 87,91.  
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283 
 
 
 
8.5.2.2. Want of Certainty 
 
The argument that the recognition of this exception will create uncertainty has been in 
substance raised by a number of Australian authorities. 834  Part of the issue of 
uncertainty has originated from the issue of construction with respect to the express 
agreement restricting the condition of draw down on the credit. Here the construction 
question most often relates to the meaning of the express terms and in some cases 
doubt has been raised regarding the uncertainty that would arise as to the proper 
meaning of the terms and whether the circumstances referred to in the term have or 
have not arisen. It is evident that in some Australian cases, some contractual 
provisions with similar clauses, have been construed differently 835  leading to the 
conclusion that the recognition of the exception will lead to uncertainty. This 
argument of uncertainty was approved by Callaway JA when he expressed doubt with 
the line of cases beginning with Person Bridge. Callaway JA’s submission, as 
plausible as it might seem836 raises the same question which has been highlighted with 
regard to broadening the exceptions to the principle of autonomy. That question is that 
the uncertainty arising from the recognition of the exception would undermine the 
                                                 
834
 See Bachmann Pty Ltd v BHP Power New Zealand  Ltd [1999] 1 V R 420, Fletcher Construction 
Australia Ltd v Varnsdorf Pty Ltd [1998] 3 VR 812. 
835
 See also the criticism of the interpretation of the contractual clauses restricting the beneficiary right 
to draw on the credit by Brooking JA with whom Tadgell and Ormiston JJA agreed. Here the Court 
noted and analysed the flaws and uncertainty regarding the treatment of the contractual clauses with 
respect to the uncertainty surrounding its meaning and construction. See Bachmann Pty Ltd v BHP 
Power New Zealand  Ltd [1999] 1 V R 420.  
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 The contention is not without its merit in the sense that in Australia where the exception has been 
recognised, there has been numerous cases where the parties have come to court to stop a beneficiary 
from getting payment on this ground even when the basis of the action can at best be said to be 
spurious. See Anaconda Operations Pty Ltd v Flour Daniels Pty Ltd (1999 Unreported) where 
Brooking JA reinforced the argument of uncertainty for seeing no apparent express contractual 
restriction upon which the claimant is relying to ask for an injunction stopping the beneficiary from 
asking for payment. 
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policy considerations837 which underlie the nature of letters of credit. However, as 
pointed out by Professor Enonchong,838 the issue of uncertainty generated by the 
recognition of the exception could be ameliorated by insisting that the exception 
should only apply where the alleged contractual restriction is an express term of the 
contract openly and mutually entered into by the parties. Such express term restricting 
the beneficiary’s right to draw on the credit should be clear that the parties 
contemplated that the otherwise unqualified right of the beneficiary to draw on the 
credit is limited by the express term in the restricting clause.839 
 
There is no easy approach to looking at certainty in letters of credit. More than 
anything else, there has been much uncertainty with the insistence that it is only in the 
case of established fraud that the beneficiary’s right to payment could be set aside. 
This has resulted, as some of the cases840 reveal, in a losing battle to fit all cases into 
fraud or nothing. The result of this attempt to fit all the cases into the fraud rule841 is 
that letter of credit cases are littered with instances where the court resorts to stating 
that this is a special case that permits the court to intervene on some other ground. A 
critical analysis of the cases most often shows that there is nothing special about the 
cases but a point that has been strenuously canvassed in some cases842 is that there are 
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 Policy consideration like certainty and prompt payment 
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 See Nelson Enonchong, ‘The Problem of Abusive Calls on Demand Guarantees’ (2007) LMCLQ 96. 
839
 As pointed out in passing by Brooking JA in passing in Bachmann Pty Ltd v BHP Power New 
Zealand Ltd [1999] 1 V R 420, such express contractual restriction drafted alongside the unconditional 
undertaking or after the credit has been issued would provide evidence that the parties intend that 
beneficiary unqualified right to draw down on the credit be qualified by the express contractual 
restriction on the credit. 
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 See Kvaerner John Brown Ltd v Midland Bank PLC [1998] CLC 446 where an injunction was 
granted on the grounds of fraud whereas, the reason is that the beneficiary was adjudged not to have 
given a written notice before drawing down on a letters of credit. If the case is analyzed critically, it 
falls under failure to comply with an express restriction rather than fraud. 
841
 Which in most cases is not possible as the ground for intervention cannot be properly predicated on 
fraud. 
842
 Special circumstances include illegality, unconscionability, express contractual restriction in the 
form of a negative covenant affecting the beneficiary’s right to draw on the credit. Where they are 
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some other instances where the court could intervene to displace the principle of 
autonomy, for example where the beneficiary, as a hard headed commercial man, with 
his eyes open expressly contracts that his right to payment should be only arise on the 
fulfilment of certain conditions. It is unlikely that uncertainty will arise because the 
court has intervened to give effect to an express contractual restriction agreed by the 
parties. 
 
8.6. The Working Principles of the Exception 
 
Having analyzed the position of the law with respect to contractual restrictions on 
beneficiary’s right to draw down on the credit in the above mentioned three 
jurisdictions, it may be proper to examine the working principles of the exception as 
evident both from general law and the cases already analyzed. It must be mentioned 
that some of the working principles of the exception are found in Sirius Insurance 
International. However, it is possible to devise some other formulation based on a 
proper appreciation of the issues and borrowing from well founded legal principles in 
general law. This more than anything else will assist in the later adjudication of cases 
where the scope of this exception is correctly defined. 
 
8.6.1 What kind of Contractual Restriction is Required? 
 
The restriction required must be express, unequivocal and negative in nature. 
Sirius Insurance International, the pivotal English authority that affirmatively holds 
that a beneficiary should not be allowed to draw on a credit in breach of a contractual 
                                                                                                                                            
recognized, it promotes certainty by not allowing technical rules to defeat the commercial expectation 
of the parties. 
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restriction in a separate agreement talks about the restriction being an express 
negative covenant. It follows that where there is a restriction on the right of the 
beneficiary to draw down on the credit, the restriction must be express and 
unequivocal843 because the autonomy doctrine is strongly in favour of the beneficiary. 
That this express provision in the underlying contract or a separate agreement, 
regulating the condition of draw-down is required for the autonomy principle to be 
displaced can be seen in Philip J’s warning in the Deutsche Ruckversicherung case.844 
His Lordship in defence of the autonomy principle noted that ‘where a letter of credit 
is issued by way of conditional payment under an underlying contract, I do not 
consider that it is correct to imply a term into the underlying contract that the 
beneficiary will not draw on the letter of credit unless payment under the underlying 
contract is due’.845The significance of this statement was pointed out by May LJ in the 
Sirius International case when he held that an express contractual restriction in the 
form of an express negative covenant displaced the autonomy principle. May LJ 
concluded that the court’s decision was in accord with Phillips J’s pronouncement by 
drawing a distinction between the situation contemplated by Phillip J, which 
deprecated implying a condition or restriction on the beneficiary’s right to draw on the 
credit in the underlying contract, with a situation where there is an express condition 
in an underlying contract or a separate agreement restricting or stipulating the 
conditions of draw down.  
 
8.6.2  Beneficiary’s Unconditional Assent to the Express Contractual 
Stipulation 
                                                 
843
  This may lead to a plausible argument that if the restriction is ambiguous or equivocal but on the 
ground of construction the court finds that it actually prevents the beneficiary from drawing on the 
credit, the right to collect the sum named in the credit does not arise. 
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One of the limiting criteria for this exception is where the beneficiary unconditionally 
accepts the inclusion of the express contractual restriction without raising any 
objection to it. Take for example, the facts of Sirius Insurance International. The 
express contractual restriction contained in a separate agreement clause(s) saying that 
the beneficiary will not draw down unless certain conditions have been fulfilled. It 
would be assumed that the parties have unconditionally assented to it if the  express 
term is drafted in such a way that it is absolutely clear that both parties contemplated 
that the entitlement of the beneficiary to draw on the credit is restricted or qualified by 
such limitation in the underlying contract.  
 
The force of the above submission has been recognised in the Australian case of 
Fletcher Construction Australia Ltd v Varnsdorf Pty Ltd.846 In this case, even though 
the court was not persuaded by the submission that the absolute right of the 
beneficiary under a demand guarantee was restricted by a provision in the underlying 
contract, Callaway JA was minded to express the view that the court should rely on 
this ground as a basis of restraint only where the there is an express clause in the 
underlying contract qualifying the unconditional undertaking in the guarantee.  Such 
express clauses restricting the beneficiary’s right, inserted without challenge by the 
beneficiary, points to the beneficiary assenting to such terms. The court in Fletcher 
Construction Australia Ltd 847  added that no implication should be made that is 
inconsistent with the commercial purpose of an independent undertaking. This 
statement of the court allies with the need to make sure that the court does not imply 
from the underlying contract terms to which the beneficiary has not given his assent. 
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It is submitted that if the terms of the express restriction are clear and the beneficiary 
with his eyes open unconditionally assents to them, the scope of this ground will be 
restricted and not cause any uncertainty or undermine any policy consideration that 
underpins the use of letters of credit. 
 
 
8.6.3 Standard of Proof of the Express Restriction on the Beneficiary Right to 
Draw on the Credit 
 
As in the cases of fraud, another criterion that will help to limit the scope of this 
exception is the standard of proof required to trigger the exception. In this situation, 
the standard required to prove the exception just like in the case of the traditional 
fraud rule, ought to be of a higher standard than the normal standard for civil cases.  
 
However, with respect to the standard of proof for the grant of interim and 
interlocutory injunctions, most Australian cases, mostly in demand guarantee cases, 
have followed the benchmark set by the decision of the English House of Lords in 
American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd. 848  This has led to the courts granting 
injunctions against the beneficiary on the basis that a contractual restriction on the 
beneficiary’s right to draw on a credit has been breached in cases where the facts of 
some of the cases raised only a serious issue to be tried.849 Granting injunctions on the 
basis that there is only a serious issue to be tried contrasts remarkably with approach 
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 [1975] 2 WLR 316, [1975] AC 396.  
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 Pearson Bridge (N.S.W.) Pty. Ltd. v. State Rail Authority of New South Wales (1982) 1 Aust. 
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adopted in the cases of the fraud exception where established clear fraud is required.  
The approach has led to suggestions that the standard is too low and that an exception 
designed to make the beneficiary stick to his contractual undertaking could thus end 
up providing a loophole for the applicant to renege easily from the independent 
undertaking evident in the autonomous nature of credits.850 
 
To alleviate the above difficulty, Prof. Nelson Enonchong851 has argued -albeit in the 
context of demand guarantee- that the scope of the exception could be further 
restricted by insisting that the applicant for the credit, to be entitled to an injunction, 
needs to prove to a higher standard the express restriction on the beneficiary’s right. 
He further submitted that it should not be enough for the applicant for the credit to 
show that there is a serious issue to be tried as to whether the express restriction in the 
credit has been satisfied, but that the applicant to be entitled to an injunction should 
demonstrate that he has a real prospect of proving at trial that the express restriction 
has not been satisfied.852 This point, to the extent that it helps to keep the scope of this 
emerging exception within narrow limits by making sure that injunctions are not 
readily available, is commendable and ought to be adopted.  
 
However, for the purposes of injunctions, the difficulty with insisting that the 
applicant prove that he has or would have a realistic prospect of success at the trial 
that the express restriction has not been complied with before an injunction could be 
granted was pointed out by the House of Lords in American Cyanamid Co. v Ethicon 
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Ltd,853 Lord Diplock, pointed out the difficulty, albeit in the context of interlocutory 
injunctions that ‘in those cases where the legal rights of the parties depend upon facts 
that are in dispute between them, the evidence available to the court at the hearing of 
the application for an interlocutory injunction is incomplete. It is given on affidavit 
and has not been tested by oral cross-examination. The purpose sought to be achieved 
by giving to the court discretion to grant such injunctions would be stultified if the 
discretion were clogged by a technical rule forbidding its exercise if upon that 
incomplete untested evidence the court evaluated the chances of the plaintiff's 
ultimate success in the action at 50 per cent or less, but permitting its exercise if the 
court evaluated his chances at more than 50 per cent’. 854  
 
The point sought to be made in the immediate preceding paragraph is that the need to 
raise the standard of proof is welcome as a way of limiting the scope of this exception, 
but insisting on a particular standard like realistic prospect of success would as, Lord 
Diplock warned,855  be likely to create room for error. The primary reason for this 
contention is that at the stage of injunction, the evidence available is in the nature of 
an affidavit, yet to be tested by any form of oral cross-examination. Hence, apart from 
providing a discretionary remedy in injunctions, it may be premature to judge based 
on the affidavit evidence whether the claimant has a realistic prospect of success.  A 
somewhat different approach is to insist on a standard that is high enough to safeguard 
the autonomy principle but not so high as to be unattainable.856 As the benchmark for 
knowing when an express contractual restriction is proved, it is suggested that 
                                                 
853
 [1975] 2 WLR 316,  [1975] AC 396,406. 
854
 [1975] 2 WLR 316,  [1975] AC 396,406. 
855
 American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd [1975] 2 WLR 316,  [1975] AC 396, 406-407. 
856
 In this respect, the court in letter of credit fraud cases has formulated in different ways the standard 
required, ranging from ‘established or obvious fraud’- see Edward Owen Engineering Ltd v Barclay  
Bank International Ltd [1978] QB 159, Per Lord Denning MR, ‘a real prospect of establishing fraud’- 
see Solo Industries Uk Ltd v Canara Bank [2001] 1 WLR 1800, Mance LJ [1815- 1816]. 
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adopting the same high standard of proof evident in letters of credit fraud cases -
where the applicant to succeed in an application for an injunction ought to show that 
evidence of fraud is compelling 857  should be considered. This high standard, in 
addition to the assessment of where the balance of convenience lies, should assist in 
keeping this exception within very narrow confines. This will not only protect the 
autonomy principle but would encourage uniformity with other exceptions, as well as 
achieve the discretionary goal for the grant of injunction which demands that the court 
should be satisfied that the claim that an express contractual restriction has not been 
complied with is not frivolous or vexatious. In assessing the frivolity of the claim, the 
court ought to pay regard to the autonomous nature of letters of credit by setting a 
higher standard that require clear proof of the express restriction by the claimant. 
 
8.7. Conclusion 
 
The recognition of the exception examined in this chapter does not appear to be in 
doubt but what seems to pose difficulties, on the facts of some of the cases858 analysed 
is defining the scope of the exception. In relation to the scope, Sirius International 
Insurance has demonstrated the point made by Phillip J 859  that implying such a 
restriction into a documentary credit would not be permitted by the courts but where 
express agreement has been made; there can be no reason not to give effect to it by 
way of displacing the autonomy principle. Also with respect to the scope, its 
application as reflected in the Australian cases albeit in the context of demand 
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 This by implication is the result of all the decisions which has formulated the standard of proof 
differently. 
858
 Mostly the Australian cases where the distinction is not drawn between express restrictions and that 
implied from the contract. 
859
 See Deutsche Ruckversicherung AG v Walbrook [1995] 1WLR 1017. 
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guarantees suffers from want of certainty in the sense that the Australian cases have 
not drawn a line between express restriction and implied restriction.  
 
More so, Sirius Insurance International can be argued implicitly to highlight the 
unsatisfactory nature of the law in England with respect to the exception(s) to the 
principle of autonomy. On examining the cases dealing with contractual restrictions, 
the unsatisfactory nature of the law with respect to the exception(s) becomes evident. 
While the courts continue to emphasize, even in the face of compelling decisions and 
dicta to the contrary, that the traditional position is that fraud is the only recognized 
exception to the principle of autonomy, some judicial pronouncements- the rationale 
for which it is difficult to fault, continue to undermine and lead to a contrary position.  
One of these contrary positions was clearly demonstrated both at first instance and in 
the Court of Appeal in Sirius Insurance International case. The decisions of both 
courts clearly appreciated and held that, apart from fraud, there are other special 
circumstances in which the autonomy principle may be displaced.  
 
One of those special circumstances, the courts held, is where the beneficiary in 
drawing on the credit, is acting in breach of a contractual clause or condition 
expressly restricting or defining his right to payment on the credit. The court held that 
the principle of autonomy is not undermined where the beneficiary had expressly 
agreed with the applicant for the credit not to draw down the credit unless certain 
conditions are fulfilled, and draw down is sought to be prevented on the grounds of 
non-fulfilment.  The legal position enunciated in Sirius Insurance International has 
the support of both Australian and Malaysian authorities.  
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If emphasis is placed on the argument that the autonomy doctrine in the absence of 
fraud of the beneficiary, trounces all countervailing consideration, then the High 
Court and the Court of Appeal in Sirius Insurance International would be criticized 
for departing from the traditional position that emphasizes the supremacy of the 
autonomy doctrine. However, considering the nature of these cases, the courts should 
be applauded for courageously holding the beneficiary accountable to his contractual 
bargain and not to use the principle of autonomy as a ground for reneging from an 
express contractual restriction openly and mutually agreed to. To hold otherwise, 
would, as highlighted in the chapter, defeat the commercial and legitimate expectation 
of the parties.  
 
It is also a persuasive argument that letter of credit is an equivalent of cash in hand 
whose realization, is not dependent on issues in the underlying contract or any other 
contract. This position could be argued to be correct where the unconditional nature of 
the instrument has not been qualified by a contractual restriction on the beneficiary’s 
right. The beneficiary, by accepting the express contractual restriction, and not 
affected by any form of legally recognised factors vitiating the contract, should held 
to have made his right to payment conditional on fulfilling that negative stipulation in 
a contract which he has agreed to. To hold otherwise, is to give the beneficiary the 
unrestricted freedom to agree to whatever terms (including terms which may be 
primary reason why the applicant agreed to the issue of the letter of credit in the first 
place) whether in the underlying contract or in a separate contract as binding upon 
him, only to later hide under the autonomy principle to renege on those promises. 
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Chapter Nine 
 
9.0.            General Conclusions 
 
Documentary credits are financial instruments used to finance international business 
transactions. A primary object of documentary credits (as highlighted at the beginning 
of the thesis) is to cater for the interest of both parties in securing the performance of 
the underlying contract that gives rise to a documentary credit. On the part of the 
seller, if he parts with the possession and property in the goods or ships them solely 
based on the buyer’s promise in the contract of sale, the seller may have no effective 
security against the buyer’s default in payment. On the other hand, if the buyer pays 
the price before the shipment of the goods, he may not have adequate protection 
against default in performance by the seller or against his bankruptcy. This primary 
object which protects both parties’ interests in a documentary credit transaction 
remains pivotal to the utility of documentary credits. 
 
To realize the above object and enable the proper utilisation of documentary credits, it 
(documentary credit) operates on two cardinal principles viz: the autonomy doctrine 
and the doctrine of strict compliance.860 The autonomy doctrine presupposes that it is 
a cardinal rule of documentary credits that the bank’s duty to pay is to founded on the 
credit itself and the right and duty to make payment do not in any way depend on the 
performance of the seller/beneficiary’s obligations under the contract of sale.  
 
                                                 
860
 The doctrine of strict compliance despite being a cardinal principle in documentary credit is not 
specifically relevant in the issues pursued in this thesis. 
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It has been argued in chapter two that the current practice evident in the autonomy 
principle in documentary credits that seeks inflexibly to detach the credit from the 
underlying transaction that gave rise to it is at the root of some of the problems with 
regard to the exceptions in documentary credit. While it is correct to define the 
autonomy doctrine as a principle that seeks to separate the credit contract from the 
underlying contract, such definition ought to be understood in line with the function 
which the autonomy doctrine, in conjunction with the doctrine of strict compliance, 
performs in documentary credit operations. That function is primarily to make sure 
that the seller who has shipped goods is paid expeditiously with the underlying 
contract not used as a ground for non-payment. The autonomy doctrine, it has been 
argued, is not designed to assure payment in circumstances where the underlying 
contract does not even exist but its non existence is not the result of the beneficiary’s 
fraud.  Such treatment of the autonomy doctrine, it has been argued, is unnecessarily 
literalistic and at times leads to a conclusion that flouts business common sense.  
 
Having noted the problem with the perception of the autonomy doctrine, it is to be 
stressed that the obligation of an issuing bank or a confirming bank to honour a 
beneficiary’s complying presentation under documentary credits admits of certain 
exceptions which have either been recognised or received favourable comments in 
common law jurisdictions such as England, Singapore, Australia, Canada and 
Malaysia. Such exceptions, which this thesis has sought to analyse, include fraud, 
nullity, beneficiary’s recklessness in presenting document(s) forged by a third party, 
unconscionability, illegality, and express contractual restriction on the beneficiary’s 
right to draw on the credit.  
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With regard to fraud, it has been argued in part of chapter three that one of the fallouts 
of the perception accorded the autonomy doctrine in English law is that the fraud rule 
is very restrictively applied. To restrict the scope of the exception, proof of clear fraud 
is required even at the interlocutory stage. The insistence on the proof of clear fraud at 
the interlocutory stage raises the standard of proof to a point where it becomes 
difficult to invoke the exception in practice for the purposes of injuncting the 
beneficiary whose presentation is alleged to be fraudulent by the applicant. A cursory 
look at the very few cases where the exception has been applied tends to show that the 
courts were more motivated by the demands of justice rather that living up to the legal 
technicalities that satisfy the proof of clear fraud in English documentary credits 
practice. It has been argued that an approach which sets a very high standard of clear 
fraud on the grounds that too much derogation will affect the commercial vitality of 
documentary credits ought to be balanced against some other considerations like the 
commercial and legitimate expectation of the parties.  This suggestion has been 
offered because, in some of the cases analysed, the high standard of proof required to 
establish fraud allows the beneficiary’s claims to be based upon legal technicalities 
(which the standard of proof required put upon the applicant for an injunction) rather 
than on whether the actual presentation is fraudulent. If this suggestion is received, the 
result would be an approach which in most instances defeats the technical issues, the 
insistence upon which hinders the invoking of the fraud rule in documentary credits’ 
practice. The current practice tends to put the beneficiary in an overly strong position 
with respect to obtaining payment. The result is that fraud which ought to have been 
stopped before payment is made to the beneficiary is allowed to succeed and the 
beneficiary running off with a colossal sum of money fraudulently obtained.861 
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 See the enormous letters of credit fraud perpetrated by Mahdev Patel with his Solo Group Industries 
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 Also, in England with respect to deferred payment, a nominated bank that honours or 
negotiates apparently conforming documents in good faith is entitled to 
reimbursement from the issuing bank regardless of any fraud affecting the document. 
In contrast, in the United States under the revised UCC Revised Article 5-109 the 
concept of fraud with respect to the beneficiary is conceived broadly. In particular, if 
at the time of a presentation the issuing bank or confirming bank knows that one or 
more of the document is materially fraudulent, it is within its rights to refuse payment 
regardless of whether or not the presenting beneficiary is innocent. Admittedly, as this 
study has sought to demonstrate, the courts are still to have the opportunity to test the 
validity of the wide language used especially in relation to the immateriality of the 
beneficiary’s innocence. Remarkably the Revised Article 5 of the UCC differs 
markedly from the English position on the question of the right of a forfaiter who has 
innocently taken up apparently conforming but actually fraudulent documents from a 
beneficiary under a deferred payment credit. While in England, prior to the UCP 600, 
such a party is not protected because he is regarded as a party who takes subject to 
equities existing against the assignor/beneficiary- in the United States he is fully 
protected. Despite the UCP 600 apparent alignment of the English position with that 
of America, an uncertainty still remains with respect to an English documentary credit 
that is not subject to UCP 600. In such a case the position is still uncertain as to 
whether to adopt the Banco Santander position or that provided by the UCP 600. 
While from a legal point of view, it is difficult to fault the position adopted in the 
Banco Santander case, as assignees take subject to the equities of the assignor. It is 
however submitted that the American approach which currently has been endorsed in 
                                                                                                                                            
for which he is still currently wanted. See also the letter of credit frauds perpetrated by Zvonko Stojevic 
as the directing mind and will of the company Stone & Rolls Ltd and the difficulty of recovering the 
huge sum involved owing to the beneficiary company being insolvent. 
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the UCP 600 is to be preferred because it is commercially more sensible and protects 
the interest of banks involved in the forfait market. 
 
In other jurisdictions like Singapore, the courts still adopt the restrictive approach of 
the fraud rule as practiced in England. However, in Singapore, the Beam Technology 
case862 departs from the English position by recognising a separate nullity exception. 
The court in Beam Technology863 held that forged documents which amount to a 
nullity should not be treated as conforming documents for the purposes of the UCP 
and should in fact displace the autonomy doctrine. The thesis has endeavoured to 
argue in Chapter Four, after analysing the argument in support and against the nullity 
exception, that a limited nullity exception seems appropriate for two principal reasons: 
first, its stance against the circulation of forged documents that nullities and secondly, 
null documents do not represent conforming documents required under the UCP. 
 
Despite the restrictive approach of fraud and the general rejection of the nullity 
exception in England, the Montrod case864 in England suggested that if the beneficiary 
has acted recklessly in presenting the documents forged by a third party, then this 
might give rise to a defence to a refusal to honour a presentation. While this exception 
may encourage the beneficiary to be more diligent with respect to the document 
presented for payment, the thesis contends in chapter five that the juridical basis for 
penalising the beneficiary without establishing any form of dishonesty on his part is 
somewhat questionable. As noted by Steven Gee, 865  commercial men often act 
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 [2003] 1 SLR 597. 
864
 [2001] EWCA Civ 1954 [2002] CLC 499, 512-513. 
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 Steven Gee, Commercial Injunctions (Sweet and Maxwell 2006) para.15.007. 
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carelessly and selfishly but this should not be a good defence to refusing their 
contractual bargain. 
 
In the absence of clear guidelines on what amounts to commercial recklessness, such 
a rule would be too vague and uncertain. Issues like whether the beneficiary had 
knowledge of the third party fraud will have to be determined. In the absence of clear 
knowledge, it has to be determined whether the beneficiary has foreseen the third 
party fraud and if he has, then to what extent the harm that will be caused is not 
remote from the beneficiary’s point of view. All these issues put together will 
introduce some level of subjectivity and may fall outside the competence of the bank 
called upon to make payment on the tender of apparently conforming documents. 
 
 
In other common law jurisdictions, unconscionability has been held to be an exception 
to the principle of autonomy in documentary credits. The scope of unconscionability, 
considering its equitable origin, is perceived to be uncertain and would introduce 
some level of uncertainty in an area of law where it is argued that certainty and 
precision is paramount.  However, it is argued that where it could be proven, and the 
beneficiary is insisting on enforcing his rights in circumstances where such a right 
does not exist, nothing should as a matter of principle stop the autonomy principle 
being displaced. Chapter six has endeavoured to argue that to insist on the autonomy 
principle as justifying ground for paying the beneficiary in circumstances where to do 
so will be unconscionable ignores the legitimate and reasonable expectation of the 
parties to a documentary credits’ transaction and in reality goes contrary to the object 
which documentary credits was designed to satisfy. This reasonable expectation of the 
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parties played a role in displacing the autonomy doctrine in the case of fraud and 
ought to be taken into account where insistence on the separate nature of the contracts 
will amount to a technical insistence on strict rights where the beneficiary, putting the 
whole issues in perspective, has no right to it. This approach has been followed in 
jurisdictions like Australia and Singapore.  
 
The principal argument against recognizing such exception like unconscionability in 
documentary credits is that its application will be uncertain and generally will affect 
the commercial utility of documentary credits. The thesis has endeavoured to make a 
case for unconscionability on the main ground that the argument of its uncertainty is 
exaggerated. As demonstrated in chapter six of the thesis, most legal terms tend 
towards imprecision but have not affected their acceptance as recognised legal terms 
having full effects in law. More so, it has been submitted that the pursuit of certainty 
has created its own problems. One such problem is that the pursuit of certainty has 
resulted in many cases dealing with the exception(s) being categorised as special. A 
lesson could be learnt from these special cases. If there are special cases that defy the 
certain order of things, and situations when the need to avoid irretrievable injustice is 
such that following the certain order of things will occasion injustice, the lesson is that 
it may be the right time to jettison dogma 866  through the recognition of limited 
unconscionability exception so that the insulated method of payment is shielded from 
abuse. 
 
More so, the argument of uncertainty and destroying the efficacy of documentary 
credits if the exception to the autonomy principle is widened to accommodate 
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 Dogma in the sense that the belief that every legal facts  would conform to established pattern 
remains an illusion and flexibility is required in some circumstances. 
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unconscionability, neglects developments in some other common law jurisdictions. 
Jurisdictions like Singapore and Australia have adopted a wider ground of displacing 
the autonomy of documentary credits by recognizing unconscionability. Specific 
example includes Section 51AC of the Trade Practices Act 1974 introduced in 
Australia to protect business from unconscionable conduct with a scope that embraces 
documentary credit transactions. It is still to be seen that the banking activities of 
these jurisdictions with respect to documentary credits have collapsed due to the 
uncertainty arising from the recognition of these exceptions. More than anything else, 
it reminds commercial parties in documentary credits in those jurisdictions of the need 
for fair dealing and lack of protection where the request for payment would be 
unconscionable. It is suggested that a robust approach that takes into consideration the 
commercial and legitimate expectation of both parties to documentary credits as seen 
in some jurisdictions should be considered in English law with a view on adopting it. 
It accords with the evolving trend to commercial activities, a trend that considers and 
promotes the commercial object, commercial morality, reasonable expectation, and 
fair dealing on the part of commercial actors.  
 
 
The thesis also sought to analyse the illegality defence in documentary credits. While 
the defence of illegality as a ground upon which the autonomy principle could be 
displaced is not in doubt, the distinction as to when the credit itself is illegal and when 
the illegality results from the underlying contract was highlighted in the analysis. As 
demonstrated in chapter seven of the thesis, the thorny issue in relation to illegality in 
documentary credits lies where the illegality in question results from the underlying 
contract. Despite the variety of ways through which illegality may result, it is 
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contended in chapter seven of the thesis that whether illegality in the underlying 
contract will be such as to taint the credit contract in a manner that bars the 
beneficiary from requesting payment against a tender of documents depends on the 
nature of illegality and the circumstances of the case. In this regard, the seriousness of 
the illegality, the knowledge of the beneficiary and a close connection between the 
underlying illegal transaction and the credit are considerations which ought to be 
taken into account before the beneficiary could be barred from payment.  
 
With respect to the exception dealing with contractual restrictions on the beneficiary’s 
right to draw on the credit, the thesis notes in chapter eight that in Sirius Insurance 
International, an express contractual restriction on the beneficiary’s right to draw on 
the credit was held to be a basis for an injunctive relief and could displace the 
autonomy doctrine. The decision reached by both the High Court and Court of Appeal 
in Sirius International 867  that an express contractual stipulations, restricting the 
conditions of draw down is such that displaces the autonomy doctrine is 
commendable as it represents the mutual expectation of the parties upon the opening 
of the credit. The House of Lords in the same case failed to express an opinion on 
whether an express restriction on the beneficiary’s right to draw on the credit was in 
fact a basis of an injunctive relief. The House of Lords stated in their decision that ‘it 
was unnecessary for the House to resolve any issue regarding the so-called autonomy 
principle applicable to letters of credit issued by banks, and the appeal turned on the 
basis of the correct contextual interpretation of non-standard documents.’ 868 
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[2004] 1 WLR 3251 at 3253 (Lord Steyn). 
 
303 
 
Qualifying the autonomy doctrine with the phrase “so called” may be an indication 
that the court, may not have disagreed with the Court of Appeal if the same issues 
which were considered by the Court of Appeal were considered by the House of 
Lords. 
  
Finally, the pursuit of certainty, while a legitimate and crucial aspect of documentary 
credits law, need not completely disregard the consideration of fairness which is 
implicit in the cases categorised as special cases. The thesis has sought to argue that 
there is nothing special about the cases that have displaced the autonomy doctrine on 
grounds other than fraud and illegality which have been referred to as special. But 
implicit in these decisions are responses of the courts motivated by fairness and 
avoiding irretrievable injustice but constrained by the current position of the law 
which fails to acknowledge such grounds as exceptions to refer to the cases as special. 
These decisions, which seek to preserve and promote the legitimate expectation of 
commercial parties, most often run contrary to established authorities. They also 
remind us that a flexible approach to the autonomy doctrine and its exceptions meets 
the expectation of parties. The thesis argues that, apart from fraud, exceptions like 
unconscionability, illegality, and beneficiary’s express contractual restriction, should 
be capable of displacing the autonomy doctrine. Viewing the autonomy doctrine as an 
assurance of payment inflexibly detached from the underlying contract upon which it 
is based would sometimes present situations where  the approach does not live up to 
commercial realities. Unless such perception of the autonomy principle is 
discontinued, we would not cease to see cases relying on such legal ratio like “this is a 
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special case or to avoid irretrievable injustice” as the grounds for justifying their 
departure from the recognised exception(s).                                                                    
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